

THE ANDOVER REVIEW

VOLUME XIV.—PUBLISHED MONTHLY.—NUMBER LXXXII.

OCTOBER, 1890

CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. SUNDAY-SCHOOL BIBLE STUDY. <i>Rev. Erastus Blakeslee</i>	329
2. THE CONGREGATIONAL USE OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. <i>Daniel Merriman, D.D.</i>	348
3. THE SOCIAL BODY. <i>President Andrews</i>	355
4. PRACTICAL SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES. <i>Rev. Charles M. Sheldon</i>	369
5. SPANISH-AMERICAN POETRY. <i>Rev. Rollo Ogden</i>	377
6. SOME ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW ENGLAND DURING THE PRESENT CENTURY. <i>Miss Annie E. Johnson</i>	383
7. THE DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE IMMANENCE. <i>Rev. John Tunis</i>	389
8. EDITORIAL.	
THEOLOGY IN THE PULPIT	405
MR. HERBERT SPENCER ON THE OBLIGATION OF JUSTICE	408
THE NEW ISSUE RAISED BY THE RECENT STRIKE	413
9. SOCIAL ECONOMICS.	
I. THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY. PART II. THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL CLASSES. <i>Professor Tucker</i>	417
II. SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES. <i>Professor D. Collin Wells</i>	422
10. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.	
Baldwin's Handbook of Psychology, 425. — Smyth's Personal Creeds, 426. — Hovey's An American Commentary on the New Testament, 429. — Simcox's The Language of the New Testament, 430. — Butler's The Fourfold Gospel, 432. — Stowe's Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe, 432.	
11. GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE. <i>Rev. Mattoon M. Curtis, M.A.</i>	435

BOSTON
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY

NEW YORK: 11 EAST SEVENTEENTH STREET

The Riverside Press, Cambridge

LONDON: WARD, LOCK & CO., WARWICK HOUSE, SALISBURY SQUARE

Entered at the Post Office at Boston as second-class matter

TERMS—SINGLE NUMBERS, 35 CENTS

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, \$4.00


"I advise all parents to have their boys and girls taught shorthand writing and typewriting. A stenographer who can typewrite his notes would be safer from poverty than a great Greek scholar." — CHARLES READE on "*The Coming Man*."

REMINGTON STANDARD TYPEWRITER.



For Fifteen Years the Standard, and to-day the most perfect development of the writing machine, embodying the latest and highest achievements of inventive and mechanical skill. We add to the Remington every improvement that study and capital can secure.

WYCKOFF, SEAMANS & BENEDICT,
NEW YORK.



IF YOU WANT A PIANO,



Write us, mentioning this magazine, and we will mail 100-page Catalogue free, giving valuable information. We make it easy to deal with us wherever you live. Prices most reasonable for strictly first-class Pianos. Easy Payments everywhere. Old Pianos taken in exchange though you live 1,000 miles away. We guarantee satisfaction, or Piano to come back at our expense for railway freights both ways.

IVERS & POND PIANO COMPANY,
183 Tremont Street, Boston, Mass.

ESTERBROOK STEEL PENS



Leading Nos.: 14, 048, 190, 195, 393, 161.
For Sale by all Stationers.
THE ESTERBROOK STEEL PEN CO.
Works, Camden, N. J. 25 John St., New York

The Life of Dorothea Lynde Dix.

By FRANCIS TIFFANY. With a Steel Portrait. Crown 8vo, \$1.50.

As the founder of vast and enduring institutions of mercy in America and in Europe, Miss Dix has no peer in the history of Protestantism. Mr. Tiffany tells her remarkable story with excellent judgment and skill.

* * * For sale by all Booksellers. Sent, post-paid, on receipt of price by the Publishers,

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO., Boston.
11 East 17th Street, New York.



CINCINNATI BELL FOUNDRY CO.
CINCINNATI, O., sole makers of the "Blymer"
Church, School and Fire Alarm Bells.
Catalogue with over 2500 testimonials.



THE
ANDOVER REVIEW:

A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XIV.—OCTOBER, 1890.—No. LXXXII.

SUNDAY-SCHOOL BIBLE STUDY.

THERE is almost no subject of more importance to the churches than how the nearly 10,000,000 Sunday-school teachers and scholars in our land shall study the Bible. For almost seventeen years past they have for the most part studied it according to a system devised by the International Sunday-school Committee, which consists of fifteen of the leading clergymen and laymen of the various denominations in America, some of whom have served during the whole period, and many of them during most of it. At the recent International Sunday-school Convention in Pittsburgh, Pa., their work, now on its third term of seven years, was most highly commended; and it was enthusiastically voted to continue substantially the same committee and the same system of lessons for another period of seven years, or until the year 1900.

The writer had several years' experience as scholar and teacher, in four different Sunday-schools, before the advent of the International Lessons, and well remembers the miserable plight in which our Sunday-school instruction was at that time. He is therefore profoundly grateful for the great advance which has been made under this system. It is needless to speak its praise. The results accomplished through it are more than sufficient to justify and honor the work that has been put into it.

In their report rendered at Pittsburgh, the committee, while positively of the opinion, in which they are undoubtedly correct, that this system is the best possible one for universal use, yet say for substance that there may be other systems better adapted for

some schools and classes. It is to some enlargement of the thought thus suggested that this paper is devoted.

I. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. It should be borne in mind that this system, so called, really includes two parts: the *system* of study, or the selection of passages to be studied, and the *methods* of study, or the ways in which those passages are presented to the schools for study. The International Committee is responsible for the system only; the question-book makers are responsible for the methods. I wish to speak of each of these in turn, and I feel that I can do so out of some experience, for I was an enthusiastic supporter of this system on its first introduction, and have used its lessons, either as teacher or pastor, from that time until now, and in five separate Sunday-schools in as many different towns or cities; so that I have had pretty full knowledge of their practical workings in various places from the very first; and I have also reinforced my own observations and experience by many inquiries of pastors, teachers, and scholars, among whom I find very general assent to the views herein expressed.

1. *The System.* (1.) This is the simplest and most natural possible; it consists in the selection of the more important incidents and teachings in the Bible, in the order in which they are there recorded, and in assigning them in turn as lessons for the successive Sundays. These lessons commonly have been selected for six months from the Old Testament, and then for six months from the New, although in some instances a whole year has been given to the study of a single Gospel, as, at the present time, to the Gospel of Luke. These lessons are so planned as to present the principal incidents and teachings in the Bible from beginning to end in seven years. Such a system is applicable anywhere, and to all Sunday-schools and classes, whether young or old, learned or ignorant, permanent or transient. It is this feature of it which so heartily commends it for universal use; and notwithstanding all the criticisms which have been made upon it, there is probably no other system so well adapted for uniform study throughout the world.

(2.) That there are many advantages in this uniform study is patent to everybody; I need not enumerate them. The only question is, whether in securing them any injury has been done to the best interests of individual schools and classes. The widespread feeling of discontent with this system at the present time would seem to indicate that such is the case. Many persons, having used it for from fifteen to seventeen years, feel that there is

too little progress in it, that their knowledge of the Bible acquired under it is not what it ought to be after so many years of study, and that in their methods of Bible study they have fallen into ruts, out of which they are anxious to get. Many attempts to satisfy the demand for something different have been made of late; among them may be mentioned Professor Harper's "Inductive Studies;" the "Practical Lessons" published by David C. Cook & Co., of Chicago; the studies offered by Professor Beardslee of the Hartford Theological Seminary, and the independent courses which are used in various schools.

(3.) It is to be regretted that the Pittsburg Convention did not see its way clear to advise the committee to provide, if possible, some other system as supplementary to this, or in addition to it, for the use of such schools as might prefer it. Such a system, historical, or chronological, or topical, or doctrinal, or whatever it might be, prepared by the committee, would have obviated the necessity of providing one from outside sources, and would have been received from it by many schools with a welcome which can be given to no similar system presented by any single individual or by any committee of less world-wide reputation. It is, therefore, with many misgivings, and with no desire to antagonize anybody or anything, but only because of a profound conviction that many classes and schools need help in this matter and are ready and waiting for it, and that the experiences and special studies of many years past have laid on me a duty to them which cannot otherwise be discharged, that I venture to offer the suggestions and the system presented herewith.

2. *Methods of Study.* Before speaking of any new system of study, I would add some remarks concerning the methods of study which have grown up under the International system, and especially concerning some defects in method, which I think must be obviated before any system of study can achieve its best results.

Singularly enough, the most important of these defects are found at just the points wherein the methods now used are apparently the strongest. Of these I mention:—

(1.) *The printing of the Lesson Text in the Lesson Helps.* This seems on the face of it to be a most desirable thing; practically, it has almost banished the Bible from the Sunday-school. Try the experiment in any school of a show of Bibles among those present, and you will probably be surprised to see how few bring their Bible to class. Some teachers urge the bringing of

Bibles, but usually without success, for the scholars feel that the portion of Scripture printed in the Quarterly is all that they have anything to do with. The facts that it is there, and that it is *called* the lesson, seem to them sufficient evidence in the case; they believe their eyes and act accordingly; so that what was intended as a convenience has become a stumbling-block.

(2.) Further, the minute study of a short portion of Scripture has led to detailed notes and comments on it. The more exhaustive the notes, the better the lesson help; this would seem like an axiom, and question-book makers have acted on it until some of the best of our helps seem absolutely perfect in this respect. The religious, and not a few secular papers, in their desire to assist in so good a work, have added other notes of their own, until the lesson text is buried underneath the notes and comments on it; and teachers and scholars alike, if they study the lesson at all, almost unconsciously follow the fashion and study these notes and comments instead of the text. That is the natural thing to do, and I am satisfied from much inquiry that very few even of our best teachers attempt much personal study of the Scripture lesson, although they may spend hours in reading the exhaustive, and in many respects most admirable notes, on it, in the "Sunday School Times," and other papers, thinking that by so doing they are studying the Bible, when really they are only studying what various people say about it. It may be said that what distinguished scholars on both sides of the ocean think about the lesson is vastly more important than what the individual teacher or scholar thinks about it. That is true. But yet what each one finds out for himself through his own study of the Word is of much more value to him than any other person's opinions can be. The one process is the *old-fashioned educational one of cramming*; the other is the *modern one of personal investigation*. One is the method of taking one's opinions about the Bible at second hand; the other, the method of studying the Bible itself, and forming one's own opinions. Into so wide a departure from correct methods of study have our schools been inadvertently led in this matter.

(3.) As the natural result of these elaborate notes in the quarterlies, the questions are made to conform thereto, so that the answer to almost every question is found in the quarterly itself. Children say they have no need to study the lesson because the answers are all in the book. If teachers ask the questions in the book, the scholars glance ahead and get the answers; if they do

not ask the questions in the book, the scholars feel that there is no need of studying the lesson in the book, because the answers to the teacher's questions are not there. I believe that one of the deepest reasons for the neglect of study so much mourned about in our Sunday-schools at the present time is found just here: almost everything being done for the scholars, they take no interest in doing anything for themselves.

(4.) The result of this method and system of study is at best but a fragmentary knowledge of the Bible. None of the efforts of the lesson-help makers to induce connected study of the Bible, in connection with the lesson, have amounted to much. The scholars do not regard those context matters as a part of the lesson, but as something dragged in by the question-book maker; and besides, I have yet to find the question-book which puts these things before the scholars in such a way as to make them seem interesting. I do not see how they can be without revolutionizing the methods now in use; nor do I think it too much to say that our young people, therefore, who have been brought up on the International Lesson system, and who after ten or fifteen years of Bible study ought to have acquired a reasonably broad and familiar knowledge of the Bible, do lack really intelligent acquaintance with it. Their ideas of it are confused and ill-defined. They know something about certain things in it, but have no grasp on the book as a whole. Many of them are greatly pained that this is so, and would gladly welcome any system or method of study which would give them a more comprehensive knowledge of it. I should be slow to say this, were I not fully warranted in it by much observation and testimony. Indeed, it is one of the commonest amusements of orators at Sunday-school conventions, to rally their hearers, who are usually among the best informed in our schools, on their ignorance of the Bible. Of course there are other reasons for this state of things, but is it not one important office of the Sunday-school to correct this evil? Does there seem to be any sufficient reason why the study in it should not be planned with a view to educate the scholars in their general knowledge of the Bible, as well as to bring its great truths home to their heart and conscience? This could be accomplished by well-arranged courses of study, but not by treating the schools to fragments of the Bible, and then hiding even those out of sight under a multitude of words. *What our schools most need is to be led into a real, personal study of the Bible itself.*

(5.) The Lesson Committee seem to have this fact in mind

in their Pittsburg report, when they say, "We have never supposed our plan would be the best for a Theological Seminary." Of course not. The ends sought in Sunday-schools and in theological seminaries are quite different; but that would hardly seem to be a good reason why Sunday-school study should not be so planned as to have progress in it, and so as to give the scholars who follow it for a series of years a somewhat comprehensive view of the Bible in its entirety. Or, if that is impracticable or undesirable for all schools, young and old, permanent and transient alike, there would seem to be no sufficient reason why the present system may not be retained as the simplest possible basis of universal Bible study, and yet there be added to it a more progressive, broader, completer system of study for the use of the schools that desire it. *It is largely due to the educational influence of the International System that many schools are now prepared for such an advance in Bible study.* It is because those now administering this system have thought it best to leave to others the task of supplying the need thus created, that the way is open for private individuals to offer help in this matter.

(6.) I think it was never so difficult as now to interest and help a class, for if the Quarterly is followed the exercise becomes perfunctory, and therefore almost useless; and very few teachers have either the time or the skill to digest the vast mass of information and opinion on the lessons in their various helps, and then, studying the lesson itself, to form out of the whole a plan of teaching which shall keep within the lines of the lesson-helps in the scholars' hands, so as to be understood by them, and at the same time have any individual life or spirit. The root of the trouble is — *too much help*. The whole system is, to a large extent, failing of its desired ends through wrong principles and methods. Helps have become crutches on which schools hobble.

II. CHANGES NEEDED. 1. *Changes in System of Study.* It is much easier to criticise the existing system than to propose a better one; but I may be allowed to say that I think that the new system should be arranged in accordance with two central ideas. (1.) It should be *comprehensive and connected outline study of the Bible*, rather than minute study of disconnected incidents in it. (2.) It should be *Christo-centric*, that is, it should in general treat all Scripture in its relation to the Christ. It should, therefore, begin with the life of the Christ himself, and study it comprehensively and as a self-consistent whole, proceeding next to a study of the other parts of the Bible with special reference to

their connection with his person and work. Such a course might include an outline study of the development of the Church of Christ, as found in the Acts and the Epistles, and then go back to a study of the church before the Christ, tracing in particular the historical preparation for his coming, and the development of the Messianic idea. So much of the work would be mainly historical in its treatment of both facts and doctrines, although always seeking to bring the truth home to the heart and conscience. The next step might be to take up the teachings of Christ and the Apostles, especially those which show why the Christ came and the work He accomplished; and afterwards the doctrinal teachings of the Old Testament, showing how they lead up to the Christ; treating all such themes as practically studies in Biblical theology. A five or six years' course of this sort, going through the Bible, first consecutively and historically, and then doctrinally, and all the time practically, could hardly fail to give our Sunday-schools that general knowledge of the Bible which they now so much lack, and which can never be obtained by studying disconnected passages in it, and I see no reason why it could not be made exceedingly interesting and attractive as well as useful. A lesson scheme on the life of the Christ, arranged in accordance with these principles, is described below.

2. *Changes in Method.* (1.) The method, first of all, should be one that would necessitate the study of the Bible itself. It should therefore include large portions of the text for each lesson, and the notes should be few and short; the object being to bring the mind into contact with the Word directly, and to induce original thought on it. Further, the method should be easy and simple, and always interesting. The work laid out should include an examination by the scholar of the text of the lesson, but in such a way that he will enjoy doing it. The basis of this method of study should be, on the editor's part, careful analysis of the Lesson text, so as to get at its really essential facts and teachings; and the framing of questions which do not tell their own answer, but which *lead the scholar to the discovery* of the right answer; they should also be such as to suggest other questions, and such as to lead to some definite and positive instruction in each lesson. To treat lessons in this way is of course no easy task, but it can be done by working on right principles and with sufficient care.

(2.) It was to experiment with a method in accordance with these principles that I prepared April and May Lesson papers on the International Lessons. The method as thus applied to the

International Lessons, although my first trial in just this line, and although considerably hampered by the Lesson topics, which were not adapted to this method of study, was yet a pronounced success. It stimulated study in classes where there was little or none before. It gave them something definite and valuable to do at home, and as a consequence scholars to whom their lessons had long been a bore became exceedingly interested in them. Classes and portions of classes voluntarily came together during the week to study the lesson in concert. So far as I know, there was not a class that used these Lesson papers according to directions who did not enjoy them greatly; and this was just as marked in other Sunday-schools as in my own, and therefore not through my own personal influence.

The most important special features of these lessons were:—

(a) The asking of questions which took in the whole context of the lesson, as well the lesson itself, and which could not be answered without looking up the references, but which could easily be answered by any one with his open Bible before him. This induced study of the lesson and its surroundings in the Bible itself, rather than of notes and comments on it; in fact, it was impossible to get on with the lessons at all without using the Bible.

(b) Another special feature of these lessons, and the one for which they were named "Written-Answer Papers," was the leaving of *blank space for written answers to the principal questions*. This is a very simple and easily worked but (as experience proved) an exceedingly effective device, for the looking out and writing down of the answers afforded just the incentive and direction needed for work at home, and so awakened an unusual interest in the study of the lesson. These answers were then compared in class, and became the basis of oral questions and discussions.

This peculiar characteristic of these studies is a new feature in regular Sunday-school work, and is in harmony with modern day-school methods. Such work may seem to be difficult, but it is not; nothing was asked or expected in these lessons which could not easily be done by any Sunday-school scholar, in his teens or upwards, who would take the questions up in order and look in the Bible for the answers; and furthermore, the very doing of this added new zest to the study of the lesson. Actual and comprehensive Bible study became to many, in this way, a new and most blessed experience. The time required on each lesson was from

one to two hours, or not more than is required for any reasonably satisfactory study of the lesson in the ordinary way.

(3.) Notwithstanding the success of these papers, it was impossible for me to keep them up from month to month, in connection with all my parish duties, doing the work, so to speak, from hand to mouth, and besides I wished to apply the method to a different system of study; I therefore suspended the publication of the papers until the beginning of another year.

III. LESSONS PROPOSED. As the basis of such a system as I have suggested, I have laid out a year's Sunday-school lessons on the life of Jesus the Christ, in ten parts. *In preparing these lessons, I have selected those incidents in his life which mark the principal steps of progress in its historical development, and about these as centres, when necessary, have grouped other closely related events and teachings; so that the year's lessons, taken together, present a comprehensive outline view of his whole life, from the time when the Word became flesh until He became the ascended and reigning Lord.* It would, of course, have been much easier to extend these lessons over two years than to condense them into one, but there are many reasons why it is better to propose but one year's study of this sort at the present time; one is, that it brings this scheme pretty nearly into line with the International Lessons for 1891, which are occupied during the last half of the year with the Gospel of John, so that both schemes have much lesson material in common, and close the year with the same events, although treating them in a wholly different manner. The scope of this lesson scheme will be best understood by the following abstract of it:—

LESSON TOPICS.

(General statement, subject to revision.)

Copyrighted, 1890, by E. Blakeslee.

NOTES.

OBJECT.—To emphasize the relation of the Christ's life to the circumstances in which He was placed, and to the ends He sought to accomplish.

CHRONOLOGY.—These lessons regard the mere chronology of the Christ's life as less clearly marked in the Gospels and as of much less consequence than its real development. As a matter of convenience, and also because that work is *one of the best and most widely accepted authorities in America*, these lessons follow

the order of events laid down in Riddle's "Robinson's Harmony;" but the notes, when published, will call attention to the principal points of chronological disagreement between this and other authorities.

TITLES. — The part titles given below are intended to indicate, and briefly to describe, the ten principal successive phases or periods of the Christ's life; the lesson titles, with a few obvious exceptions, are designed to mark the principal steps of progress in its historical development; they are to be committed to memory as the lessons are studied.

LESSON MATERIAL. — The facts and teachings to be brought out by the questions on each lesson are suggested by the sub-titles under it. Should the subject-matter for any lesson seem too great, it must be remembered that it is to be considered *in outline only*, and not in detail; to consider Christ's whole life minutely would take many years instead of one.

PART I. — BIRTH AND THIRTY YEARS OF PRIVATE LIFE.

LESSON 1. — *The Word made Flesh.*

- (1) The eternal Word — The Creator. (John i. 1-18; Col. i. 13-17; etc.)
- (2) The Babe of Bethlehem.
- (3) The Doctrine of the Incarnation.

LESSON 2. — *Childhood and Youth.*

- (1) Presented in the Temple; Simeon and Anna.
- (2) Worshiped of the Wise Men from the East.
- (3) Flight from Herod into Egypt, and return to Nazareth.
- (4) Visit to Jerusalem; Jesus' "understanding and answers."
- (5) Subject to his parents.
- (6) Map study: the journeys of Jesus during this period.
- (7) The world into which he came, as suggested by the persons mentioned and the places visited.

PART II. — HIS SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR HIS PUBLIC MINISTRY.

LESSON 3. — *Baptized.*

- (1) John the Baptist, — his relation to the Christ.
- (2) All the facts about Jesus' baptism, and their meaning; compare the various accounts; combine them all into one complete account.

- (3) God's testimony to Jesus, and the reason why he is "well pleased" in his Son. (Heb. ii. 9, 10; Phil. ii. 5-11.)

LESSON 4. — *Tempted of the Devil.*

- (1) The temptations in their order; compare accounts; make one complete account.
- (2) The special force of each temptation; relation of the temptation as a whole to the Christ's person, work, and character; Jesus sacrificed in spirit.
- (3) The nature of temptation; difference between temptation and trial, and between temptation and sin; how could Jesus be tempted?
- (4) Christ's sympathy with us in our temptations. (Heb. ii. 16-18.)

LESSON 5. — *Made known as the Christ.* (John i. 19; ii. 11.)

- (1) The expected Christ, — some prophecies about him.
- (2) Pointed out by John as the Lamb of God; the special significance of this title; its relation to the temptation as well as to the cross.
- (3) Reveals himself to the first five disciples as the Messiah.
- (4) Manifests his glory by a miracle, — water made wine.
- (5) Review: Summary of things revealed about Jesus during this period; a careful mental picture of him as he appears to us at this time, as a basis of comparison with what he was later.

PART III. — THE BEGINNING OF HIS PUBLIC MINISTRY, — A PERIOD OF WORK IN JUDÆA, WHERE HE ATTRACTED MUCH ATTENTION, THOUGH HE MADE BUT FEW DISCIPLES.

LESSON 6. — *At the Passover Feast in Jerusalem, — First Public Appearance; the Cleansing of the Temple, and the Conversation with Nicodemus.*

- (1) Drives the traders out of the Temple; his Resurrection the one sufficient sign of his authority.
- (2) Nicodemus comes to him by night; first recorded teaching, — the new birth.
- (3) Multitudes seek Jesus; his disciples baptize.

LESSON 7. — *Return to Galilee, and Conversation with the Woman at the Well.*

- (1) John's second testimony to Jesus; on John's arrest he leaves Judæa for Galilee.

- (2) The dialogue with the woman at the well ; nature of God ; true worship ; Jesus declares himself the Messiah.
- (3) Review : Summary of facts and truths revealed during this time ; mental picture of Jesus at the end of this period as compared with what he was at its beginning.

PART IV. — THE EARLY GALILEAN MINISTRY, — A PERIOD OF RAPIDLY GROWING POPULARITY.

LESSON 8. — *Begin^s to preach in the Synagogues ; is rejected at Nazareth, and makes Capernaum his Home.*

- (1) Miracle — the nobleman's son.
- (2) Rejected at Nazareth ; the spirit and purpose of his ministry.
- (3) Capernaum ; location, etc.

LESSON 9. — *A Decided Step forward, — calls Four Disciples to leave All and follow Him ; works many Miracles.*

- (1) Miracle — draught of fishes ; "fishers of men."
- (2) A Sabbath in Capernaum. Miracles — Demoniac in synagogue ; nature of the demoniacal possession ; Peter's wife's mother ; many unrecorded miracles.

LESSON 10. — *Enlarging Operations, — First Preaching Tour throughout Galilee with the Four.*

- (1) Praying "a great while before day."
- (2) Many unrecorded miracles ; his fame spread abroad ; great multitudes follow him.
- (3) Miracles — the leper whom he touched ; the sick of the palsy borne of four.
- (4) Matthew called.
- (5) Review : Summary of events during this period ; progress made ; truths revealed ; his prospects ; compare his situation now with what it was at the beginning of his public ministry.

PART V. — THE TURNING POINT, — THE SABBATH QUESTION.

LESSON 11. — *The Beginning of the Deadly Opposition of the Jews.*

- (1) At the "Unknown Feast" at Jerusalem.
- (2) Miracle — the impotent man healed on the Sabbath Day ; Jesus makes himself "equal with God ;" Jews seek to kill him.

LESSON 12. — *The Lord of the Sabbath. — First Secret Plottings against Him in Galilee.*

- (1) Plucking corn on the Sabbath.
- (2) Miracle — the man with the withered hand healed in the synagogue on the Sabbath; Sadducees and Herodians plot to destroy Jesus; he withdraws; crowds follow him; his fame spreads abroad.
- (3) The law of the Sabbath.

PART VI. — CONTINUATION OF THE GALILEAN MINISTRY, —
A PERIOD OF GREAT ACTIVITY AND OF CONSTANTLY IN-
CREASING FAVOR AMONG THE PEOPLE, BUT OF GROWING OP-
POSITION FROM THE PHARISEES.

LESSON 13. — *Advance in Face of Opposition — The Choosing of the Twelve, and the Sermon on the Mount.*

- (1) A night of prayer.
- (2) The Twelve chosen.
- (3) Brief abstract of the Sermon on the Mount, — righteousness, trust, and good works in their relation to the Christian life.

LESSON 14. — *John the Baptist's Last Message.*

- (1) Intermediate events. Miracles — the Centurion's servant; the widow of Nain's son.
- (2) John's message, and Jesus' answer.
- (3) Jesus' estimate of John.

LESSON 15. — *Second Preaching Tour throughout Galilee with the Twelve; Great Multitudes follow Him; no time "so much as to eat."*

- (1) "Woe to thee, Chorazin!"
- (2) "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden."
- (3) Simon's feast; the woman that was a sinner; first anointing of Jesus' feet.
- (4) Journeying with the Twelve, the women, and many others.
- (5) Multitudes gather; his friends think him "beside himself."

LESSON 16. — *First Open Rupture with the Pharisees — they accuse Him of casting out Demons through Beelzebub.*

- (1) Miracle — the blind and dumb demoniac.
- (2) Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit.
- (3) "Woe unto you, Pharisees."
- (4) Multitudes that "trode one upon another."
- (5) The "five sparrows," and the "signs of the times."

LESSON 17. — *A Change in his Method of Speaking, — the First Great Group of Parables.*

- (1) The five parables to the people by the lake, — the sower, the tares, the seed growing secretly, the grain of mustard seed, and the leaven.
- (2) The three parables to the disciples in the house, — the hid treasure, the pearl of great price, and the fishing-net.

LESSON 18. — *Enlarging Operations again, — the First Journey to the East Side of the Lake ; a Notable Group of Miracles.*

- (1) Miracles — the tempest stilled ; the legion of demons cast out.
- (2) Return to Capernaum, and Levi's feast.
- (3) Miracles — the woman that touched the hem of his garment ; Jairus' daughter ; the two blind men whose eyes he touched ; the dumb demoniac.

LESSON 19. — *Third and Last Preaching Tour throughout Galilee ; the Twelve sent out Two by Two.*

- (1) Second rejection of Jesus at Nazareth.
- (2) The Twelve sent forth ; their powers and instructions.
- (3) Finding life and losing it.

LESSON 20. — *The Culmination of Jesus' Popularity — the Feeding of the Five Thousand, when the People would take Him by force to make Him a King.*

- (1) Intermediate events, — death of John the Baptist ; return of the Twelve.
- (2) Miracle — feeding the five thousand ; effect on the people.
- (3) He departs to a mountain by himself alone.

LESSON 21. — *His First Break with the People, — the "Hard Saying" in the Synagogue at Capernaum ; the Passover at which He did not go up to Jerusalem.*

- (1) Miracle — walking on the sea.
- (2) Discourse on the Bread of Life ; the "hard saying ;" the crowds leave him ; disciples remain.
- (3) Review : Summary of facts and teachings during this period ; progress made ; contrast his situation now with what it was when he went up to the "Unknown Feast" at Jerusalem.

PART VII. — A PERIOD OF EXILE IN THE COASTS OF TYRE AND SIDON, AND IN DECAPOLIS, AND IN THE REGION ABOUT CÆSAREA PHILIPPI.

LESSON 22. — *Jesus in Retirement, vainly seeking to have his whereabouts unknown.*

- (1) Eating with unwashed hands; collision with the Pharisees.
- (2) Miracles — Syro-Phœnician woman's daughter; the deaf and dumb man of Decapolis; the four thousand fed in Decapolis.
- (3) Crosses the lake to Dalmanutha; collision with Pharisees and Sadducees.
- (4) Crosses lake again to Bethsaida. Miracle — the blind man who saw men as trees walking.

LESSON 23. — *Alone with his Disciples, He foretells his Crucifixion; the Transfiguration.*

- (1) Peter's confession.
- (2) Jesus first foretells his death and resurrection.
- (3) The Transfiguration.
- (4) Miracle — the demoniac boy.
- (5) He again foretells his death and resurrection.

LESSON 24. — *At Capernaum again; farewell to Galilee; the Seventy sent forth.*

- (1) Miracle — the tribute money in the fishes' mouth.
- (2) How to be greatest — the little child in the midst.
- (3) The law of forgiveness — parable of the unmerciful servant.
- (4) The instructions to the Seventy.
- (5) Jesus' final departure from Galilee.
- (6) Miracle — the ten lepers.
- (7) Review of this period: Summary of its more important facts and teachings; mental picture of Jesus now, compared with what he was at the beginning of the Galilean ministry; his relation to the people.

PART VIII. — APPROACHING THE END, — A PERIOD OF GREAT ACTIVITY AND OF MUCH PERIL IN JUDÆA AND PERÆA.

LESSON 25. — *He goes up to Jerusalem and speaks boldly at the Feast of Tabernacles; First Attempt to arrest Him. (John vii.)*

- (1) People marvel at his boldness.
- (2) Rulers send officers to take him.

- (3) A division among the people.
- (4) Officers return without him, saying, "Never man so spake."
- (5) Nicodemus shows himself friendly.

LESSON 26. — *Still at the Feast of Tabernacles ; calls himself " The Light of the World ; " First Attempt to stone Him.*

- (1) Discourse on " the Light of the World."
- (2) " Before Abraham was I am."
- (3) Attempt to stone him.

LESSON 27. — *At the Feast of Dedication ; " the Man born Blind ; " Second Attempt to stone Him ; He withdraws beyond the Jordan.*

- (1) Parable of the Good Samaritan.
- (2) The Seventy return.
- (3) Miracle — the man born blind.
- (4) Calls himself " The Good Shepherd."
- (5) Jews attempt to stone him ; he escapes out of their hands, and retires beyond the Jordan.

LESSON 28. — *The Return to Bethany and the Raising of Lazarus ; the Sanhedrim resolves to destroy Jesus ; He withdraws again beyond the Jordan.*

- (1) Miracle — the Raising of Lazarus, and the consequent action of the Sanhedrim.
- (2) Jesus withdraws to Ephraim, and from thence across the Jordan.

LESSON 29. — *He begins his Last Journey to Jerusalem ; more Sabbath Controversy.*

- (1) Miracles — The woman loosed from her infirmity, and the man healed of the dropsy, on the Sabbath ; criticism and answers.
- (2) Parable of the Great Supper.
- (3) Bearing the cross after Christ.

LESSON 30. — *Some of the Parables of the Journey ; the Second Great Group of Parables. (Luke xv.-xvi.)*

- (1) The Lost Sheep.
- (2) The Lost Coin.
- (3) The Prodigal Son.
- (4) The Unjust Steward.
- (5) The Rich Man and Lazarus.

LESSON 31. — *More Parables by the Way ; the Third Foretelling of his Death.*

- (1) Parables of the Unjust Judge, and of the Pharisee and the Publican.
- (2) "Suffer little children to come unto me."
- (3) The rich young man, and the Parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard.
- (4) He again foretells his death and resurrection.

LESSON 32. — *Drawing near his Journey's End ; Incidents at Jericho ; the Two Blind Men and Zacchæus.*

- (1) Ambitious requests of James and John.
- (2) How to be chief in Christ's kingdom.
- (3) Miracle — the two blind men at Jericho.
- (4) Zacchæus, and the Parable of the Pounds.

LESSON 33. — *Arrival and Supper at Bethany.*

- (1) The Supper, and the second anointing of Jesus' feet.
- (2) Crowds visit him and Lazarus ; the chief priests consult how they may destroy Lazarus also.
- (3) Review of this period : Summary of events since his arrival at Jerusalem at the Feast of Tabernacles ; the most important teachings of this period ; Jesus' position at its close.

PART IX. — THE CLOSING WEEK, — THE LAST PASSOVER OF HIS PUBLIC MINISTRY.

LESSON 34. — *Sunday and Monday ; the Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem, and the Second Cleansing of the Temple.*

- (1) The entry, and the return to Bethany.
- (2) Miracle — the barren fig tree.
- (3) He drives the traders out of the Temple, and returns again to Bethany.

LESSON 35. — *Tuesday ; the Last Day of his Public Ministry ; Discussions in the Temple ; the First Attack on Him, — the Chief Priests question his Authority, and He answers them in Parables.*

- (1) "By what authority doest thou these things?"
- (2) Jesus' reply, — the parables of the Two Sons ; the Wicked Husbandmen, and the King's Son.

LESSON 36. — *Tuesday's Discussions in the Temple continued ; his Enemies change their Tactics, and try to entrap Him with Questions.*

- (1) The Pharisees ask about tribute to Cæsar.
- (2) The Sadducees ask about the resurrection.
- (3) The lawyer asks about the great commandment.
- (4) Jesus' question about the Christ ; the Jews silenced.

LESSON 37. — *Tuesday continued ; Jesus, having silenced his Enemies, upbraids them ; the Close of his Public Ministry.*

- (1) " Woe unto you, hypocrites ! "
- (2) Lamentation over Jerusalem.
- (3) The widow's two mites.
- (4) Greeks that desire to see him.
- (5) His last public words.

LESSON 38. — *Tuesday Evening ; Jesus' Final Withdrawal from the Temple, and Discourse to his Disciples on the Destruction of Jerusalem and the End of the World.*

- (1) Destruction of the city foretold.
- (2) The signs of his second coming.
- (3) Parables of the ten virgins, and of the five talents.
- (4) The judgment day.

[NOTE. On Wednesday Jesus probably rested at Bethany.]

LESSON 39. — *Thursday Evening ; the Passover Meal and the Lord's Supper.*

- (1) Judas' treacherous bargain with the Jews.
- (2) Preparations for the Passover.
- (3) Incidents in the Passover meal.
- (4) Lord's Supper instituted.

LESSON 40. — *Thursday Night ; Christ's Last Words to his Disciples.*
(John xiv.-xvii.)

- (1) Discourse in the upper chamber ; the Holy Spirit promised.
- (2) The closing prayer.

LESSON 41. — *Thursday-Friday ; Midnight in the Garden of Gethsemane.*

- (1) Christ's prayer and agony.
- (2) The arrest ; Miracle — the High Priest's servant.
- (3) Led away for trial.

LESSON 42. — *Friday Morning ; the Five Trials, — Two by the Jews, and Three by the Romans.*

- (1) Preliminary trial before Caiphas ; Peter's denial.
- (2) Trial and condemnation by the Sanhedrim.
- (3) First trial by Pilate.
- (4) Trial by Herod.
- (5) Second trial and condemnation by Pilate.

LESSON 43. — *Friday continued ; the Crucifixion and the Entombment.*

- (1) Scourged and mocked.
- (2) The "seven words" on the cross.
- (3) Dead and buried.
- (4) Review : Daily calendar of the principal events and teachings of the closing week.

PART X. — THE RISEN AND ASCENDED CHRIST, — THE LORD OF GLORY.

LESSON 44. — *The Five Appearances of Jesus on his Resurrection Day.*

- (1) The guard at the tomb.
- (2) The angel and the earthquake.
- (3) Jesus alive again. He appears (1) to the women at the sepulchre ; (2) to Mary Magdalene ; (3) to Peter ; (4) to the two at Emmaus ; (5) to the Eleven at Jerusalem.

LESSON 45. — *The Five Appearances of Jesus during the Forty Days from his Resurrection to his Ascension.*

- (1) To the Eleven, Thomas being present.
- (2) To seven disciples on the shore of the lake. Miracle — the second draught of fishes ; command to Simon Peter.
- (3) To above five hundred at once on a mountain in Galilee.
- (4) To James.
- (5) To the Eleven at Jerusalem.
- (6) His parting commands and promises.

LESSON 46. — *The Ascended and Reigning Lord.*

- (1) The Ascension.
- (2) At the right hand of God exalted. (Acts ii. 32-36 ; Phil. ii. 8-11.)
- (3) Heavenly hallelujahs, — worship of the Lamb that was slain. (Rev. v. 7.)

348 *The Congregational Use of the Christian Year.* [October,

LESSON 47. — *Review of Lessons 1 to 10, or to the Close of the Early Galilean Ministry.*

LESSON 48. — *Review of Lessons 11 to 21, or from the Turning Point until the Break with the People.*

LESSON 49. — *Review of Lessons 22 to 33, or from his First Going into Exile to his Final Going up to Jerusalem.*

LESSON 50. — *Review of Lessons 34 to 46, the Closing Week ; Resurrection and Exaltation.*

NOTE 1. — Two Sundays are left for Christmas, Easter, Missionary, Temperance, or other special services, as the school may desire.

NOTE 2. — It is my purpose to have these lessons in readiness for use during the coming year, *provided the proposition to print them meet with sufficient encouragement* ; and to treat them in the manner used in my Written-Answer Papers above described. I use this method partly because I believe it to be theoretically correct, and partly because it has been found successful. The question papers can, however, be used in the ordinary way by any who do not choose to write the answers. From the deep interest shown by all whom I have spoken with on the subject, and the readiness in many quarters manifested to adopt such a course of lessons for schools and classes in case they are issued, I believe that their publication would supply a long-felt need, and be gladly welcomed by many Sunday-schools and classes. The nearest approach to anything of the sort is in the various Normal Class Outlines, none of which are adapted for ordinary Sunday-school work. *Further information on this subject can be had of the undersigned. Correspondence solicited.*

Erastus Blakeslee.

SPENCER, MASS.

THE CONGREGATIONAL USE OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR.

ONE of the greatest of the undeveloped, or imperfectly and irregularly developed, functions of our Congregational churches is worship. In respect to this our inheritance from the Puritans, for reasons that need not be entered upon, was meagre and forbidding, putting us out of sympathy with historic Christianity.

In comparatively recent years this defect has been generally recognized, and sincere attempts have been made in many directions to remedy it — not all of them, however, marked by historical knowledge, good taste, or liturgical feeling. Still the aim has been good. The heart of the people has asserted its right, sometimes crudely, to fuller, richer, more varied and pronounced public expression of the great emotions of penitence, adoration, and

thanksgiving. Music has begun to claim its rightful place, not, however, without many discordant and mischievous errors which were to be expected, and which are hard to eradicate. The reading or chanting of the Psalms, the repetition of the Lord's Prayer, of the Apostles' Creed, and sometimes of the General Confession by the congregation, have served a valuable purpose in bringing the people into sympathy with one another and with the church universal, while they have developed and cultivated, especially in our children and youth, those indefinable and deep-lying Christian sentiments in which, by the divine Spirit, character and conduct are mysteriously rooted.

In connection with all this, and with a great, but often misguided movement towards a more worshipful church architecture, there has sprung up without any deliberate intention, but by a common influence, a general observance of the two greatest festivals of the Christian year, — Christmas and Easter, — and this fact in the face of the most pronounced traditions of the elders. The religious observance of these two festivals has taken a very strong hold on our people. No services are better attended, no sermons listened to with more interest, than those connected with these two days.

Somewhat allied with this movement there has come the establishment of the Week of Prayer, Children's Sunday, and Hospital Sunday, and the disposition to unite and concentrate Christian forces in evangelistic efforts at fixed times.

Now there are certain good reasons for all this, in glancing at which for a moment we shall perhaps be able to discern also the spiritual advantages likely to accrue to our churches by a further observance of the Christian year.

1. This new interest in worship and in the observance of Christmas and Easter is the perfectly natural and indeed, we may believe, divinely inspired effort of the Christian community to supply the loss caused by the overworking of the dogmatic side of Christianity. It has come in connection with the disturbance of dogmatic belief and the loss of interest in the theoretical, as distinguished from the historic, vital, and practical aspects of faith. Feeling and conduct, as well as thought, the inspiration of personality, and sympathy with the great events and examples of the past, as well as dogma and philosophy, are needed for the founding of the Christian habit, and the development of the Christian life. Our churches are discovering this, hence the reaction against metaphysical preaching, and the hunger

for worship, for the personal and historical aspects of Christianity. The reaction is healthful and hopeful. It is the child of the Puritan entering into the inheritance which his fathers unfortunately felt themselves compelled to leave.

2. The interest in the observance of the chief festivals of the Christian year is also partly awakened by the desire for union with other Christians upon the great essential facts of Christianity, and it tends to promote that union. Notwithstanding the pleasant boast of one of our most gifted writers, that while others claim to have the historic episcopate, ours is prehistoric, we are practically more narrow and provincial in our ecclesiasticism than we like to admit. Doubtless we have many advantages. We stand for certain truths, but there is a savor of separation, of sect, of non-conformity, which is out of harmony with the larger spirit of Christianity. We can hardly expect Puritan Congregationalism, pure and simple, with its traditions of individuality, of separateness, to furnish an adequate platform for Church unity. It may contribute something worthy. But when we find ourselves observing heartily and joyfully Christmas and Easter we discover at once a sympathy with the great historic churches, and tacitly admit that the Christian year opens channels to us that had been closed, and furnishes a very natural and beautiful common ground for us and these churches. However diverse our dogmas or polity, we understand each other, and sympathize most deeply as Christians when we join in the Gloria in Excelsis about the cradle of Jesus, or sing our praises over his empty sepulchre. We surrender nothing worthy as Congregationalists by thus uniting with our brethren. We believe in an incarnate and risen Lord as well as they. The hopes and mysterious influences that are stirred by his birth and resurrection, by his ascension, and the coming of the Holy Ghost, thrill us as well as them. Why may we not go further and unite with our brethren in observing the Advent, and the temptation and passion of our Lord? Why may we not profitably make Good Friday, with all its moving associations, our great annual fast day, and Whitsuntide the fixed period for seeking the reviving influences of the Holy Spirit?

If it be replied that these are exactly the things against which our ecclesiastical ancestors protested, and which they cast off, then two things are to be said, first, that it was not from these things that they separated, but from abuses that had gathered round them; and, second, that the conditions are now wholly changed: that while then independence and separateness were the only

refuge and a virtue, to-day they are almost a crime, and their opposites a necessity.

3. The observance of the Christian year is both stimulated by the fresh interest in the life of Christ and promotes that interest. "Christianity, both as a creed and as a life, depends absolutely upon the personal character of its Founder." As the chief attention of criticism, and so necessarily of theology, and thus of the actual Christian life, is more and more concentrated upon the story of the Gospels and upon the portrait and life of the Divine Man therein set forth, such an annual following of that life in study, worship, and practical application to our own conduct as the felicitous ordering of the Christian year affords becomes more attractive and useful. It tends to fix attention on that which is simple, primary, and essential to the faith. It incites personal affection and loyalty to Jesus, and lifts Him up, as an example and inspiration, in daily conduct. In this way the Christian year tends to bring Christians out of the abstractions of theory and opinion into the region of life. It makes our religion more real and vital, because closer to the life and person of our Lord.

4. The observance of the Christian year naturally tends to relieve us of that uncertain, restless, and arbitrary way of arranging for special services and periods of religious activity which is often now so distracting and wasteful. There is tacit agreement that we must have times and seasons for rejoicing, for penitence, for confession, for revival. But the appointment of them is left to chance; the observance of them to gusts and freaks of feeling. Many churches feel the need of making the autumn a time of spiritual preparation. Why should we not all agree to observe the Advent regularly at such a time, and concentrate attention upon this? The Week of Prayer was established from a sense of the necessity of a fixed and regular period in which all could unite in confession, repentance, and supplication for the divine favor. As such, the Week of Prayer constitutes a very strong argument for Lent. But it is a very arbitrary appointment, unfortunate and impracticable in its time, artificial in its suggestions and associations. So of the Day of Prayer for Colleges. Why should not the regular observance of Lent by our churches helpfully take the place of these two appointments, and, indeed, by bringing our churches into sympathy with other Christians, make this period of repentance and revival much more effective? And if especial evangelistic efforts are to be made in our churches, let them not be made suddenly by fits and starts, at odd and acci-

dental times, but regularly and soberly in connection with these occasions of the Christian year.

What with the constant craze for new organizations, and original methods and fresh appliances for Christian work, our churches are becoming bewildered and their forces scattered and frittered away in change. The further observance of the Christian year would be in the direction of a check upon this dissipation, and of concentration and conservation. Our Sunday-school work would be vastly improved if, instead of the arbitrary hop, skip, and jump method of selecting the lessons which now prevails, some attention could be paid to the systematic study of the life of Christ, the history of the church, and the meaning of faith in connection with the festivals of the Christian year. The individual minister would gain some relief from the distractions which now oppress him. His themes would be chosen with more point, and his whole year's work would have more consistency and effect.

Moreover, neighboring churches would have more interest in one another's work, and could plan it more in harmony and sympathy. As Cardinal Newman so beautifully points out, six months of each year, from Advent to Trinity Sunday, would be the period of struggle, of work, of effort in Redemption; and the remaining six months, from Trinity Sunday to Advent, would be the period of growth, of joy, of peace,—of peace in believing.

5. We may well go further in the observance of the Christian year for the sake of our children and youth. We can hardly understand how the Puritan child two hundred years ago got on without any Christmas or Easter. It is true that he did, but then he did not have to contend with the disadvantages of the modern child. He had his own simple resources, and they served him well. But our children have a different outlook on a different world and far different proximate ends to serve, though none the less noble and necessary. There is the same Bible, but it must now be read with very different eyes; the same Gospel, but it must be studied with different tools and methods; the same history of the church, but it discloses greater treasures and different lessons; the same Jesus Christ, "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever," but He is drawing nearer to man, to society, to life, to claim them more simply and directly for himself.

The Christian year, with its beautiful literature, its divine associations, telling significantly year by year his mysterious and

thrilling story, contains treasures, avenues, and inspirations to a larger, simpler, and more serving spiritual life, which we shall be blameworthy if we keep hidden from our children and youth, when they, in this day of specialties, subdivisions, and distractions, need all that they can get of sobering and steadyng association and tradition.

Turn now to the other side for a moment. No doubt there are many objections which will arise to any further observance of the Christian year. Let us glance at two or three of these : —

1. It will be said that there is a dislike in the minds of most Congregationalists of such observance, and a prejudice against the churches that practice that observance, and that such dislike and prejudice are natural, and mean something from the point of view of our history. It will be said that it is hardly worth while to oppose this dislike and prejudice by the effort to introduce customs and imitate ways that are unsuited to "the genius of our denomination," as it is called.

The reply is, that such dislike and prejudice have not availed to keep our churches from the observance of Christmas and Easter, and that so far as they exist they are a hindrance to us and we should endeavor to remove them. Our churches and ministers will be broader, more catholic, more effective, and more disposed to act a useful part in Christian unity if they do not hold themselves aloof from a movement which is affecting all classes, and of which the disposition to observe the Christian year is a significant exponent.

2. It will be said that this observance, history shows, makes formal and unspiritual Christians, who stay themselves much upon times, seasons, and services, but lack moral earnestness and vital religion. No doubt there is some force in the objection ; but it proves too much, and applies equally to all forms and fixed appointments of worship, to the Week of Prayer, to the international system of Sunday-school lessons, to the week-day prayer-meeting, to the Sunday service. Carried to its extreme, it would make us all Quakers, who without forms are in many cases the greatest formalists. Absence of regular times and methods of worship does not necessarily produce piety, nor does their presence necessarily hinder it. On the contrary, all life presupposes form and method, and as the Christian life of the community becomes richer and more varied, form and method become more essential. Our only care should be that they are kept subordinate, — that they minister, and are not ministered unto.

3. A more serious objection is that the temper of the times is towards superficiality and show rather than towards substance, that there is a passion for æsthetic effects rather than serious thoughtfulness, and that there is an insatiate and debasing lust for entertainment, which constantly seeks to make even religion and religious services tributary to it.

The reply is that the spirit of which these things is a manifestation is not in itself essentially vicious; that it comes as a perfectly natural and healthy reaction from the austerity of the fathers; that it is not to be crushed by direct opposition; that it will have some channel; that we need for it a larger vessel than the old barn-like meeting-house, cold, and shut all the week, with its dry, frigid, and dolorous services; and that the reasonable observance of the great seasons and festivals of the Christian year, with its varied and richer outlook and worship, furnishes the best reasons for training and conserving to the highest ends this vigorous spirit, and tends to save it from landing our youth in a lot of vanities miscalled religious and Christian, but really essentially vain, worldly, and unspiritual.

It is worth while to make a few practical suggestions respecting the observance of the Christian year in our churches:—

1. Let the minister prepare the people for it by a clear statement of its meaning, of the spirit with which it should be entered upon, and the results to be hoped from it.

2. Let the spiritual aspects of the whole observance be constantly kept uppermost, and the people be made to feel that it affords a great opportunity and means for repentance, for revival, for amendment of life, for growth in grace, for active and consecrated service of Christ.

3. To this end let the preaching be of the most direct, pungent, and vital character, care being taken to map out the subjects beforehand in such a manner as to bring the great and perennially attractive events and aspects of the life of Christ and the work of redemption into the strongest light, and to apply them directly and spiritually, so as to secure clear and helpful results in conduct and character. The sincere effort to do this will lead preacher and people into fresh fields, with a great wealth of new material, close to life and thought, will touch incidentally the most vital questions of the hour, will relieve the pulpit from its incessant perils to be on the one hand dry and on the other sensational, and will keep the people constantly in a revived state.

4. Do not undertake too much at first. To the observance of

Christmas and Easter, as now established in most of our churches, add Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, and Whitsunday, with an effort through the whole of Lent to make the Sunday services and the week-day meeting tell upon the great themes of repentance and faith. Passion Week might well be observed by a daily service. Yet care should be taken not to overwork, or run too far ahead of the people, but to keep their interest at every step. The first efforts will probably result in disclosing the indifference of the people to any sustained spiritual exercises. This discovery is itself salutary.

5. So far as possible, get some neighboring church to unite with you, one of your own order, if convenient, but, better still, a liberal-minded Methodist, Baptist, or Episcopal flock, and if you can succeed thus in getting one or two other denominations to combine in a few services only, you will find out some new and blessed things as to the power of Christ in human hearts, and the meaning of the phrase, "Communion of Saints." And if the partial development of this hitherto undeveloped function of our Congregational churches in the observance of the Christian year does no more than enable you sympathetically to look over the fences that hedge in your little denomination, into the folds of your brethren, and feel the pulses of their love for the same Christ, it will be worth all it costs.

Daniel Merriman.

WORCESTER, MASS.

THE SOCIAL BODY.

WHAT is man? Mankind, wherein does it essentially consist? The question has been asked and answered thousands of times,¹ yet seems, if possible, actually farther from recognized solution now than when, at Paris, in the morning of the twelfth century, Abelard wrangled over it with his old master, William of Champeaux. The popular anthropology of our time is extremely individualistic, more so than would have pleased the hardest Nominalist of the Middle Age. To most people "Man" means simply a man, Oakes or Noakes or Stiles or Brown or Thompson. "The human race" signifies these and other individuals viewed collec-

¹ For the latest words, see Newcomb, *Principles of Political Economy*, and Jevons's *Posthumous Treatise*, edited by Foxwell.

tively. No vital tie is conceived to exist between them. Each is envisaged as complete in, of, and by himself, a final and round-about entity, an entelechy, in Aristotle's phrase. The notion of "man," as a class, is supposed to have arisen by a process of mental abstraction and generalization, after the formulas put down in the old logic books. We notice, so runs this easy explanation, that Oakes and Noakes and Stiles and Brown and Thompson are, in certain particulars, alike. Observation of so many individuals enables us to collect their common traits. This we do, and, by a mental fusion of these, arrive at our idea of the race as a unit. But it is held that notion is purely subjective, nothing but a creature of our thought. It corresponds to no reality in objective existence. The hard facts in the case are just Oakes and Noakes and Stiles and Brown and Thompson. Their seeming oneness is only a figment of your brain, baseless and volatile.

This atomic theory of man is very old. Plato, so early, felt called to enter the lists against it. The Stoics, not avowing the whole, sanctified a phase of it in their doctrine of a man's ability to defy his nature, his environment, and fate itself. Among the Scholastics, as part of Nominalism, that apprehension of man as a choppy, discontinuous aggregation had proud career. Moderns have encountered it mainly as a phase of liberal political theory and of advanced Protestantism, rife whenever needed as shelter or weapon against oppression in church or in state. Our denominational forefathers flew to it in their revolt against Anglicanism in the days of Elizabeth and James, precisely the days, significantly, when George Buchanan's "*De Jure Regni apud Scotos*" first saw the light. Hobbes, Algernon Sidney, and Locke, as well, stood upon the same atomist platform.

For the dominance of such an anthropology since his day Locke is more responsible than any other writer. Both his general and his political philosophy inculcated it. Locke's influence was the vital breath of eighteenth century Whiggery and dissent in England. Our Revolution was fought through under his inspiration. So was the French, for Lockian ideas had wrought even more radically beyond Channel than in England itself. The French Encyclopædia reeks with their odor. Condillac, Helvetius, Rousseau, Voltaire — what were they but Locke's disciples?

Closely associated with this conception of man as myriad and not monad have come down to us the philosophemes of a law and state of nature, and of government as originating in contract. Thought of a law of nature, a rule of life discoverable by human

insight but superior to human laws, Chrysippus was the first articulately to voice. He and his pupils conceived that sacred code as heritage from a state of nature, lingering vestige of a long-gone golden age. Perfection they judged a thing of the past, though saving elements of it for the individual life: simplicity, symmetry, equanimity, strength, moral order in general, were not hopelessly out of men's reach. Enter the path, sounded therefore the stoic evangel, go back to nature, and thy spirit shall find its health.

Embedded in stoicism, the law of nature doctrine crossed to Rome, to be espoused with avidity, particularly in legal circles. The Roman jurists first incorporated, then identified, it with the *jus gentium*, which they had long recognized already, now accounting for the common elements in the various national codes as so many survivals from nature's ancient reign. This idea of a law above law, a scheme or standard by which all legislation ought to shape itself, became in time the very soul of Rome's great legal system. Wherever the influence of the civil law penetrated it was present. Not a page of the *corpus juris* but shows traces of its touch. Canon law took it up. It colored all European literature. Fresh life inspired it when the Reformation had rent Church and Empire, and a new ground of international obligation had to be sought. It was on the basis of natural law that Grotius built his immortal treatise, the "*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*." Pufendorf, Grotius's pupil, named his greatest work "*The Law of Nature and of Nations*." This is our earliest systematic discussion covering the whole field of public international law. Also from Pufendorf's pen is an able Moral Philosophy, whence a hundred writers, since have borrowed without thanks, entitled, "*On the Duty of the Man and the Citizen according to Natural Law*." These authors simply wrote upon the great topic which was engaging all thinkers during the next two centuries after the Reformation. Buchanan, Hooker, Hobbes, Milton, Sir Harry Vane, and Roger Williams breathed air that was literally charged with the natural law sentiment.

"Natural law, for all practical purposes, was something belonging to the present, something entwined with existing institutions, something which could be distinguished from them by a competent observer. The test which separated the ordinances of nature from the gross ingredients with which they were mingled was a sense of simplicity and harmony; yet it was not on account of their simplicity and harmony that these finer elements were

primarily respected, but on the score of their descent from the aboriginal reign of nature."¹

Accordingly, we find writers discoursing freely of what they assume to have been an actual past condition of our race which lacked all the peculiar marks of civil society, and of a specific crisis by-and-by arriving, when a change was made from the natural to the artificial polity. Hobbes depicts with particularity the primordial situation where, to use his phrase, the only freedom which man can have is "the desolate freedom of the wild ass." Aristotle's dictum touching man as a political animal he ridicules. Original human nature he declares to have been radically unsocial and selfish. So far from being born in or for society, we were dragooned into it by the horrors, or at least the dangers, of bloodiest Ishmaelism.

"Natural laws," says Montesquieu,² "are so called because drawn from the character of our being. To know them we must take man before the establishment of societies. The laws of nature are those which he will then accept." This author, like Hobbes and Pufendorf, essays to separate and classify these laws. The primitive man will, he says, recognize his Creator. So he will seek nourishment. Other beings like himself, owing to his sense of weakness, he at first avoids, but after a while, noticing that they shun him, as he them, he draws near and joins his kind in framing society.

"To supply," says the judicious Hooker,³ "those defects and imperfections which are in us as living singly and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others. This was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies." "But I moreover affirm," adds Locke,⁴ after quoting this, "that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society."

Christianity begot a tendency, which prevailed with some, to locate the ideal or noumenal state of things in the future instead of in the past, to think the righteousness in the world as foregleam rather than afterglow. In this point philosophy after Christ wavered most interestingly. The pagan view triumphed, but with modifications. Hobbes exhibits the state of nature as one of

¹ Maine, *Ancient Law*, chap. iv.

² *Esprit des Lois*, liv. i., chap. ii.

³ *Eccl. Pol.*, book i., § 10.

⁴ *Of Civil Government*, chap. ii., s. 16.

ceaseless war, no sense of obligation between man and man yet existing. Algernon Sidney, Locke, Pufendorf, and Montesquieu regard reason as resident and president in that state, involving the recognition of obligation and the prevalence of peace.¹ Again, Hobbes, Sidney, Locke, and Rousseau agree in locating the state of nature behind us, as a lot which we have left; but while the three Englishmen suppose that, on the whole, we progressed in getting out of it, Rousseau, in true old classic fashion, paints the exit as a fall.

But whether our first estate was hell or heaven, we raised or lowered ourselves out of it by contract. The state of nature knows no crowned heads. If any one is to be exalted, it must be done by general agreement. Under nature, all the sons of Adam are as equal as they are free. The Declaration of American Independence breathes the spirit of this ultra democracy. All are born equal: governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. So reads also the Declaration of Rights by the French Constituent Assembly of 1789, before the Revolution began: all men both free and equal. The terms "free" and "equal" occur together, as well, in the Bill of Rights to the original Massachusetts constitution.

Now these words were not placed in those immortal documents as mere *ad captandum* vocables, but with clear, sober, impressive meaning. Well, indeed, might Bentham see "anarchical fallacies" lurking in them, but they phrased for centuries the dearest beliefs of minds as noble as ever enriched the world. It has been fancied that Jefferson, in drafting our Magna Charta, purposely eschewed the word "free" because slavery was here. But "free" would have been no less truthful than "equal," while both chimed perfectly with the political ground-note of that age. Slave no less than king must be born free by the law of nature, no ordinance of man having validity save over such as consent thereto. And as to the equality proclaimed, it is alleged to subsist not in fortune or power, but only in rights, and only in those rights which are parts of the law of nature itself. This is what was meant by the sway of nature. No man may affect jural authority or superiority over his fellow, because civil rule is not yet, and legitimate civil rule cannot be till some body of human beings wishing to be under it shall say, Let it begin, and shall depute king, archon, consul, or president to execute the behest.

In the system of thinking which I am trying to describe there

¹ The state of nature was the reign of God. — *Pope*.

was one trait more. The rise of political society thus artificially, as moved, seconded, and voted by Oakes and Noakes and Stiles and Brown and Thompson, implies that every individual's full complement of natural rights, except as explicitly surrendered, remains what it was. True, Hobbes alone aside, exponents of the school spoke of certain social obligations as imposed by the law of nature; but even such were always explained as self-regarding, so that for the entire code of a man's social duties, strict and defensive construction was the rule. The centre and norm of right in all things was the individual. The presumption was in each case in his favor, against society. If the whole of us claim aught from one of us, the whole must prove its case beyond possibility of question, or fail and pay the costs.

I have lingered thus at length upon these tenets that we may know and antagonize them at sight. They are viciously dominant still. Their tenacity of life is equal to their perversity. They fill literature, and get themselves uttered in all sorts of speech. To many, like Herbert Spencer, they are as veritable words from heaven, not to be believed only, but fought for to the death. This devotion arises partly from the littleness of attention as yet given to social questions, and partly from the glorious and ever memorable part which the philosophy just reviewed has played in the history of liberty. During the last century and the first half of this, that partial truth served splendid turn, over which I will chant laud and benedictions as high and long as any man living. Complete social revelation could not have done better, probably not as well. But times and needs have changed, and a new set of social facts and laws now calls for emphasis. Half truths fail and mislead us. We must advance from the Old Testament to the complete Bible. The social distresses of our day cannot be corrected, or even comprehended, till a better sociology has become common.

I contest atomism as a theory of man. Pascal has somewhere written that "the whole succession of human beings down all the long duration of the ages ought to be considered as one single human being, subsisting always and comprehending continuously." And if you study men, or a group of them, at any given moment, you have but to probe never so little beneath the surface to uncover aims, tendencies, a life entire, which differ *toto cælo* in both compass and kind from mere generalizations of particular experiences. We are members one of another. Whatever aid the individual may afford us in forming our thought of men as a class,

the class-notion is equally indispensable to an apprehension of the individual. Nor is this so merely in that things are known by their opposites. It is so because in a most important sense the race is one, not as a *compositum* but as a *totum*.¹ The individual, except as parcel and facet of the social body, is a fragment, not a finality.

The social body is like an organism. Its units are so vitally related that, like cells in a tree or in the animal frame, each is both end and means, at once serving all the rest and receiving service from them. So far from being an accident, a somewhat which could be dispensed with, yet leaving man man, this mutual giving and taking is fundamental in man's life. Not only are the powers of the individual as such incapable of development without a human environment, but even if developed they would be useless, having no scope for application. Man is a political animal. It is not good, but death, for man to be alone.

For man to live in society does not mean slavery, as Rousseau vainly pictures, but the reverse. Only in society is real freedom possible. Only in society can individuality itself get free field. As no one of us can live for himself alone, so none can live from or by himself alone. We draw from each other, and still more from the human totality. Oakes or Noakes is far more a creature than a creator of his environment. Your consciousness is fed from that of your kind, which latter is no affair of the here and the now alone, but reaches out by a million lines of spiritual communication to the remotest abodes of men, and back through all the ages and generations past. That collective consciousness, whose beginning and bounds are unthinkable, which never slumbers, sleeps, or ends, is a fact of tremendous import.

When a unity presents, as the social body does, a congeries of parts, forces, elements, no one of which has meaning except in relation to the whole of the others, but each of which finds perfect explanation in that complex, you have all the essentials of an organism. Now, it has been asked, do not the permanent social groups and the social total form real organisms as truly as anything in the animal or the plant creation? Do not these social organisms act and develop according to the same fundamental organic laws as all other organic things in nature, except that here purpose prevails over causality more than elsewhere? Does not the human being stand in the same relation to the social

¹ On the social web, Hyndman, *Historical Basis of Socialism in England*, 73, 99, 100.

organism as each single organic cell does to that of some plant or animal?¹

But habit has associated the word "organism" so much with plants and animals that many teachers disincline to use it of society, and the nomenclature is of no consequence. Certainly the social frame, if you term it an organism at all, is one of an order all its own.² Its realm is higher up than biology. It is spiritual. The power which unifies it is spiritual, too, though operating through physical means, voice, writing, telegraph, and telephone, as well as all those sorts of instrumentalities by which people move from place to place. It is spiritual commerce in feelings, ideas, volitions, deeds, which endows these modes of communication with their supreme worth. I set nothing, therefore, by the term organism in this exposition. Least of all would I seek, with Haeckel, to fill out the hierarchy of organisms by fitting society into its place at the head of them, or to hunt up among the social forms and phenomena a strict match for every organ of the organisms lower down. To call government society's will, the enlightened class its brain, economic processes its digestion and nutrition, and the like, throws no light on the path I am trying to open. Let Comte, Spencer, and Lilienfeld do that work. Much of it will yield truth and fact, much will end in mere analogies.

¹ Paul von Lilienfeld, *Sozialwissenschaft der Zukunft*, I., page 25. Cf. Di Bernardo, *La Publica Amministrazione*, etc., vol. i. 192 seq. The conceptions of natural science have too much colored the thoughts of many recent political writers. C. P. Planta, in his *Wissenschaft des Staates oder die Lehre vom Lebensorganismus*, speaks of the inmost life of the state as its *pysché*, which, he says, has a parallel development with its body. The constitution regulates the dynamic connection between the *pysché* and the powers of the state, etc. Frantz speaks of the "physical essence" of the state, and of the state as in part produced by the "force of nature," though partly also a "moral organism." Bluntschli likens church and state respectively to female and male in the family, and has a chapter on the inquiry whether there is an analogy between the sixteen fundamental organs of man and the sixteen primary organs of the state. Zachariä, Wangenheim, Eschenmaier, and Nibler speak freely of political "anatomy," "physiology," "pathology," "therapeutics," etc. Nothing is commoner than mention of the "organic" parts, relations, conditions, and creations of society. Di Bernardo replies: "With what organ of the animal organism will you compare the judicial power, for instance, or what, in the state, corresponds to the reproductive function of animals? What are the state's organs of sensation?" On the other hand, mere romanticism or metaphysics, mere theorizing about the state, regardless of actual political history and life, is no less vicious than the above.

² On this line of thought I have derived much help from Schaeffle, *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*, vol. i.

But perhaps not all should be regarded as analogy which might at first seem so. The social body undoubtedly does present certain relatively constant forms for the grouping of its parts, a sort of typical morphology in political, economic, religious, and educational organizations. Again, it very significantly arrays its elements — persons and their possessions — into a whole of groups rising one above another in regularly advancing complexity — families, communities, states. There are also tissue-like and plexus-like social layers and combinations, as classes, churches, fraternities, guilds, political parties, schools of thought, and so on. The same organization pervades economic and political formations, giving us our means for production, exchange, transportation, education, insurance, keeping the peace.

The social body, moreover, is alive and active. Out of its own resources it keeps together its parts and processes against all disturbances. But its life is *sui generis*. It is an individuality by itself, physiologically as well as morphologically and anatomically. It works, indeed, through and for its active elements, — individuals and groups of them, — at the same time maintaining unbroken its separate and higher consciousness, handing on mental and material possessions, and making all past generations tributary to all future ones, as single individuals could no more do than they could build worlds.

This omnipresent, supersensible individuality is also in constant process of teleological growth. Earliest human existence is homogeneous and little reflective, determined mostly from without. Thought and self-consciousness presently appear, bringing diversity, migrations, separate races and peoples. Civilizations, ruling ideas, forms of culture, change. Cities and empires rise and fall. Conquerors sweep through the earth, subdue all, then lose all, and are perhaps themselves forgotten. But there is no chaos. Causality is pervasive, and all the world's greatest thinkers, of every school, agree that the ages together display progress, however general and slow. And the advance is toward a moral goal.

But does not Oakes's personality fade out in this transcendent personality if we admit the existence of such? Have we not been talking pantheism? Not at all. That it belongs in a physical organism does not sublate the relative independence of the animal or vegetable cell. This, however, is but an analogue, faint, and even misleading, to the truth I wish to impress. The contents of Oakes's consciousness nearly all appear equally in

Noakes's. Nine tenths of the thinking done on any given day is done by most thinkers in common. Combinations differ somewhat, but the strictly personal elements are few. And it is to be noticed that the truer our thinking is, that is, the wiser we become, the more one man's thoughts must of necessity coincide with every other's. If you and I both conceive "isosceles triangle," our act results not in two things but in one. Prevalence of truth means community of thought. Now this correction and purification of our mental life, which is nothing else but a fusion of various "thinkings," does not in the slightest eliminate specific personality, but perfects it rather. That is, the existence of an immense, ceaseless thought-cosmos above and beyond you, in which you participate according to your measure, and more and more as your powers increase, in no wise affects the reality of your particular being. Nor is the doctrine solipsismus, since there is infinite entity objective to you.

But you will say, perhaps, that this grand oversoul, ethereal, ideal, acting across space, binding together all continents and all centuries, is a manifestation of divinity rather than of humanity, or that if it is a thing of this earth the assertion of it leaves no place for divinity at all. Not so. Really, we have been contemplating only what was very finite. We have not left this planet. Is God so small? The divine, it is true, permeates this higher human life, as it does all life, yet transcending it at the same time.

No one, probably, longer believes in a primordial state of nature in the form so dear to Hobbes and Rousseau; yet nearly the same vagary endures in the doctrine of natural rights, and in a very prevalent manner of distinguishing what is natural in society and government from what is artificial. "Natural rights," exclaims Bentham, criticising the French manifesto of 1789, "is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, — nonsense upon stilts;" and he goes on to argue in the well-known strain, that there are no rights but acquired rights, which originate solely from government.

I cannot accept this extreme any more than the other. It is true that the derivation of civil rule from contract — the assumption of a no-government condition, succeeded by government after deliberation — is pure fiction. Every permanent human community spontaneously and inevitably claims and exercises more or less authority over its members, forcing each, within certain limits, to obey the collective will. We see this in mining camps, cara-

vans, exploring expeditions, and among pirates. Government does not rise out of contract any more than life does, though a particular style of polity may thus begin. Some form of public authority always has been exercised, and always will be, however high a degree of moral, social, or political advancement may be reached. It is not the wickedness of men, which we hope will in time abate, but the permanent finiteness of their knowledge, that forces us to look upon government as an everlasting institution. The perfected state, heaven itself, is to be a kingdom.

But to show that rights cannot temporally precede or outlast government is one thing: to admit that rights have their jural fountain in government is quite another. Those common rights whose immediate source is in the civil authority themselves get their moral stringency, if they possess any, from that higher law of the general good, whereon the public power itself ethically rests. There is, I am convinced, a sound sense in which one may speak of a "state of nature" and of man's "natural rights," namely, that which makes these expressions synonymous respectively with "rational condition" and "liberties accordant with the general good." Rights in this view are, indeed, imprescriptible and absolute. Nor will it do to question the citizen's privilege — his duty even — to pronounce upon laws and governments whether or not they are good, or, on occasion, to resist them.

Yet the popular idea of natural rights is perverse. Its vices are chiefly two. It takes these rights, distributively and specifically, as absolute, and it supposes their scope and that of government to be antagonistic, inversely proportional, in fact. I do not admit that any specific right is absolute. The right to property is not. The right to liberty is not. The right to life is not. Either must give way instantly if opposed to the community's weal. The precious right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience comes under the same rule. Obviously, too, the range of a man's rights may change with the hour and the circumstance. What you are free to do in peace-time you must perhaps forego in war-time. Country people build what and where they will: city people have to ask leave to build at all.

That other so popular view, of a strong and pervasive government as necessarily abridging liberty, is equally false. The precise reverse is true, that, paradoxical as it may seem, state power and personal liberty have widened their scope together. "Wagner's law is valid: historical and spatial comparisons covering different lands show in case of peoples that are going forward in

culture a progressive extension of the activities of the state and of all those other public activities which are effected by self-administering bodies in connection with the state. . . . The state and these bodies assume more and more activities, and they perform both the old and the new with increasing completeness."

In the early middle age of any people little else is expected from the state but protection against foreign foes.¹ In the classic world, till late, the commune was the highest civil authority which its citizens knew. Our word "state" we cannot put over into either Greek or Latin. The classic peoples had no such word, because they had no such thing. Even the Roman Empire never developed solidified statehood, or so much as a clear conception of it. Germany, France, and England, like Greece and Italy, were at first nothing but geographical names.

And when the state had at last begun to be, the individual hardly felt it, whether for good or for ill. A great part of its present functions, church, family, corporation, commune, or guild, then fulfilled. The head of the house once had the power of life and death over wife, child, and slave. The family bore the guilt and avenged the wrongs of its members. All our penal law has grown out of blood vengeance. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was much broader than civil. Exalted evil-doers only the clergy dared discipline. The clergy, whom no civil court could try, regulated all legislation and practice in respect to marriage, divorce, and bequests. Cities, many of them, were miniature republics, each with its own legislation, high justice, finances, and treaties. The guild-like organizations with their *quasi* civil power, conspicuous all through Rome's later history, developed a still ranker life in full middle age. Every university was an imperium. Innumerable bands of lords, knights, and towns were organized, assuming, what all gladly accorded them, the right to maintain the peace. Private international law had its origin and its whole early growth in the Hanseatic League and similar non-political institutions. When popular legislation began, it was long before the right of majorities to bind minorities was conceded. Legislatures, laws, customs-duties, and public debts were provincial, not national.

Now, all this is changed. Family, church, corporation, have quit civil functioning and passed it over to the state. Not only so, but the state has invaded the economic, the educational, and the moral realm, to contest with many a private institution for the

¹ On this and the next paragraph, see Roscher, *Nationalökonomik der Ackerbaues*, Einl. With Professor Wagner, too, the thought is a favorite one.

whole or a part of its business other than civil. The state is to-day expected by every one to look out for its citizens' health, wealth, education, and general culture. How the consequence of the family has been trimmed down! It may neither abuse nor avenge its members, nor control its head in disposing of his property. Professor Riehl traces this enlarged significance of the public to the family in the very structure of the house. The mediæval house presented its end to the street, the modern offers its side. Formerly the family apartments — the hall, the dining-room — were the most important, only alcoves being assigned to the separate members. Now the individual rooms are as spacious as any, unless it be the one or the few set apart for society.

Corporations, guilds, and the like no longer do civil work, and must ask leave of the public authority to perform that which is left them. Common law narrows its sway before the advance of the conviction that the jural directorship must emanate day by day, as it were, from the actual sovereignty. States and provinces lose their old-time independence, while every new constitution that is established adds fresh might to the office of him, be he president or premier, who acts for the great total.

This centralization can certainly go too far. Local self-government, such as our United States Constitution and constitution guarantee, political and social organizations to stand between the individual and the ultimate civil power, must be preserved. But for them, in the phrase of Edmund Burke, "the commonwealth itself would in a few generations crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven."

But equally sure is it that the growth of state dignity and puissance thus far has been a nearly unmixed blessing, no foe, but a furtherer of liberty. In no preceding age have men been politically so free as they are at this moment, so welcome to go each his own way, so little likely to be pushed, jostled, or any wise injuriously wrought upon in the name of the body politic. Never before has individuality been so out of shackles. Men are, indeed, still hampered and cramped in their development, but the causes are social or economic, not political; and while government will clinch none of those trammels which remain, some of them, at least, we may look to see it rip off.¹

If this is so, if the state is no nuisance, but either the cause or a manifestation of man's best life and development thus far, what

¹ To the same effect, Huxley, in *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1888, 176 sqq.

insanity to stigmatize it as an artificial creation! Or, if one will cling to that old contrast of natural and artificial, let him admit that the artificial is superior to the natural, that for society as for any product of manufacture, the course away from the state of nature is the path of progress and perfection. But that terminology is ill-chosen. The developed, the intricate, the far-along, call it the artificial if you please, is not therefore the reverse of natural.

What is the natural, in true conception? Beginning with Aristotle, who, in the second chapter of the first book of his *Politics*, nobly leads us in the doctrine just propounded about the commonwealth as natural, writers, quite down to our own day, use this word with bewildering confusion. Now, they seem to mean by it simply that which is ordinary and in course. But surely an earthquake is natural. Next, the natural is identified with the inevitable, that which comes to pass in spite of any power or wit of man, as the liquefaction of platinum at two thousand degrees of heat, Centigrade. Men often still speak as if supposing material things alone to lie within the compass of the natural. But certainly mental processes may be natural, and so may many results of human volition, as the fixing of prices in open market.

The more intelligent of those who, in their speech, habitually set the natural over against the artificial, probably mean to include in it all effects brought to pass through will, unless specifically purposed — through *voluntas*, yet involving no *arbitrium*. Such thinkers would, for instance, regard the distribution of the precious metals among the various nations, though wholly the work of men's wills, a natural operation; while a law to tax or to prohibit the sale of beer they would characterize as unnatural or artificial, on the sole ground, apparently, of its originating in a particular, conscious purpose.

This notion of the natural bears analysis no more successfully than the others. Is it not natural, pray, for a father to feed his family, for a citizen to risk life for his country's sake, for legislators to enact a good law? What, then, is the natural, and what the reverse? We shall, I firmly believe, find no other tenable definition but this: that the rational is the natural, and the irrational the non-natural, or (in this sense) the artificial. What is the natural? Why, that which is *zweckmässig*, appropriate to the moment, the environment, the agent, the patient, to all and to everything concerned. Things are natural in proportion as they are sensible and for the best. The criterion is painfully indefi-

nite, doubtless. It may not guide you far. But it has this merit, that it is no *ignis fatuus*; it will not pretend to give light where or when it does not actually give light.

"If we are asked, therefore, where the state of nature is to be found, we may answer, it is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan. While this active being (man) is in the train of employing his talents, and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations are equally natural. If we are told that vice, at least, is contrary to nature, we may answer, it is worse; it is folly and wretchedness. But if nature is only opposed to art, in what situation of the human race are the footsteps of art unknown? In the condition of the savage as well as in that of the citizen are many proofs of human invention; and in either is not any permanent station, but a mere stage through which this traveling being is destined to pass. If the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; and the highest refinements of political and moral apprehension are not more artificial in their kind than the first operations of sentiment and reason."¹

E. Benj. Andrews.

BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

PRACTICAL SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES.

THE writer of this paper will be excused, no doubt, if the first personal pronoun is prominent in it. Being an account of his own experience it is almost necessary, for the sake of clearness and simplicity of diction, that he tell the story in his own person.

He begs leave to plunge at once into the subject, with this brief preface, which no one need misinterpret as an apology.

On the 9th of March of this year I announced to my people from the pulpit that for two months or more, by their cordial consent, I should absent myself from all so-called parish work, such as calls, social gatherings, and extra meetings, for the purpose of making personal studies along the line of the common, every-day life of men, in their various trades or professions. My church and parishioners, so far as I know, were unanimous in wishing me God-speed, and allowed this self-imposed vacation from them

¹ Adam Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, section 1.

with the greatest good-nature and a hearty interest in the result of it. During the time of my studies I kept up my Sunday preaching and Thursday evening services, giving to my people on Sunday evenings the story of the week's work exactly as it had been done.

My plan was, in brief, summed up in the motto, "Put yourself in his place," — meaning by "his," "Humanity's." I can best illustrate this statement by telling exactly what I did.

I divided the population of the city of Topeka into eight groups, — the horse car and electric car men, the Washburn College students, the negroes, the railroad men, the lawyers, the doctors, the business men, and the newspaper men. It was my intention to spend a whole week with each of these groups, living as nearly as I could the life they lived, asking them questions about their work, and preaching the gospel to them in whatever way might seem most expedient.

I began with the street car men. I said to myself before I went out Monday morning, "You are to put yourself into the place of those men just as thoroughly as it is possible. For the whole week you are a street car man. You get his wages, board at his boarding-house, and do his work." I spent the entire week on that plan; rode on nearly every car belonging to each company; went over every route, and talked with a large majority of the employees. During the week I wrote some letters to horse car conductors who expressed a desire to see me again. Of that I may speak again. But the entire week was spent in personal contact with the men on their cars, where they lived and did their work. I spent all my loose change in riding over the city, standing on one end or the other of the platform of the car, and getting as close to driver or conductor on the physical and spirit side of his existence as he would let me. I will speak of results, if we may call them such, later on.

The second week, with the college students, was spent with the same motive and for the same purpose. I lived as much of the time as was possible with the boys, — went into their classes, studied their lessons with them, translated the classics with two or three, visited them in their rooms, played ball with them on the campus, asked them all the questions I knew about their plans for future life. Three mornings in the week I announced that I would be in the Young Men's Christian Association college room, and would be glad to meet the students between the periods of recitation for discussion of religious or social subjects.

Nearly every student in the college met me in those morning meetings, coming in from nine to half past one in groups of two or three or a dozen. Incidentally I interviewed nearly all the teachers in the college in one way and another, but my time was mostly given to the students in all the ways I could devise.

Owing to various reasons it happened that my third week, which was to be spent with negroes of the city, extended itself into three. The first week I gave to a personal observation of the homes of the negroes, went into their houses, tried to find out the immediate causes of their destitution where it was specially prominent, and helped as many of the idle ones to get work as I could. The second week I visited the schools where negro teachers and pupils were, and spent most of the time in long talks with the teachers. The third week I gave to personal interviewing of the most intelligent and prominent public negro men in the city. During that week I also made some experiments to test the feeling of the community towards the black man. One of these experiments was as follows :—

It was stated again and again that the negro was not allowed in certain hotels and restaurants. I asked an intelligent, respectably dressed young negro, who was a bookkeeper for a loan company, if he would go with me to different eating-places and see how he would be received. After a little hesitation he agreed, and we first went together to a highly respectable restaurant, and were received and served, so far as I could see, exactly alike. We could not see any difference. To avoid any possible advantage caused by our going in together, we next agreed that he should go to the next place alone, and I would come in a little later. He went to one of the most fashionable caterers in the city, gave his order, and was served politely and promptly. I came in a little after and found him enjoying himself, very much surprised to find matters as they were. We next went separately to another house which, I had been told, refused to let the negroes come in, and there my friend disposed of his third meal with no disturbance except possibly to his digestive apparatus. We then made a move on the city Young Men's Christian Association, and the negro applied for a full membership in the association, while I waited in the reading room. He gave satisfactory references, but after some conversation was politely refused admission on the ground of color, and that only.

I have not time to speak of other similar experiments. Owing to the condition of the negro and the interest attaching to his

position as at present defined in society, I counted the three weeks spent with that group as only equivalent in certain ways to one week spent with each of the others.

I went next to live with the railroad men. In order to accomplish something definite, I narrowed my territory down to the freight department on the Santa Fé Road, and put in the whole week with brakemen, switchmen, yardmen, and freight engineers and firemen. This week I was obliged to put in most of my nights with the men. I went down the road on freight trains, part of the time in the engine cab, part of it in the way car, and part of it on the train as best I could. I spent one night in the yard, going on with a crew at eight o'clock in the evening and coming off at eight in the morning. Nearly all of this time I was in the cab of the switch engine, where I found a little time for conversation with the men. I was favored this week with a general order from the superintendent giving me the right of way on engines, freight cars, or anywhere else if I wanted it.

The fifth week, as I called it (reckoning my three weeks with the negroes as one period), was given to the lawyers. I attended court, read cases, discussed briefs, and interviewed men in their offices. At the end of the week I invited, through the newspapers, the lawyers of the city to come out to the Sunday evening service and see if I had treated them fairly. In answer to the invitation, a large number responded. I do not know just how many.

The following week with the doctors was very similar to that with the lawyers. I read medicine, went with the doctors on their rounds, attended their medical societies, listened to their discussions, and questioned exhaustively about the life of the profession.

The seventh week, with the business men, was mostly made up of personal interviews with representative business men in all departments: dry goods, groceries, hardware, boots and shoes, real estate, books, in short, all business so called. Much of the questioning was done with a view to ascertaining how far firms had investigated or made use of any system of profit-sharing or coöperation. I again, through the newspapers, invited business men in a body to come out to the Sunday evening service, at which I gave the results of the week's work. As before, a large number responded, and the house was crowded as before, but no count was taken.

My eighth and last week was with the newspaper men. I did not know any better way to get close to the life of that group of

men than to become one of them. I applied for a position as reporter on the "Topeka Daily Capital," and was detailed to do the depots, hotels, and suburban work. I wrote several columns for the paper, made the circuit of the city, did up the suburban news and the depot arrivals, besides several runaways, personals, one editorial, and numerous local items. I spent one night in the composing-room and stereotyping and press departments. Interviewed everybody, from the editor-in-chief to the devil, and closed up my labors Saturday night, very thankful that I was neither one nor the other.

Summing up what may be called the results of all this study (if it may be dignified by so scholarly a term) is not by any means an easy matter. But doing it as well as I can at this point of time, which is too close to the actual work to make results definite, I have resolved it all into the following, subject, no doubt, to revision and correction. I will group the results under three heads: 1. *The results to myself.* 2. *The results to the persons with whom I lived and talked.* 3. *The results to my own church as an organization.*

1. *Results to myself.*

In the first place I attempted too much, or rather I tried to carry on two things at the same time. I should have given up my parish work altogether, or else have given two weeks to each group instead of one. To be sure, I purposely neglected (except in cases of sickness and death) my parish visiting and social invitations. But I still carried on my Sunday preaching services and the week-day service. This made me work at too high a pressure. Much of the special work of the week called for night labor, and for several weeks I suffered severely from loss of sleep. There is a limit even to a preacher's endurance. But in spite of this disadvantage, which I do not see how I could have avoided unless I had given up my church work entirely, I received an immense amount of valuable material which I cannot but believe will stand me in good stead in the work of my ministry. I feel that it has been worth much to know a little more closely how men live. It has broadened my thought of men's needs. I am less inclined to judge men harshly or hastily. I find myself from the discipline of those twelve weeks constantly putting myself in the other man's place, and the effect of that is to quicken my sensitiveness to the man's actual needs. I think another result to me is a firmer belief in the power of an applied Christianity to reach men everywhere. So far as I met men (and I interviewed more persons

in three months, probably, than a newspaper man interviews in a year), I did not find one who did not speak of Jesus Christ with respect. Many a man sneered at the church, and found fault with the preacher, but not one had a word to say against the Carpenter of Nazareth.

Another result to me was the increased knowledge, superficial, no doubt, but better than none, of other people's business. I know how an air brake stops a train, and I can describe the process of stereotyping. Now some men might wonder how that could be of any advantage to me in my business as a preacher. But I feel that it is of large advantage. The more I know of a man's business the better I can preach to him. Everything else being equal, the more I know a man on all sides the better I can preach to him, the more good I can do him as a man. It makes no difference if I discover by close contact with him that he is not half so good as I thought he was. I want to know *him*. I feel that I *must* know *him* in order to preach to him most effectively.

The final result of my studies has been the resolve on my own part to get the church to put into actual motion some of the unapplied power of Christianity; to get men back into the divine image through the Christ; to work as a body and individually to remove the distrust that exists between the workingman and the church; and to make of the Christian ministry the broadest possible interpretation of manhood, making of it, first and foremost, a *man-building* business, the great motive power of the preacher being his close, heartfelt sympathy for humanity, his identification with it, and his application of the Christ spirit to its needs.

2. *The result to the persons with whom I lived and talked.*

Here, of course, I do not know with any satisfactory definiteness what the results are. I always had a horror of what might be called "statistics of the soul." I started a correspondence with several working men, some of which has continued. I find in my Sunday evening congregation men whom I have met in my week's visits, and who are not regular church-goers. During the time of the studies, while I was giving a weekly account of them to my Sunday evening congregations, my church, which will seat about three hundred, was well filled, and on the evenings to which the lawyers and business men were invited by special notices in the papers, the room was crowded. What the results may be of the personal conversations held with men whom I have not seen since or met in any way except just for the casual word, I cannot tell. I did not seek spiritual conversation, or religious

as you may call it. Neither did I avoid it. In a great many cases I asked men to tell me what their definition of life was. More than one man said no one had ever asked him that question before. I cannot help believing that a great many persons with whom I talked and lived were helped into more thoughtful, prayerful living. It is at least a source of humble, sincere satisfaction to me that my list of personal acquaintances with whom I do not fear to talk on plain questions of right and wrong is very large and among so many groups of human activity. My only regret is that I cannot meet oftener many of these acquaintances, made during my special work among them. It is the regret of having apparently more friends than I can possibly take care of. I feel as if my parish were limited only by the persons in whom I have grown to have so deep an interest.

3. *The result to my own church as an organization.*

Every Sunday evening the result of the week's work, or the story of it, was told to the church. Pleasant weather and other favorable circumstances combined to make possible the attendance of nearly the entire church membership at every evening service. It has always been my habit to write out everything in full. I so far abandoned this habit as to write out only two of the series, — the one to lawyers, and the one to business men. The rest I told simply as a series of stories, making little or no application, simply telling what I had done, how I had lived, with whom I had talked, what had been said, etc. The result to the church has yet to be seen. This much is already true, as expressed by some of the most thoughtful. The look at the world, away from the local centre about which as a new organization we might too selfishly revolve, has been a broadening look. The advantage of seeing just how the pastor does his work has been an educating process with many who never thought anything about it before. Most of all, the feeling that denominational competition shall have no place in its activity is, I am sure, a feeling which is growing stronger and purer in the church. The desire to get men to Christ, not into our church simply, is, I am quite sure, one of the results to prove itself true in the near future. The needs of humanity, as such, everywhere, larger sympathy for the working man, a growing shame that the church should be avoided by those who need it most, a glowing desire to go out and do personal work for souls, a larger respect for all sorts and conditions of men, — these, in brief, will be a few results to the church, or I shall be sorely disappointed. For it was with all these results in view that I undertook the work just described.

I am inclined to think that the title of this paper is bigger than its contents. *Sociological* has a long and learned sound. It bristles with statistics in every hard-turned consonant, and I might perhaps have done better to select a more modest heading. For it was not my purpose to amass figures relative to wages, to hours' work, or church attendance, or spiritual condition. Somehow I have grown suspicious of those things unless they are gathered with a minuteness and carefulness to detail which were far beyond my power to exercise. I made constant inquiries concerning wages, hours of work, Sunday labor, religious instruction, time for reading, propelling motive for existence, and so forth, but I took few or no figures down, and tabulated the exact relationship of no man's soul to the Creator. As I look back at the work from this distance I cannot but feel that I am the greatest gainer by it. Whatever may be true of other preachers' contact with humanity, for myself I do not hesitate to assert with the most positive emphasis *my* need of constant and practical touch with life just as it is. The terms "sociology," "Christian socialism," "social problems," are in the air. I take it, the solution of most of the questions, yes, of all of them, rests upon the Christian thought and life of the race. Most of us do not know enough to help out the solution of social questions by writing or debating along lines of intellectual economics. But the preacher may *live*, and a church may *live*, a socialism that may prove a practical demonstration of its possibility. I am not at all sure but that the next twenty-five years will witness one of the greatest upheavals in church and pastoral work that the world ever saw. If they do, I want to be in it. We may at least be sure of this, we who preach the blessed gospel of the Son of Man and the Son of God, — "We cannot love mankind too much to preach to it." To know men at a distance is not to love them as Christ did, for the multitudes *thronged Him*. It were worth much to the church and the world if we might feel as we face, with tears of compassion, the really hungering, thirsting world of dirty, commonplace humanity, "How shall these souls be fed?" The answer that my own heart gives back is this: "I will acquaint myself with the life of the world, with its poverty and its selfishness, its indifference and its monotony, its suffering and its joy, its heroism and its commonplaces. And with as large a knowledge of the facts as I can possibly get I will preach Jesus Christ and Him crucified to a humanity that needs only his life in it to be the true life of the world." To know *mankind* is not enough

for the preacher. He must know *men*. Sociology is not alone a study of books and principles. It is a study of hearts and lives. The world will be converted by the personal touch of soul on soul.

Charles M. Sheldon.

CENTRAL CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH,
TOPEKA, KANSAS.

SPANISH-AMERICAN POETRY.

It is forty years since an article in the "North American Review," by W. H. Hurlburt, after a notice of some Cuban and Mexican poets, came to a close with brief allusions to the poetry of South America, prefaced by the apologetic statement that the main object was "to show that we are so far in advance of the majority of our readers as to know that poets *are* in the troubled republics beyond the Isthmus." Since that time the educational and literary movement of Spanish America has gone on at an accelerated pace, and many writers of real merit have their homes in the countries to the south of us; yet their names even, if we except those who are Mexicans or Cubans, are scarcely known either here or in England. The difficulty lies not alone in the difference of language; that barrier is easily leaped over in our day. That it is not a lack of broad culture which condemns Spanish-American poets to comparative obscurity is true at least in the case of the Argentine Estevan Echeverría; that scholarly attainments are not at fault, Venezuelan Andres Bello witnesses, linguist and grammarian, as well as poet; that true poetic gifts of imagination and expression are not wanting is proved by the examples of the Cuban Heredia and the Mexican Navarrete.

The state of publishing and the book-trade in South America is probably the main obstacle in the way of bringing native talent to the notice of the world. As is the case, to a large extent, in Spain, original works of pure literature can with difficulty find a publisher; scientific and political treatises, text-books, and translations monopolize the presses. The result is that the literary talent of the Spanish-American countries is driven largely into journalism. In newspapers and periodical literature the poets truly multiply and abound. Occasional volumes of poems are published; but a poet's collected works are almost unknown,

though exception must be made of the case of the Argentine poet, Olegario Andrade, whose writings were issued by the Government, in 1887, at an expense of twenty-two thousand dollars. Some national anthologies exist also, more or less complete and valuable, such as the "*Parnaso Colombiano*," published in 1886-1887. But the history of Spanish-American literature, as a whole, or even of Spanish-American poetry alone, has yet to be written.

It is, therefore, a considerable debt which we owe to that volume (the twenty-second) of Brockhaus's "*Coleccion de Autores Españoles*," compiled by Anita J. De Wittstein, and consisting of selections from the writings of forty-eight of the poets of Spanish America. It is probably the only anthology of the kind in existence. Its contents are of very unequal value. Much in the book amply justifies the remark of a critic of Spanish literature, that it is a very easy matter to write mediocre verses in Spanish, and that an unfortunately large number of leisured people devote themselves to doing it. Indeed, we have the opinion of a Spanish critic, Menendez Pelayo, in reference to this very book, to the effect that it contains "some detestable pieces which can be thought meritorious neither in America nor in any part of the civilized world." Fortunately this does not apply to the whole book, and it is from the more valuable parts that the citations which follow are taken. The unrhymed translations will give, it is presumed, a better idea of the originals than would a less artless rendering.

The compiler divides her work into sections, of which the first is "Religion." Of the few poems to be encountered under this heading four are translations of Psalms. Three of these are the work of the Peruvian, Valdes, and the fourth is from the hand of Figueroa, a native of Uruguay. José A. Maitin, a Venezuelan, has a poem entitled "*Jehovah*," which is a dignified performance, not without touches of feeling. Parts of the first two stanzas will indicate its style:—

"Eternal Being! in whose rich and sovereign strength
The whole creation finds its life and soul;
Thou who with gentle gesture of thy hand
Assign'st its station to each whirling world;
Not in the sacred books by prophets writ
Is all Thy name majestic to be read.
Weak speech of man, which neither word
Nor phrase befitting has to call thee by!"

Ideas more in accord with the prevailing religious conceptions

of Spanish America are to be found in Bello's "Prayer for All Flesh," — a professed imitation of Victor Hugo. One stanza will suffice : —

"When thou dost pray to God for me,
Then like a pilgrim tired and faint,
I drop my burden by the dusty path
And sit me down to grateful, longed-for rest."

Far more profound and spiritual, as well as poetic, is the sacramental poem, as he calls it, of Fray Manuel M. Navarrete. This Mexican poet was known among his countrymen as the "American Swan." His dates are 1768–1809. His collected poems were published in Mexico in 1823. The poem under notice has much grace and vigor, as the following translation of its opening lines may perhaps suggest : —

"Far, far from me be worldly strains,
But with the sacred lyre
On themes supernal let us sing
To God who prompts our lay ;
Far hence ! ye verses vain and worldly."

The second division of the volume is made up of poems coming under the head of "Nature." Here we have a wider selection, and, in many respects, greater excellence. One will look in vain for such nature poems as the English language can boast in the works of Wordsworth and Arnold. It seems as if the rioting exuberance of nature in the tropics had overwhelmed the imagination of the writers so that they can be little but exclamatory. Only occasionally will one come upon a bit of calm insight and interpretation. Worthy to be called this is Echeverría's "Twilight on the Ocean," and his lines on "The Pansy" are graceful and delicate. The first and last stanzas follow : —

"I am a flower obscure,
Of perfume and of splendor
Despoiled !
A flower of no allurements,
Who live an instant only,
Afflicted.

"Symbol I am of thought,
Of love and feeling ;
Destined
To charm the soul devout,
And bring to mourning hearts,
Assuagement."

But by far the most notable contributor to this section, if not,

indeed, to the entire volume, is the Cuban, José Maria Heredia. Exile from his native land at the age of twenty, he lived for three years in New York, where a volume of his poems was published in 1825. A year later he went to Mexico, and was made Assistant Secretary of State of that country. Afterwards he became a judge of the Supreme Court, dying in 1839. His poem, "Niagara," to be found in the volume under review, was translated by Bryant, and the translation was published in Longfellow's "Poets and Poetry of Europe." Perhaps of equal merit with that is his poem, "To the Hurricane." No one but a child of the tropics could have written it. Its irregular meter and broken movement can be measurably conveyed in translation, though much of its force and vividness will pass away in the process:—

"Hurricane ! Hurricane ! I feel thee draw near,
And, with thy breath upon me,
Exulting I welcome
The power of the lord of the storms.
Whirled on the wings of the wind,
Behold it wheeling through space,
Silent, terrible, irresistible,
In its swift flight. A sombre calm
Mysterious rests upon the earth, with dread
Fronting the fury of its awful face.
See yonder bull ! He paws the ground
With bleeding hoofs, bursting with fear,
And, brandishing his powerful head,
Breathing fire in his contorted nostrils,
Summons the tempest with his bellowings.
What masses of furious clouds ! The trembling sun
Hides his glorious face in gloomy mist,
And from his clouded disc
Comes a funereal and shadowy light
Which is not night nor day, —
Fearful hue, the veil of death itself !
The birds tremble and flee to hiding,
At the approach of the roar of the hurricane ;
And on the distant mountains crashing,
The forests hear it and to its voice respond.
Now it is here !
With what terrific majesty it unfolds its mantle !
Giant of storms, I salute thee !
Into fierce confusion the howling wind
Dashes the fringes of thy tawny vesture.
See ! On the horizon,
Those swift encircling arms ;
In their embrace
The deep valley is caught.

Darkness over all ! Its breath
 Flings into whirlwinds
 The dust of the plains.
 Thundering in the clouds
 Goes the chariot of the Lord,
 And from its wheels fly off the swift lightnings,
 Wounding and terrifying the earth,
 And flooding the heavens with livid light.
 That noise ? It is the rain. Unfettered,
 It falls in torrents, blotting out the world.
 Sky, clouds, hills, forest beloved,
 Where are you ? In vain I seek you.
 The circling winds bury all
 In an ocean of black shadow.
 At last, fated world, we part ;
 Alone am I with the hurricane.
 Tempest sublime ! How do I,
 My breast filled with thy solemn inspiration,
 Forget this poor and wretched world,
 And lift my brow in joy serene !
 Where is the coward soul
 That fears thy roar ? I through thee
 To God's own throne am lifted ; in the clouds I hear
 The echo of his voice ; the earth beneath me
 Hears it and trembles. Warm tears
 Rain on my pallid cheeks,
 And trembling I adore the majesty on high."

"Youth, Love, and Friendship" is the title of the next section, and here the poets of Spanish America find congenial themes. If the search were only for extravagant expression and galvanic passion, nearly every page would yield a specimen. We can only mention, as of a different rank, the "Song" of the Argentine poet, Balcarce, which is marked throughout by exquisite feeling. It is a song of farewell to the La Plata, and the refrain with which each stanza closes has a true dying fall in the Spanish — as may possibly be guessed from the following translation : —

"Stay thy wings but yet a moment,
 Rob me not of this contentment,
 Gentle wind."

Another Argentine, Juan C. Lafinur, contributes a sonnet, which is of a merit not entirely to be spoiled in the rendering.

"TO A ROSE.

"Thou mistress of the garden, queenly rose,
 Pride of the autumn, honor of the field,
 May no north wind e'er lacerate thy beauty,
 Nor ever-chilling frost cause thee to wither.

Be happy longer ; — in my loved one's hands
 Erect thy throne ; then straightway in her hair
 Be her adornment, while her blushing face
 Grows rosier in the happy shame to see thee.
 Preserve for me these tears which I let fall
 Into thy snowy bosom ; and if thy lot
 Shall bring thee to the lips of her I love,
 Then, too, my grief will run to her sweet mouth,
 Will tell itself to her, and straightway say :
 ' This rose came to its bloom in purest love.' "

The section headed " Grief, Misfortune, and Death " would suggest its own dangers in a collection of poems from any race of writers, and offers perils to which Spanish Americans are peculiarly susceptible. Many a selection is fitted to excite as many tears as bathos can. Perhaps no more than a single poem can be found to even suggest that kind of pervasive melancholy, reading its own reflections into all nature, of which English verse furnishes so many illustrious examples. If any lines here are worthy to be named with such productions, they are to be looked for in the poem of Maitin, beginning : —

" Little lonely streamlet flowing
 From that forest drear, if to death,
 In the river broad, thou goest,
 Why thus dancest on the way ? "

The portion of the book assigned to " Romances " is given up to the poetic recital of local legends, after the rather dreary style not unknown in English poetry, — especially familiar in American verse. " Humorous Poems " fill thirty-five pages, occupied mostly with satires on bad laws and inefficient governments, varied by occasional society verses, and attempts at epigrams which are happily infrequent. Spanish can point to such a splendid list of proverbs, many of them with a sting and snap like the cut of a whip-lash, that it is, at first sight, surprising that it does not take kindly to poetical epigrams. But the typical poetry of Spain is verbose to a degree, and is not a little open to such a charge as De Maistre brought against Voltaire : "*Il n'a pas su faire une épigramme, la moindre gorgée de son fiel ne pouvant courrir moins de cent vers.*"

The last section of the volume is devoted to poems of patriotism. These are mostly cast in the 'Ercles vein, into which the Spanish-American genius falls with a greater ease than even our own. Warlike notes are naturally frequent ; invaders are repelled, and enemies defied in great profusion. The most stirring

verses are those of Fernando Calderon, the Mexican Tyrtæus, whose life fell in the troublous times of the war of independence and the internecine strife that followed. His poem, "The Soldier of Liberty," has a fine martial ring all through, and its refrain expresses what was undoubtedly the animating spirit of the conflict to which it refers: —

"Others may enjoy, in fetters,
Shameful peace;
I will rather seek in combat
Freedom or death."

Some of the tributes to the popular heroes of the Western World are well conceived and not unhappily expressed; the sonnet to Washington, for example, by the Cuban poet, Gertrudis G. De Avellaneda, is worth reading. But much the most striking of the compositions of this class is the sonnet of the Venezuelan writer, Rafael Maria Baralt, addressed to Columbus. With an inadequate translation of that, these notes may be brought to an end: —

"Who dares insult the fury of my waves?
Who, out of sight of men and far from land,
Thus steers his shattered, solitary ships,
Now flung against the sky, now plunged in the abyss?
Those flaunting banners given to the breeze,
All torn and drenched shall lie upon the beach,
And fill the world with fear, not with thy fame;
For wrecked shall be thy haughty Spanish fleet.'
Thus cried the sea! but a supernal voice
Answered 'Columbus!' and at the mighty name
The sea bows its proud head, kissing the prow.
The rudder turns; the wind fills every sail,
And, guided by his God, the mariner
Lays a new world at Isabella's feet."

Rollo Ogden.

RYE, N. Y.

SOME ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW ENGLAND DURING THE PRESENT CEN- TURY.

Two different types of schools were to be found in New England at the beginning of the century, omitting the private schools which were an insignificant element.

There were the incorporated schools, called academies, which

filled an intermediate place between the college and the common school. Sometimes they were well endowed, but often they depended entirely upon the tuition to meet the expenses. Those which were the best endowed, or had the best teachers, survive and have grown through the century. Others have been added, often called schools only. Many of them are fitting schools for colleges, and others have enlarged their courses of study till, in many cases, these cover the curriculum of the colleges of fifty years ago. Often being under the care of denominational boards of trustees, definite religious instruction is given. Of course only a small portion of the children of New England, and these of the more cultivated class, have been instructed in them. Each one works on its own lines without any relation to the others. Their work is apart from instruction for the masses.

By far the larger portion of young people received their education in the free district schools, in which were gathered all ages and both sexes, and in which were taught "the three R's," and whatever the teacher happened to know besides.

Considered as a system of education, these schools, as well as the academies, must have been very imperfect. There were powers in the child which they made no attempt to train. The development of body was scarcely thought of. A well-proportioned and developed physique was rather the result of happy accident than of any systematic care. Neither was it thought necessary to pay any attention to the training of the senses. Eyes were made for seeing, and one had only to look about to see. That the senses might be cultivated so as to become wide and ever-widening avenues for knowledge to enter the soul had not dawned upon the mind of parent, school committee, or teacher, nor that the accuracy of apprehension of outward things held a definite relation to clearness of thought. As little attention was paid to any industrial training, except sewing, and that came in rather as an occupation which kept the child from mischief, than as a part of the instruction. The whole range of bodily work was out of place in school. The child was to keep still. The value of alternation of activity of body and brain in securing the wider development of mind as well as body is hardly yet beginning to be generally understood.

The development and use of the sensitive powers was little regarded. Lessons were duties, not pleasures. Little was done to make them attractive, few were the helps to the understanding of them. What a stern and unsympathizing person was the

typical teacher! I remember a master who I am sure was a good man, and yet he told me one day, taking out his penknife and opening it, that he was going to cut off my ear because I had listened to the whisper of another girl. I really believed he was going to do it, and suffered small agony. It was a training of the sensibility, to what evil purpose!

What a bare and uninteresting aspect the school-room wore, how hard were the seats, and how forlorn was the play-ground. There were no shade trees, scarcely any grass, not a vine, nor a flower. And the building itself was, and still is in all country places, hopelessly ugly, without and within. One recognizes it from afar as the blot on the landscape. Some years ago an effort was made by the Educational Committee of the Social Science Association, following a suggestion from President Woolsey, to form a plan for the adornment of common schoolhouses. A member of the committee appointed for this purpose, a man of unusual culture, visited several of these schoolhouses, in a town not twenty-five miles from Boston. After looking them over carefully, he said, "They must be entirely rebuilt, if one is to do anything."

It is not strange that there was so little method in the work. Metaphysics were in such a tangle as might excuse the half-educated educator for his haphazard work, his uncertainty and bewilderment. Wiser heads than his were at sea. What were the subjects of knowledge? Of what was one certain? Was there any reality in matter? Or was matter the only reality in the universe? Was spirit the creator of what it saw outside of itself? Along what lines other than the traditional ones ought the development of the child to tend?

Each real, earnest teacher was feeling his way alone toward some method of teaching with dim perception of any principle underlying his method, while the pressure of the ever-increasing numbers to be taught was drawing the attention of many thoughtful minds to the problem constantly growing more complicated, and each successful worker was contributing something toward its solution.

The development of the system of Froebel is perhaps the most important educational advance in the present century made by any one person, a germ of which the full unfolding will revolutionize all teaching. His kindergarten gave a new aspect to the training of infant minds. Learning became for them a pleasure. The child was led to exercise his own powers in perception, and to reflect and act upon the idea which he had himself gained by his senses. To carry out this method required trained teachers,

and Froebel found it necessary to superintend their education. What a noble contribution was this to the advance of education, a right foundation laid in developing the senses, and leading the child to reason on what he had himself gained. Such a careful preparation of the teacher for his work was needed.

This first movement for the education of teachers has widened into normal and training schools of many kinds in many countries. Such schools were opened in Massachusetts as early as 1839. These schools, wherever they are established, change the work of teaching into a delight. The value of them has been acknowledged only after a long and hard fight by earnest educators. A dozen years ago, a gentleman of liberal education, connected with the school board of a Massachusetts city in which a training-school had just been opened, said that teachers, like poets, were born; they needed no training. The future of the common school is now secure so far as regards the training of teachers. No natural endowments, no acquisitions of knowledge, are sufficient to prepare a person to begin his work as a teacher without special training for that work. The day of amateurs is fast going by. The college graduate needs equally with the common school teacher a professional training, to enter successfully upon the work of teaching in high schools and colleges.

The teacher of the future, in all grades of schools, must know and feel that the life is more than meat, must be able to work for the individual, as well as for the class, and must feel unsatisfied with his work, if he does not reach and quicken the dullest mind in the class. Activity and growth must be more to him than precise scholarship, valuable as that is; more than development of the subject which he teaches. He must enlist all the will power in his pupil on the side of truth and right. There is an enormous inert mass of mind in our schools, which will never be otherwise, till the moving force within each soul is reached and put in action. This is the great reason why the results in our schools to-day are so meagre, why so few strong thinkers and doers are found in the great numbers of the so-called educated.

The common New England town school of the first of the century has developed into a system of schools regularly graded, the courses of study being arranged in some accordance with the latest demands of our time. But the growth has been a somewhat blind feeling after symmetry, and there has been loss as well as gain.

The gradual diminution in moral as well as religious instruction has gone very far. The latter has shrunk almost to zero. This

has come naturally with the change from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous population. It has been thus far impossible to have any religious teaching which is not denominational. And what right has any one to teach sectarian religion in schools supported from the public treasury? The day perhaps is coming, when all Christians may agree on some common basis of religious instruction, but it is not yet here. Even then the public schools will have pupils whose parents will object to any religious instruction, so that cannot be given in the public school. The only form of religious teaching now is the perfunctory reading of the Scripture, and that is too often true in other places than these schools. There is a very meagre knowledge of the Bible among the young people of our communities, even those who are the most taught. A few years since I was with a company of young girls gathered from New England towns, coming from intelligent native families. They asked for a story, and the story of Ruth was narrated, as an Eastern idyl, disguised only by the omission of the proper names. Not one recognized it as anything ever heard before. This is not a peculiar case. Even among Sunday-school scholars there is great ignorance of the Bible, historically and geographically, as well as doctrinally. How much less still has the conception which the Bible presents of Christianity as a living force, working within the soul and transforming it, been the subject of instruction even in our Christian families, Sunday-schools, Christian Associations, Societies of Christian Endeavor, and even in the church itself. Everywhere people seem to learn the outward observance of Christian duties of one class apart from their daily activities. "One of my boys," said a teacher, "recently joined the church." He did such poor work in school that he was asked if he did not think it a Christian duty to get good lessons. He never thought that good lessons or faithful school life had anything to do with being a Christian. Teachers are constantly having a like experience.

Moral instruction, except of the most rudimentary and incidental kind, is given in public schools only as the teacher goes beyond positive requirements. In some schools a text-book on morals is not allowed. Although it is true that the influence of a teacher of strong character is worth more than any text-book instruction, still the book is a valuable help to all teachers, and coming with positive authority it reinforces the efforts of the teacher.

But it is always to be remembered that it is not knowledge of the right alone that will make a moral people. As Joseph Henry

and Richard Cobden stood together one day in Appleton's bookstore and looked at the boxes of district school libraries which were just ready to be sent to Ohio, "There," said Cobden, "is the safeguard of your liberties." "Not so," said Henry; "the devil knew more than is in those books, but he was not the better for the knowledge." There must be an active, impulsive force in the soul which knowledge can neither rouse nor impart, if there is to be a moral life.

We may hope continually for growth in the public schools in all good methods of imparting knowledge. The training of the senses, physical development, and manual instruction, cultivation of the intellectual and æsthetic nature, — these may be safely left to these schools for the future. Their work and advance through the century warrants trusting them for the time to come. But the moral training must come from other sources. The need of moral training is being felt more and more among teachers, as the utterances at educational meetings witness. But the propositions put forward as means of meeting the need seem like playing with it. The Chinese nation have had a moral training more perhaps than any other, but it is not their morality which we want to-day. It must be something stronger and sturdier which is to meet the present need. The ocean could not be swept out by Mrs. Partington's broom, neither can the tide of immorality be driven back by maxims.

The highest, the growing type of morality is only to be found in truly religious communities. The relation of the soul to God determines the character. The motive of love to Him gives the truest impulse to right living which can overcome *all* the allurements to evil that beset every soul on its way through the earthly life, evils often concealed in such attractive forms that it needs the spear of Ithuriel to detect their true character, and the strength of the archangel to beat them down. That is no child's play, and every child should be girded for such battle with the strongest weapons, offensive and defensive.

If the best Christian training of to-day needs to be quickened and uplifted far beyond its present attainment, what an urgent call there is for a strongly aggressive attempt to reach with religious training the unchurched masses, whose only education is in the public school, if we are to have, in the future of our country, a morally and spiritually noble people. Who will enter on this work?

Annie E. Johnson.

BRADFORD ACADEMY, BRADFORD, MASS.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE IMMANENCE.

THERE is a very considerable hope abroad that we shall reach a higher conception of God by looking at Him as the immanent principle of all things. Some very harsh censures are passed at the same time on the contrary and older conception of the divine transcendence. The idea is gaining ground that we shall be brought a good deal on our way by discarding all language of the Creator as distinct and apart from the creature, and by cultivating a habit of religious speech in which, if they are not identified, they are at least brought very near together. It is thought that reverence will be very much promoted by such a change. The old expressions which imply a God enthroned afar off are being rapidly and generally superseded in favor of expressions which imply that He is the soul of things, the mind of nature, and the hidden spring of life underlying all appearance. "The spirit of the living creature was in the wheels." So it is thought the vision of the prophet Ezekiel is made to yield up its secret.

There can be no doubt that such a tendency is toward a more worthy attitude before God. Its advantages are, however, a good deal less than men are tempted to believe. The advantages are a good deal less than the disadvantages, the gain is far less than the loss, if some most important safeguards are left out. That any radical change in theology can be hoped for is a delusion and a snare. All that we are able to say is that this new language is a help, provided that other and older considerations are not disturbed. The doctrine of the divine immanence is a help just as long as it has its roots in the deeper doctrine of the divine transcendence. The essence of religion and theology is in the latter. There is simply no Christianity without the doctrine of the divine transcendence. What makes Christianity the power it is comes from its teaching about transcendence, and not immanence. The weakness, the incoherence, and the instability of religion in the world has been according to the degree in which the idea of immanence overshadowed the idea of transcendence, and evil was made an illusion, and moral distinctions became hesitating and unreal. The greatest religion, we may be sure, will satisfy in both directions. A really great religion can exist without any doctrine of immanence, but not without the doctrine of transcendence. The one is an aid, a completion, a necessity, indeed, to a complete doctrine. The other is the real essence. Christian thinkers need

to be on their guard lest in allowing this fuller and freer interpretation of the thought of God, they relax their hold on what is much the profounder matter.

The bent of any age can be clearly seen in the things which most easily command admiration. The bent of our age is seen in the admiration which the literature of the divine immanence commands. A most popular book of sermons is entitled "The Immanent God." The argument of that most thoughtful book, "The Continuity of Christian Thought," proceeds on the assumption that the exigencies of political existence overtook the Greek genius in Christianity and forced the doctrine of the divine immanence to give way to that of transcendence; that in these days we are recovering the lost spirit, and Augustine is being rapidly supplanted by Athanasius. "The motive which lends interest and value to a study of the history of Latin theology in the Middle Ages or in its later Protestant modifications, is to seek in its varied fortunes for that tendency to revert again to the true interpretations of the Christian faith, from which it was originally a falling away."¹ "The formal theology, the ecclesiastical institutions which Augustine sanctioned for the ages that followed him, which Calvin renewed for the Protestant churches, are built upon the ruling principle that God is outside the world and not within."² Happily there is no dispute about the facts, nor is there any will to deny the change which is coming to pass. It must be urged, however, that the change is in reality not the substitution of one teaching for another, but the completion of an established doctrine by the addition of another which the necessities of the times had laid aside. It must be urged, and I shall hope to show, that the difference between a God without the world and within the world is really a very subordinate one in comparison with the difference between a God *above* the world and a God merely equal to the world, a God who is only the world. The conception of a God *above* the world makes essential Christianity, and while it is easily granted that the conception of a God *above and within* the world is a larger and fuller conception, its importance for humanity lies less in the immanence than in the transcendence.

The traces in popular poetry of the conception of divine immanence range all the way down to absolute pantheism. Not, indeed, that either the writers or the readers of these poems are strict

¹ *Continuity of Christian Thought*, by Alexander V. G. Allen, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

pantheists, but they are captivated by the pantheistic strain. They are working in the vein of the doctrine of immanency, and the sober second thought of consequences or of what these fine fancies must come out on, if carried out to their proper conclusion, is wholly absent. Shelley professed himself a pantheist, although he used his doctrine only as suited his convenience. One of his noblest verses is:—

"Spirit of nature ! thou
Life of interminable multitudes ;
Soul of those mighty spheres
Whose changeless paths thro' Heaven's deep silence lie ;
Soul of that smallest being,
The dwelling of whose life
Is one faint April sun-gleam."¹

We have from Carlyle, though as a translation from Goethe, a poem which is characterized by the thought of immanence:—

"Here eyes do regard you
In eternity's stillness;
Here is all fullness,
Ye brave, to reward you.
Work and despair not."

Tennyson shows the influence of his time in many poems, especially in one called "The Higher Pantheism":—

"The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains, —
Are not these, O Soul, the Vision of Him who reigns ?
Speak to Him thou for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet —
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

Again in "In Memoriam" he has furnished some of the most exquisite statements of the thought of immanence:—

"Thy voice is on the roving air ;
I hear thee when the waters run ;
Thou standest in the rising sun,
And in the setting thou art fair."

Tennyson, however, distinctly declares in another canto, —

"I found Him not in world or sun,
Or eagle's wing or insect's eye ;"

but this refers to —

"That which we dare invoke to bless."

Browning's whole way of looking at things is unfavorable to the

¹ The Pantheistic impression as distinct from the explicit doctrine is even better given in a stanza of one of the songs in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*. This well-known stanza begins

"Life of Life, thy lips enkindle," etc.

thought of immanence. His gospel is one of resistance, his great plea is for men to brave their lots and not be submerged or identified with them. Nevertheless he has given us notable expressions of a doctrine with which he must at heart have had scant sympathy:—

“Why where’s the need of Temple, when the walls
O’ the world are that? What use of swells and falls
From Levites’ choir, Priest’s cries, and trumpet calls?”

“That one Face, far from vanish, rather grows,
Or decomposes but to recompose,
Becomes my universe that feels and knows.”

Better yet from “Saul:”—

“I but open my eyes—and perfection, no more and no less,
In the kind I imagined full fronts me, and God is seen God,
In the star, in the storm, in the flesh, in the soul, and the clod.”

In Emerson, the more properly Oriental conception is allowed utterance. In “Brahma,” Emerson reproduces a thorough-going pantheism:—

“If the red slayer thinks he slays,
Or if the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep and pass and turn again.

“Far and forgot to me is near;
Shadow and sunlight are the same;
The vanished gods to me appear;
And one to me are shame and fame.

“They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.”

It is quite unfair to judge any of these verses as expressions of strict doctrine. The plain meaning of some modern poems is pantheism pure and simple. It is, however, almost certain that their authors held by no such creed, if creed we may call it. The strong moral fibre in Emerson makes pantheism impossible, although pantheism is the legitimate conclusion from some of his verses. Pantheism in European or American civilization is an anomaly, and is contradicted by every tendency of life, and by the standards of morality. But one has often to note the real need which exaggerated language is aiming to satisfy. Our modern poets are not trying to establish pantheism, for this is repug-

nant to every element in our religion and our civilization, and for Western minds is well-nigh unthinkable. They are trying to satisfy the present need of considering God as the immanent principle, of doing justice to the consideration that God animates the universe from within and not from without. He is the spirit within the wheels. The conception of God which has prevailed has been very mechanical. The doctrine of transcendence has so dominated Christian thought that it has left religion dry, abstract, and lifeless. The doctrine of inspiration was a mechanical dictation of inspired words. The doctrine of the atonement was a mechanical transaction. Creation was a mechanical operation, the result of successive fiat. The conception of God as the immanent life of the world could not help but produce a transformation in these doctrines as well as in the conception of God himself. Nevertheless the fact remains that the doctrine of God's immanence is of help only so long as there is a background of God's transcendence. It is the transcendence which after all is the heart of the matter. In reacting from an exaggerated belief in the awful majesty of God, it is but natural that the expression of his relation to the creatures as the indwelling life should be so overstated that the distinction between creator and creature should be confused. The necessities of practical life, however, soon restore the balance. We may discern certain deep reasons which govern the prevailing tendency in any time and people. It is not an accidental thing that the idea of God as the indwelling spirit should attract us to-day, while the idea of God as a righteous and austere sovereign should attract the popular conscience at the time of Augustine. It was not an accidental thing that in the fifth century Latin theology replaced Greek theology in the Christian Church, and Alexandria gave place to Rome. In the stormy times which were then beginning there was needed a different religious conviction. While the current of events was fairly smooth, then the doctrine of God's immanence as held by Clement and Origen and Athanasius was enough to live by. But when the empire began to break up, and when the very foundations of the civilized world seemed to be dissolved, it was imperative that a strong sense of God's righteous government should be aroused. Athanasius was settling an ideal theology, Augustine was looking for a practical rule of life. What to think, and how to think correctly, and within a hair's line of absolute truth, was the important consideration when the Council of Nice met. But when the Roman Empire began to totter, when the eternal

city was shaken to its foundations, and all the elements of social existence began to melt in the fervent heat of invasion, such abstract considerations had to be laid aside for the time being. As Goths and Huns swarmed in, as the Roman empire seemed to reel and stagger under the blows of the invading multitudes, the one thing important to get rid of was man himself. Man himself was prostrated, broken with confusion, and utterly without confidence. All the elements of civilization seemed to be tossed into the melting pot. There was no assurance of the future. Man prayed to be released from all responsibility. He had only one wild craving, and that was for some power outside himself, and above the earth, in which he could hide himself and be safe. Any doctrine of God in the world was at such a time a torture to his spirit. Man wanted an authority, a mighty leader standing outside life, even thundering his commands unto it. It was a time of utter confusion, and the one word which men were craving for was the word of command. It was an inexpressible relief to men to dwindle into insignificance. It was felt no loss to give up all original will, and even the moral initiative, because it was transferred to another who was stronger and wiser. It is certain that the condition of the time is the explanation of Augustine's doctrine of the will. At the time in which he lived, when the world seemed to be ripening for a fall, freedom of the will was the last thing to give a thought to. Men were praying for a deliverer because they were paralyzed with fear. "They said to the mountains cover us, and to the hills fall on us." To be absolutely nothing, and God, the refuge and strength, absolutely everything until the tyranny should be overpast, this was the burden of all their thoughts. It was possible to go through the crisis only by leaning utterly on the strong arm of Another. Men despaired of earth, man seemed contemptible, the refuge now was in a city of God which Augustine saw descending out of heaven from God. No one can study the period from the fifth to the ninth century and not recognize that the doctrine of divine immanence would have been utterly feeble as a theology by which the Christian Church could have conquered the heathen hordes. Later times may suffer from the exaggerated form in which the thought of God's transcendence was expressed, but it was not the least exaggerated for the stormy times which the church had to weather in those early centuries. It was the kind of doctrine needed at the time, and any other would have snapped like a reed under the burden. When the strain was eased, and when confi-

dence was once more restored, the theology of the church reflected the change. It was, however, the doctrine of transcendence, the thought of God's almighty power, which saved the day.

But with the beginning of the ninth century a very sensible difference of tone is perceptible in Christian civilization. The world is safe, and the church is safe. The heathen races had settled into their places, they had adopted the religion and the morals of their subjects, and the threatened subversal of all law, order, and civilization had not come to pass. Europe began again to breathe freely, and to court the future. From this time there is an unbroken succession of religious thinkers who expatiate on the doctrine of God's immanence in his creation. The brilliant young Irishman John Scotus Erigena stands for the revival of the Greek spirit, and is always counted among pantheistic speculators. While he saves the distinction between the creator and the created, yet all created things are really manifestations of the one Supreme Unity, abide in the eternal act of his creation, and are ultimately gathered back into the bosom of the Father. Our life is God's life in us. This is the doctrine of immanence in full bloom. Arabian philosophy is full of this doctrine, and Arabian philosophy influenced strongly the scholastics of the time. But in the various schools and communities of mystics there was little left to be supplied, so outspoken was the expression of the doctrine. The reaction against the worldliness of the church, its formalism, and its corruption helped along the tendencies of the Middle Age mystics. The sacerdotal spirit must have been the very mainstay of not only the Christian religion, but of civilization during the rude centuries of invasion and disorder. In the centuries of quiet and restored confidence, when men reflected on the arrogance and spiritual pride of the priestly order, it jarred on their minds as something unbearable. Consequently the prevailing sacerdotalism must have stimulated the growth of the communities of Puritans and quietists, and helped to arouse their antagonism to the established order. At this time also the only general teaching of the church was through the ritual. Of preaching, of awakening the conscience through the sermon, there was almost nothing. There was a hunger to be talked to, reasoned with, appealed to, and this was met by the great preaching orders which in the thirteenth century began to cover the earth. But just this same instinct of unrest provoked the independent satisfaction of the religious communities. In the Netherlands arose the Beguines and Beghards, in Italy the Waldenses, in Southern France the

various sects of Puritans or Cathari. These are all touched by a mystical quality, verging more or less on pantheism. One of the popular books of the time, important as the oldest work of the kind in German, was called "*Das Fliessende Licht der Gottheit*."

A most captivating idea during this and subsequent periods was shared in by Amalrich of Bena and the famous Abbot Joachim of Floris, proclaimed by the latter as the Eternal Gospel. In the view of the three stages or ages of the world corresponding to the respective reigns of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the Trinity, there may not appear anything very startling or innovating. The good abbot himself died in full communion with the church. A very little reflection, however, will show that the Eternal Gospel was the point of departure for a doctrine of quietism, and even inner revolt, which the church could not wisely tolerate. The necessary outcome of it all was the great superiority of the passive and contemplative life. It involved individual judgment carried to a perilous extreme, and was destined to end in overweening spiritual pride. It is a contribution of the highest order to the history of the doctrine of the divine immanence. The kingdom of the Father represented the very notion of divine transcendence which they found irksome, and this, together with the kindred age of the kingdom of the Son, was past and passing. It was the kingdom of the Spirit which was to be, and by this Joachim meant the world indwelt by God. It was the immanent idea. God was to be conceived as inhabiting man, as the soul of things, and therefore all the external religion of ritual and priesthood would be left behind.

The high-water mark of the thought of the divine immanence was reached by Meister Eckhart. With Eckhart what had hitherto been the expression of practical piety, and the drawing of the devout heart, becomes the expression of the pure reason, and assumes a highly speculative character. Mysticism in him becomes a philosophy. The doctrine of the immanent God is Eckhart's reading of Christian theology, though the facts of historical Christianity are treated lightly, and readily subordinated to the system. Beyond God is the Godhead. By God Eckhart understands the Trinity, the revealed God, but there is an object of thought which is higher than this. The eternal Godhead, at once the beginning and the end of all things, is concealed in absolute obscurity. As the Father, the divine nature is revealed, and as the Son, the Father pours himself out, while as the Spirit, the Son returns eternally back into the Father in love, which unites

both. To dwell on this real presence of the Spirit in the world, and to lead all back to the bosom of the Father, would have satisfied the doctrine of immanence, although it would have been no essentially new teaching. But the pantheistic tendency in Eckhart would not let him rest with such a stronger emphasis on the Immanent God. Eckhart really warred on the idea of any distinction between the finite and the infinite. He wished to crush out the finite. The finite was of the nature of an illusion. The absolute divine unity neutralized all difference. Out of God there is nothing but nonentity. The world of things as independent of God is not. Manifoldness exists only for the finite intellect. To God there is only one, and repose in Him is the end of all. Man must be silent that God may speak. The true life for man is to forego his proper selfhood. Individuality is a mistake. Our better part is to give it up, and be possessed by God. Everything finite, or distinctive of man is to be surrendered. So long as man still has the will to fulfill God's will he is yet short of perfect. Eckhart's doctrine was variously appropriated by sympathizers with his spirit. Few go to the same lengths with him, and the general desire is rather to satisfy the craving for exalted piety than to elaborate a system. After the long ages of a hard and dry conception of God, it was an unspeakable relief to have Him brought near as a gracious and indwelling presence. It seemed an immeasurable advance for the affections to have the distant ruler become the inspirer of the world from within, that the thoughts of many hearts might be revealed. Now arose the society of the Friends of God, taking in Switzerland and the Netherlands in its extent. In spite of many differences, the aim of strengthening one another in a living intercourse with God united them. Heinrich Suso was called the "Minnesinger of the love of God." Tauler and his mysterious friend Nicolas of Basil, Heinrich von Nördlinger, John Ruysbroeck, and the author of "German Theology" are all representatives of the same movement. We have also to mention the Brethren of the Free Spirit.

With the Reformation a change of attitude in the conception of God necessarily accompanies the changed regard toward man. The modern era, which may be taken as beginning with the Reformation, is occupied with developing the conception of man, but along with this, and because of this, the conception of God underwent serious changes and modifications. The first fruit of the change was to abandon mysticism. The doctrine of Justification by Faith is characteristic of Protestantism, although variously

understood. In all its different ways of being understood, however, the one constant feature is that of a life immeasurably above all human life, and by whose favor human life is permitted to be. Human life sinks into insignificance, becomes as nothing before the divine. This temper is not favorable to the growth of the idea of God's immanence. It seems to cry out of its crushing sense of littleness and helplessness to a divine succor. There is no disposition to dwell on the image of God in man; man is humbled to the ground before an awful judge. He is bowed before a God whom he knows is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity." The grace of his God saves him. Nothing that he can do can atone for his shortcomings. Now the circumstances of the time must account for this changed emphasis. The Reformation theology is based on the idea of God's transcendence. It riots in the affirmations of man's depravity. It must be that here again the necessity of laying hold of a higher source of strength, of despising man's estate in order the more unreservedly to have the grace of divine help, was an outcome of the particular time. Augustine had to hold civilization, humanity, religion, against the floods of heathen conquest. Luther and Calvin had to wrest the destiny of man from the established and consolidated oppression of the Roman Church. In the deadly conflict, in the almost hopeless contest with a power so entrenched, and so unlimited in resources, a power professing to have in its charge the keys of heaven and hell, nothing human could avail. Human pride was thus a mockery. The language that could utter their inmost souls was that of a Psalmist who cried, because his soul was drawing nigh unto hell: "Save me, O Lord, for the waters are come in even unto my soul." "Be merciful unto me, O God, be merciful unto me: for my soul trusteth in thee, and under the shadow of thy wings shall be my refuge, until this tyranny be overpast." The theology of an age is its mainstay. It is the standard around which men can rally. Nothing is so irrational or unscientific or superficial as to decry theology. The theology of Tauler, or of Eckhart, never in the world could have carried through the Reformation. The theology of Calvin could, however, and did. In quieter times it needs to be gravely modified, but Calvinism and Augustinianism are mighty witnesses to deeper currents in religion than we are conscious of during the pleasant and unruffled times of political or religious tranquillity. Whenever a strain is at hand, men will drop in a moment the pretty theological ideas of human exaltation, and will cry out for an actual Saviour and a deliverer. A

mysterious and divine presence is not able to hold his mind for the extreme need of a veritable champion and an avenger. He prays to one who is sovereign over all, a Lord who will have his enemies in derision.

The reason for the general fascination which the doctrine of immanence has for our own age is still less far to seek. We live in a time of tranquillity and expansion. But there is a positive reason as well as a negative one, or the mere absence of disturbing and distracting conditions. It is undoubtedly due to an era of tranquillity that such extraordinary advances have been made in scientific insight, and in so far, the positive cause of a new and wonderful revelation of the constitution of bodies rests on the merely negative cause of freedom from external conflict. The new knowledge, however, is so striking and the results of scientific penetration so startling, that every other consideration is lost. What it must have been in the sixteenth century to have the new astronomy displace the Ptolemaic while the receding heavens opened up world on world of undiscovered heavenly country, that and more it is to have the new geology, chemistry, and biology displace the old. The wonderful processes found at work both among organic and inorganic matter required a wholly new consideration of the relation in which these objects stood to the divine mind. So long as the deficient observation of earlier times supplied the knowledge of created things, it was suffered to pass that created things had been endowed with a potency, and left to the play of mechanical forces. The mechanical conception of the world served about an equal purpose for the impersonal religion of deism and for the personal religion of Christianity. There was nothing to shock the sense of either in the general understanding of the physical world as wound up like a clock and left to run itself. Astronomical discoveries, however great and important, would do but little to jar such a general understanding. It was when the forces at work in the present changes of the appearance of the earth's surface were discovered to be sufficient in the main to account for the formation of a habitable planet that astonishment began, and men questioned the need of any power outside the world itself. It was conjectured that the earth contained in itself all that was necessary to account for its present condition. The forces of elevation and denudation, the igneous and aqueous operations going on, above all the hypothesis of contraction, all these speculations were pursued with such an absorbing interest and with such amazingly profitable results that the *deus ex ma-*

china became quite unnecessary. It was perceived that the machine was running itself, and the event of winding up the machinery was removed to so distant a date as really to be lost in the discussion. From merely physical considerations thus it became inevitable that if the Providence of God was not to be wholly lost sight of, it must be brought as an immanent energy into the very theatre of events.

The effect of the new geology upon the ordinary conception of God, however, was as nothing in comparison with that produced by other branches of study. The study of chemistry and molecular physics produced what was little short of a revolution in the conception of matter. So long as the constitution of bodies was the time-honored atomism, little if any changed as it passed through the hands of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, the mechanical notions held in regard to these glittering and lifeless particles held their own. But when there was broached what we may call a microscopic astronomy, and molecules were found to be infinitesimal worlds, having invariable laws and modes of motion, having their orbits of revolution, and paths of transit of ascertainable dimensions, when the size of the molecules was conjecturally fixed, the length of their paths of movement, the laws of their cohesion, of union and combination, of their transformations according to fixed laws, and when, instead of being any longer merely particles acted on from without, they were rather of the nature of centres of force, and animated by self-determining movements of attraction and repulsion, then the sustaining principle of matter was seen to be within and not without. But it was by the new biology that the loudest demands were made for a change in the point of view. Just as matter was found to be instinct with life, and the original seat of the most mysterious sort of energy, so the animal world was found to be instinct with the powers and capacities which had been thought the exclusive possession of man. The rudiments of morality were even traced in the animal world. The lines of distinction between the species were seen to be indeterminate. It was found that the animal world was very sensitive to new conditions, that advantageous variations were preserved, and improved on, that the result was a higher form of life. It was seen that man himself had been the subject of great changes, that he was a developed creature. Then the sublime hypothesis was urged that the break between human and animal life had not always existed, and that man had descended from the higher types of the animal world. There was seen to be less dif-

ference between man and the higher form of anthropoid apes than the latter and the lowest forms of apes, while between these there could be traced a continuous line of development. This brilliant guess was confirmed when the study of the lower forms of plant and animal life revealed the impossibility of fixing any dividing line, or saying where the one began and where the other ended. If anything was yet needed to establish a conviction of original rather than derived power for the created world, it was given by the results of psychological study. There were not wanting some who thought the phenomena could be satisfactorily explained by no other supposition than that a material brain was its own soul : —

“ As the bird wings and sings
Let us cry, all good things

Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul ! ”

It was not unnatural that with all this new wine of knowledge people lost their heads. It at least broke the old bottles into which it had been poured. To not a few it seemed like granting all that deism, or even atheism, had contended for. There was even talk of “an interloper.” In the minds of all important changes ensued. Especially was the change brought about and elaborated in theology, and chanted in poetry, of the life which was at the heart of things. It was seen that what was shaken in faith affected the form and not the substance. The mechanical relation between God and the world was now quite out of the question. The inherent energy in things was the root of their being, and either that inherent energy was God or else material things were able to take care of themselves. The sober good sense of men could not admit the last, and the glorious revelations of the former view carried men off their feet. Every modern philosophy has a different way of regarding God’s relation to the world, but with all it is in greater or less measure a doctrine of immanence. He may be the substance to the world’s shadow. He may be the subject and the material world his objectification. The world may be the self-realization or self-manifestation of God. The central idea of all is the immediate relation of God to the world ; in a sense new, and yet strangely the fulfillment of the old, it is the doctrine of the Real Presence.

It is very easy, therefore, to persuade ourselves that we are living in one of “the years of the right hand of the Most Highest.” Not without compassion for the hard fortune of men of an earlier time, our own age is put forward as having found a short cut to theology. Now this is not so. That which affords us so

much gratification, and rightly so, is rather the holiday attire of Christian thought. The idea of God's immanence is an exceedingly attractive one, but also one which needs to be employed with great reserves. Strange and contrary as it may seem, it furnishes us with less of real apprehension of God than the doctrine which it is supposed to replace. If any substitution of the doctrine of God's transcendence by that of immanence were made, it would result in a collapse of all that is characteristic of Christianity. The reason of this is plain. The language of the divine immanence is serviceable in illustrating and extending the operation of God's nature. It is of the nature of a sublime iteration of a creed which is elsewhere vouchsafed for. In itself, however, it affords almost no ground of intuition into the nature of God. The matter of great importance to the human soul is not whether God's life is streaming through nature, but whether some actual possible relation is allowed between man and God, no matter where God may be, how near or how far. If a personal relation is possible, then however far, He is near. If such a personal relation is denied, then however near, He is far. Now it was this personal relation that the men of old times sought to establish. It is this personal relation that the men of our own time seem most anxious to ignore. There seems to be an instinctive feeling of their incompatibility, for the employment of the Immanent God generally leads to leaving aside the personal God. We are quite misled by a plausible show of nearness in a physical sense, to consider that we have made no corresponding gain in nearness in the moral sense. The two, however, are utterly distinct, and are apt also to be at variance. "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." The nearness of God which we feel from a conviction of Him as an all-pervading presence is only a physical nearness. It is in terms of space, or time and space, which are very inadequately applied to a nature without man's limitations. That which it is so urgent to establish, that which it is so perilous to lose sight of, is the moral nearness of God. Is there any personal being to whom we are accountable, before whom we stand as at a Judgment day? Now this makes the tremendously practical difference in all our lives. Whether God is the immanent cause of the world's life, whether He breathes through the flushing lips of all created objects, is an idle inquiry compared with the question, Is there a being whose attitude toward me is different according as I act rightly or wrongly? This very statement is begging the question.

Right and wrong have no other meaning than social expediency, if there is no personal life knowing men singly, calling them to individual account, sitting in judgment on the way they have lived their lives. Far truer it is, indeed, to think of such a personal God as animating the whole of his creation, but the essential consideration is a moral one. The physical nearness of God, as in leaf and flower and mountain, seems child's play in comparison with the moral nearness of a God to whom we are personally accountable. Just to the extent to which the doctrine of divine immanence saves this sense of a transcendent person and judge, it will aid and inspire us. Just to the extent to which it leads us to slight the moral relation, and lose sight of it in the pretty sentiment of a transfigured and deified nature, it is a miserable curse and an idolatrous lure. In our belief in God, presence and absence, nearness and distance, *must be couched in moral terms*. For the spiritual life, the distance, the yawning gulf between what takes place objectively and what takes place subjectively is the greatest that we can think. The distance of a divine sovereign throned afar is nothing in comparison with the distance of that God who breathes through our breath, looks through our eyes, thinks through our thought, and who yet never discloses himself as a being whom we can love, and by whom we are loved, who is our Maker, Defender, Redeemer, and Friend. It is the distance from without to within, from object to subject, from matter to spirit, and greater distance than this no man can imagine. The modern poet who sings, —

"O Thou more near my life than life itself,"

may cherish a conception of God at an infinitely greater remove than the Psalmist who cried, "O Thou that dwellest in the heavens," for the Psalmist also cried, "O God, thou art *my* God."

There may be observed in this, as in all times, the almost resentful effort to escape the theology of responsibility and of human accountability. There is an ever-present danger of losing our most vital convictions as they are allowed to evaporate in a mist of words, employed, not in the interest of the conscience, but of the æsthetic faculty, in the interest not of sound thought, but of vagueness, and looseness, and ease. In its doctrine of the Incarnation, Christian theology has always aimed to satisfy the claims of the divine immanence. The one life in which the word of divine wisdom and love became flesh, and took upon it the nature of a man, was a glorified type of what had been from the beginning of creation, and the intenser witness of Him

of whom all created things might say, Thou hast been our dwelling place in all generations. But in thus witnessing to one truth, it did no violence to another and a greater. The cheat of pantheism, with its confounding of moral distinctions, has been always detected, and fought against. Pantheism in any sense in which we can conceive it is the purest outside of thought, and the suicide of theology. The doctrine of the divine immanence is not pantheism, but is a help to religion when it preserves a background of the transcendent God. Pure immanence unrelieved by the moral portrait of God sinks by its own weight, and has as little effect on life as the doctrine of an immanent ether, as an all-pervading tendency of gravitation, or the omnipresence of chemical affinities.

We cannot get rid of the idea that the essence of man's life is in conflict. The whole drift and tendency of conceptions of immanence is toward acquiescence. It may be made to serve the purposes of trust, but it has constantly to be guarded against and kept in check. It needs to be constantly reinforced by the stern language of divine judgment: "I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God." Such an expectation keeps alive the real heart of religion. The spirit is known to be within the wheels. But lose this vital heart, and there is no longer a spirit within the wheels, but only a driving mechanism, blind, senseless, and irresponsible. Our temptation is great to make our improved doctrine an excuse for a weaker sense of obligation to uphold the institutions of religion. A good deal of indifference shown to actual church needs and actual religious duties is fed by the fine doctrines of a universally diffused deity. In fact, the loosening hold is often seen by the quickness with which the vague word deity supersedes the more concrete word God. It is a great loss to religion, it is with a distinct drop to faith, if the thought of God broadens, but thins out, or if it is more generally applied, but less keenly felt.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

John Tunis.

EDITORIAL.

THEOLOGY IN THE PULPIT.

AMONG churchgoing people there is a general aversion to theological preaching. Theology seems as much out of place in the pulpit to some as politics seems to others. There is a demand for practical rather than for doctrinal preaching. There are two reasons for this aversion. One reason for it is that theological preaching is believed to be directly or indirectly controversial. It is thought to mean the defense of a set of opinions held by one denomination as against another, or by the religious as against the non-religious members of a congregation. But controversial preaching is so generally disapproved that it has practically ceased, and is now identified with theology in the pulpit only by former association and tradition.

The aversion finds its principal reason in the form which it is supposed theological preaching necessarily adopts. Doctrinal discourses are thought to consist of arguments in support of the several doctrines of Christianity and of answers to objections. A series of doctrinal sermons, if announced, would be expected to begin with the existence of God and to end with eschatology, and in each case to prove the truth of the doctrine under discussion by appropriate arguments from Scripture and reason, and to refute all objections. Such a method did prevail till a time not yet out of the memory of all, as the published "bodies" of divinity, containing the sermons of eminent New England divines, abundantly testify. Almost every clergyman was expected to preach, even if he did not publish, his system of divinity. There was doubtless an intellectual interest in those performances, on the part of certain members of the congregation, deacons and others, some of whom were themselves no mean theologians. But it must have been dreary business for the plain folk and the young people to listen to semi-popularized theological lectures. Such preaching was nothing more nor less than pulpit apologetics. In a period which had not produced the religious review and newspaper, it was perhaps necessary to introduce theological discussions into the pulpit. If doctrinal preaching must be of that sort the aversion to it is justifiable. There may, indeed, still be occasional need of argumentative discourse in direct support of the truths of Christianity, as when new theories of science are popularized and come into apparent conflict with religious beliefs. When the proposal to test the efficacy of prayer by statistics precipitated a debate in which the public became interested, a fitting occasion was presented to discuss the doctrine of prayer in the pulpit. The preacher may sometimes attempt to harmonize religion and science, and may render valuable service to perplexed minds. But if the pulpit is frequently occupied with the argumentative discussion and defense of Christianity, even against the errors of current and popular

thought, wearisomeness and unprofitableness ensue. Already the complaint is sometimes heard that the minister dwells too much on modern science. The writer once, after several weeks of traveling, attended service at an American chapel in a European city, hoping to gain some spiritual strengthening, and was obliged to listen to an account of the seven admissions of Haeckel as to the ignorance of science respecting the origin and nature of the universe. A stone was offered instead of bread.

But of theology in the comprehensive sense the pulpit of to-day needs more rather than less. To defend the truths of Christianity against attack is but the preliminary work of theology, whether in the pulpit or the lecture room. Its higher function is to exhibit the reality, the inspiring and purifying power, the spirituality of the facts and truths of the Christian religion; in a word, to exhibit Christianity as motive for realizing the true ends of life. The method may be argumentative, illustrative, experimental, or didactic, so long as it finds the correspondence of Christian truth and ideal life. If the preacher persuades his listeners that Christ has power to satisfy a spiritual need, of sorrow, temptation, or regret, and thus makes real the fitness of God's highest revelation to the life of his children, the sermon is theological even more than when he wards off some plausible objection to a supernatural revelation. To defend belief in miracles, or to defend belief in the resurrection of Jesus, so that one's objections are answered, and he can again give his assent, is of less importance than to convince him of the power of the risen Christ sending forth the Spirit, ruling in the hearts of his followers and consummating a renewed humanity. In both cases the preacher is defending the central doctrine of Christianity, but by very different methods.

A comparison was once instituted between two eminent preachers, to the effect that one began every sermon with the thought of God in his greatness, or holiness, or mercy, and always ended in some experience or need of man, but that the other began every sermon with man in some aspiration or condition of common life and always ended with the thought of God, in his love or perfection, as satisfying the need of man. One started with truth and found its correspondence with life; the other started with life and found its correspondence with truth. The first, announcing some attribute of God as his theme, might be considered a theological preacher. The other, beginning in human life, might be considered a practical preacher. But both brought theology into the pulpit, for theology is concerned with the reality and significance of God's personal relations to men.

A preference is sometimes expressed for Biblical rather than topical preaching. It is remarked that Scotch preachers, a few of whom, for that reason, occupy prominent pulpits in this country, are saturated both in preaching and prayer with truth in its Biblical forms. It is thought that this type of preaching is more useful than the type which considers

distinct topics, and which is semi-doctrinal. It is said that evangelists make much larger and better use of the Bible than ordinary preachers, falling back on its authority at every point, and claiming to be distinctive preachers of the "Word." But the process is that which we have described as theological. The truth in Biblical form is brought into correspondence with life. By illustration or appeal to experience some fact of life is established, and then an appropriate passage is quoted, and is lighted up with a new meaning by reason of the correspondence. A character of the Bible is made the subject of discourse in order to trace out analogies to present conditions. The mere citation of passages which bear on the text, and which could be readily looked up in a concordance, is not preaching at all. Biblical preaching is theological in one form, while topical and argumentative preaching is also theological, but in another form.

It may be said, however, that in this view all preaching which produces any impression is doctrinal, and that the considerations which have been urged merely remove the reproach of an epithet. But a certain impression may be made by preaching which is not theological, that is, by preaching which either does not bring out the distinctive truths of Christianity, or does not bring them into a real relation with human needs. Some sermons do not get beyond the ethical considerations which are involved in the natural relations of men, a few phrases standing for what is religious, the thought being expended on what is moral. Such preaching may have some value, as a speech on temperance may have, but is not theological, since it does not develop the motive powers of Christianity. Some sermons awaken the emotions by touching the plaintive chords of human feeling, and by recalling painful experiences, but without bringing them into harmony with God's purpose for men in the gospel. On the other hand, sermons may reiterate in accustomed phrase the principal doctrines of Christianity without making impression of reality, and without interpretation or interpenetration of truth into life. This, in fact, is the most unedifying kind of preaching, for it is wholly unreal; but that which dwells on experience and appeals to emotion has some reality, for it suggests the unexpressed postulates of religious truth.

He certainly is the true preacher who, with knowledge of life and sympathy with it, has clear, broad, and deep knowledge of Christianity in its great facts and truths, as he is the true physician who, with insight into disease, has a complete knowledge of appropriate remedies.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that one needs to know what the message of the gospel is, and therefore needs to learn all that may be learned about it. He should be intelligent concerning its historical origin and development, concerning the person of the Redeemer and the nature of his redemption, concerning the records of his life and work, and concerning all those truths which constitute the Christian religion. It is not possible at haphazard to hit upon the helpful forces of the gospel.

One must have intelligent convictions of the truth he proclaims if he would make that truth a power for the redemption of men and the renovation of society. He needs to know what constructions have been put upon Christianity by profound thinkers, what conflicts it has passed through, what are its permanent and what its transient elements, and what its adaptedness to the thought and life of his own time. He needs, in a word, a thorough theological training either in the schools or in his own investigation. The processes by which he gains conviction he need not, probably should not, reproduce in bringing the truth home to others. But what he has found by methods appropriate to his own intelligent conviction he may hope to make real to others. He who bears a message should know what the message is. To proclaim that message in its real significance, so that men shall comprehend and appropriate it, is to be in the best sense a theological preacher.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER ON THE OBLIGATION OF JUSTICE.

In the March and April numbers of "The Nineteenth Century," Mr. Herbert Spencer publishes in advance five chapters of the part of his "Data of Ethics" which is to deal with its "Principles." Their aim is to show the evolution of the sentiment and the idea of Justice, and to obtain an ideal or ultimate conception of it.

The theory is briefly this. Human justice develops out of sub-human or animal justice. The preservation of the species is a *desideratum*. This end can be secured only by conformity to certain laws of self-sustentation. These laws imply obligation. The species cannot be preserved unless the young are cared for. It cannot thrive unless its superior members have suitable advantages. The supreme principle is the well-being of the species. This requires individual sacrifice. The law of freedom comes into conflict with the law of restriction in association. Justice is the subjective appreciation of these objective requirements. In its highest conception it is the equilibrium, in a social state, of the principles of inequality and equality, of unrestricted individual activity and of the restraints imposed by organization.

We make no attempt to reproduce what is of main interest in these chapters, the ingenious description of the method in which, as their author supposes, a desire to preserve the species gives rise to the complex phenomena and final conception of social justice. Our purpose is simply to call attention to a single point, that of the element of obligation.

It so happened that Rev. J. Llewelyn Davies was moved by the same socialistic discussion of justice which incited Mr. Spencer's utterance, to read in January a paper afterwards published, in which he clearly recognized the authority of this ethical principle and advocated a theory of its nature. Both writers cited Plato's "Republic," Mr. Davies in support

of his view, that justice is "the social order which the Divine Maker creates and develops," Mr. Spencer by way of illustration of a special conception. On the appearance of the latter's chapters Mr. Davies, who had previously charged that the evolutionary philosophy of justice resolved it into that of Thrasymachus in the "Republic," namely, that justice is the interest of the stronger, found in them a distinct resemblance to this ancient view, and also maintained that Mr. Spencer had committed the curious mistake of attributing it to Plato and the Greeks generally, whereas it is only the contention of certain speakers in the dialogue who cannot be regarded as thus representative. He then proceeded to consider whether Mr. Spencer's addition to the older scheme of the postulate "that the development of the species is desired, or is to be desired," meets the demand of a truly ethical conception of justice, and said:—

"Suppose any one considering this definition—that to say a man ought to do this means that, if the interests of the species be kept in view, he will do it—were to protest, 'For my part, I care for my own interest more than for the good of the species,' perhaps what a disciple of Mr. Spencer would be inclined to say would be, Let us not reason about him, but look at him and pass on. He might suggest that such a man, if he does not take care, is very likely to find he has to reckon with the species. But how is the man to be answered from an ethical point of view? He will say, 'You teach me that my original nature moves me to serve myself, and that the only reason for my serving society is that this is a way of serving myself; I will therefore serve society just so far as I can perceive it to be for my own advantage; but, as to sacrificing myself for the benefit of others, why (as Glaucon put it) should I be such a fool?' To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Spencer, though often challenged, has never fully explained how, with his philosophy, he can take advantage of the ordinary language and sentiment of mankind about duty. He abundantly explains, with his wonderful power of analysis and his trained habit of tracing everything to its beginnings, how the virtuous feelings have come into existence. So, in these chapters, he accounts for the 'sentiment of justice,' and traces its growth. He shows how men have learned to acquiesce readily and even with pleasure in the restraints put upon their own activities by the simultaneous activities of others, and have thus been led to admire justice. First, there was fear:—

"The dread of retaliation, the dread of social dislike, the dread of legal punishment, and the dread of divine vengeance, united in various proportions, form a body of feeling which checks the primitive tendency to pursue the objects of desire without regard to the interests of fellow-men."

"Then came the influence of sympathy. Habits of association train gregarious creatures to feel together the same emotions, to find pleasure in the pleasure of others, pain in their pain. The sentiment of justice arising from sympathy is 'altruistic,' that arising from fear is 'pro-altruistic.' But, as the idea of justice is double, so will the sentiment be. It will be egoistic in claiming that our own gratifications be not needlessly interfered with; altruistic in desiring not to interfere with the gratifications of others. Who will not admit that there is a great deal of truth, if not the whole truth, in this account? But I have to repeat a criticism which I offered in my former paper. Mr. Spencer seems to me to imply what he professes not to recognize. To

construct the idea and sentiment of justice, he implies a law having authority over the human mind and its conduct—namely, that the well-being of the species is to be desired, and an acknowledgment by the human mind of that law, a self-justifying response to it. Whilst he confines himself to tracing natural evolution, he has no right to use the terms of duty. What can be added to the *dictum* of Kant, and how can it be confuted?

“If we fix our eyes simply upon the course of nature, the *ought* has no meaning whatever. It is as absurd to ask what nature ought to be as to ask what sort of properties a circle ought to have. The only question we can properly ask is, What comes to pass in nature? just as we can only ask, What actually are the properties of a circle?”

“When Mr. Spencer inveighs with genuine moral vehemence against aggression and other forms of ill-doing, when he protests, for example, against ‘that miserable *laissez-faire* which calmly looks on while men ruin themselves in trying to enforce by law their equitable claims’—he is borrowing *our* thunder, he is stealing fire from heaven.”

Mr. Davies expressed the hope that his criticism would “not be felt by Mr. Spencer, if he should think it worth while to look at it, to be inconsistent with profound and grateful respect,” and added, “But I confess I should like to provoke him—if I may say so—into some justification of the use of ethical terms by one who professes only to describe natural and necessary processes.”¹

Mr. Spencer responded at once, and his letter appeared with one containing comments from Mr. Davies. We give both letters in full:—

FAIRFIELD, PEWSEY, WILTS, July 24, 1890.

DEAR MR. DAVIES,—The copy of the “Guardian” has just reached me, and I have read your criticism with much interest. Would that criticisms in general were written in the same spirit!

I will again look into Plato to see whether I have misapprehended as you allege. I took a great deal of trouble to make out the meaning—a task by no means easy, for the discussion is an utter muddle.

Your remark that the general conception of justice set forth by me leaves us without practical applications is made in apparent forgetfulness of the fact that the five chapters published are, at the outset, stated to be preliminary chapters. The remainder of Division IV. of the “Principles of Ethics,” on which I am now engaged, is devoted to the drawing of corollaries.

In asserting the illegitimacy of any use of the words “duty,” “ought,” “obligation,” etc., you remind me of the criticisms of Mr. Lilly. By such community as exists between you, amid your differences, you are both led to the assumption that the idea of “duty” can have no other than a supernatural origin.

This assumption implies that men’s actions are determined only by recognition of ultimate consequences, and that if recognition of ultimate consequences does not lead them to do right, they can have no motive to do right. But the great mass of men’s actions are directly prompted by their likings, without thought of remote results; and among actions thus prompted are, in many

¹ *The Guardian*, July 16, 1890. For Mr. Davies’s paper, “What is Justice?” see the same, March 5. The letters we quote are taken from the number for August 6.

cases, those which conduce to other men's welfare. Though, on reflection, such actions are seen to be congruous with the ends ranked as the highest, yet they are not prompted by thought of such ends.

The relation of direct to indirect motives is best seen in a familiar case. Any normally constituted parent spends much labor and thought in furthering the welfare of his children, and daily, for many years, is impelled to do this by immediate liking — cannot bear to do otherwise. Nevertheless, while he is not impelled to do what he does by the consciousness that he *ought* to do it, if you ask the reasons for his self-sacrificing conduct he will say that he is under obligation; and if you push your inquiries to the end you will compel him to assign the fact that if men in general did not do the like the race would disappear. Though the consciousness of obligation may serve to justify, and perhaps in a small degree to strengthen, the promptings of his natural affections, yet these are quite sufficient of themselves.

Similarly is it with the idea of obligation in respect to conduct to our fellow-men. As you must know from your personal experiences, such conduct may be effectually prompted by immediate desire without thought of other consequence than the benefits given. And though these benefits are given from simple desire to give them, if the question be raised whether they should be given there comes the answer that it is a duty to minister to human welfare.

You contend that my theory of moral guidance gives me no warrant for anger against aggression or other ill-doing; saying of me that, in such case, "he is borrowing *our* thunder." This implies the assertion that only those who accept the current creed have any right to feel indignant when they see other men wronged. But I cannot allow you thus to monopolize righteous indignation. If you ask what prompts me to denounce our unjust treatment of inferior races, I reply that I am prompted by a feeling which is aroused in me quite apart from any sense of duty, quite apart from any thought of divine command, quite apart from any thought of reward or punishment here or hereafter. In part the feeling results from consciousness of the suffering inflicted, which is a painful consciousness, and in part from irritation at the breach of a law of conduct on behalf of which my sentiments are enlisted, and obedience to which I regard as needful for the welfare of humanity in general. If you say that my theory gives me no reason for feeling this pain, the answer is that I cannot help feeling it; and if you say that my theory gives me no reason for my interest in asserting this principle, the answer is that I cannot help being interested. And when analysis shows me that the feeling and the principle are such as, if cherished and acted upon, must conduce to the progress of humanity towards a higher form capable of greater happiness, I find that though my action is not immediately prompted by the sense of obligation, yet it conforms to my idea of obligation.

That motives hence resulting may be adequately operative, you will find proof on recalling certain transactions dating back some eight years, in which we were both concerned. You can scarcely fail to remember that those who were moved by feelings and ideas such as I have described, and not by any motives which the current creed furnishes, displayed more anxiety that our dealings with alien peoples should be guided by what are called Christian principles than is displayed by Christians in general. I am, sincerely yours,

HERBERT SPENCER.

P. S. Should you wish to publish this letter as my response to your appeal, I am quite willing that you should do so. Other claims on my time will, however, prevent me from carrying the discussion further.

KIRKBY LONSDALE, July 28, 1890.

DEAR MR. SPENCER, — I am much obliged to you for responding so kindly to the challenge which I ventured to address to you. You will not think it ungracious, I hope, if, notwithstanding the purpose which you intimate in your postscript, I make public some of the reflections which your letter suggests to me.

The general development of the discussion concerning justice in the "Republic" of Plato is found, I believe, by most readers clear enough. I have noted the superficial confusion, which is not really confusing, between the "justice" which Thrasymachus defines and the "injustice" of which Glaucon makes himself the temporary advocate. Some of the verbal arguments in the dialogue will seem to the modern reader hardly serious, certainly not cogent. The method which Plato invents for the pursuit and discovery of justice must be admitted to be a somewhat artificial one; but it is quite clear, whilst it is also convenient and interesting. With regard to what seems to you a mere blunder, — Plato's assumption that the principle which declares it to be just for a man to have what is his own and not to take what is another's implies that it is just that a man should do his own *work* and not meddle with another's, — I should like to add to what I said before, that Plato would never have recognized in *ownership* anything primary or fundamental on which ethical deductions could be built up. Possessions and duties alike would have been to him parts of the order in which he found justice to consist, the order of a perfect commonwealth. That a man should have anything assigned him to possess, and anything assigned him to do, would have depended equally on the man's place in the social body.

Most amply do I acknowledge the generous zeal for human welfare, the indignation against oppression, shown by yourself and others who recognize no supernatural sanction of morality. The Christianity of to-day owes much to — has, I hope, really gained much from — your own humane ardor and the bold protestations of the followers of Comte. A Christian's allegiance is not to the Christian world, not even to Christianity, but to the law of Christ and the will of the Heavenly Father; and he may as easily admit that Christians have been surpassed in Christian feeling and action by agnostics as that the priest and the Levite were put to shame by the Samaritan.

I have also no difficulty in acknowledging that the performance of good offices may arise out of sympathy and pleasure in doing them. I do not understand why "the assumption that the idea of 'duty' has a supernatural origin" should be supposed to imply "that men's actions are determined only by recognition of ultimate consequences, and that if recognition of ultimate consequences does not lead them to do right, they can have no motive to do right." I never thought of questioning that men act, in a great part of their conduct, from the motives you describe. What I wish to know is why, when the thought of duty comes in, a man should think himself *bound* to do, whether he likes it or not, what will tend to the preservation of the species. It is quite intelligible to me that you "cannot help" trying to protect other men from wrong: what I still fail to see clearly is, how your philosophy justifies you in

reproaching those who *can* help being good. It is nature, you say, that makes the thoughtful parent good, that makes the generous man sacrifice himself for the benefit of his fellow-men. But nature also makes many parents selfishly regardless of the interests of their children ; nature makes some men hardened freebooters. If they also cannot help being what they are, is there any sense, from your point of view, in saying that they act as they ought not to act ? Would they feel that you were appealing to their sense of duty if you explained to them as a fact of nature that, should other men do as they are doing, the race would tend to disappear ? To Mr. Huxley, as a philosopher, a taste for good behavior belongs to the same category as an ear for music — some persons have it and others are without it ; the question which I cannot help asking is whether that is the ultimate word of your ethics. I cannot see how a man who is made aware that he acts only from natural impulse can reasonably consider whether he ought or ought not to do a certain thing, nor how a man who knows that he acts only for the gratification of his own desires can reasonably throw himself away for the sake of any advantage to be won for others.

As I do not quite know what "the current creed" may be on the questions at issue, I beg leave to sum up my own belief as follows : The Unseen Power is gradually creating mankind by processes of development, and the human consciousness is so made as to be responsive to the authority of this Power ; justice is the progressive order which the Maker is establishing amongst human beings, and it is binding upon each man as he becomes aware of it, and is felt to be binding, because he is the Maker's creature. Believe me, very truly yours,
J. LLEWELYN DAVIES.

It may be questioned whether Mr. Davies's theory does not require supplementing. The relation of "Maker" and "creature" is insufficient. Justice is rooted in the ethical nature of God, and man is created in the divine image. Mr. Davies has done excellent service in putting a question which Mr. Spencer, we believe, will be generally regarded as not having yet answered : How can the evolutionary philosophy which he advocates claim that justice is ethically obligatory ?

THE NEW ISSUE RAISED BY THE RECENT STRIKE.

THE strike of District Assembly No. 246 of the Knights of Labor on the New York Central Railroad differs from other strikes in the absence of a tangible grievance like over-work or under-pay. The complaint on which the strike was ordered was that certain men had been discharged because they were Knights of Labor. This charge was met by Vice-President Webb, on behalf of the corporation, with a direct denial, he affirming that the causes of discharge were the usual causes, — incapacity, insubordination, failure to attend to work, drunkenness, and the like. Had Mr. Powderly, acting for the Knights of Labor, at once accepted this disclaimer on the part of the corporation, he might have made large use of it to the future advantage of his organization, although he might have seemed to surrender an immediate advantage. He chose, however,

to insist upon the question of veracity between the railroad officials and the discharged employees, and to make on this question a demand for arbitration. Mr. Webb met this demand with the reply that there was nothing to arbitrate, or rather that there were no parties to an arbitration, the men who were out on the strike having left the service of the company, and so being no longer its employees; a view which the State Board of Arbitration accepted, refusing to interfere farther than to order an investigation, which at the time of writing has just been concluded. Meanwhile the United Order of Railway Employees, to whom the Knights of Labor had turned for aid, expressed their sympathy, but declined to order a strike, on the ground that the Knights of Labor did not belong to their federation. The strike, therefore, of the local Assembly failed, and the railroad corporation, for the time being, carried its point, namely, the right to discharge its employees without giving reason for its action, and without submitting its action to arbitration.

It will be seen that the issue which has thus been raised presents a new phase in the struggle between corporations and labor organizations. And it is a very hopeful feature of the contest that the issue has been raised in advance of a general and far-reaching strike. For although such a strike may come before the question is settled, and may be necessary to its settlement, the opportunity is now afforded for the calm and broad consideration of all matters which the question involves.

The right to the absolute discharge of employees, subject only to the legal conditions of the contract, would seem to be the necessary right of a corporation, and essential to its discipline and efficiency. As Mr. Webb is reported to have said to Mr. Powderly, "to submit this question to arbitration at your demand would be tantamount to saying that you and I had better change our official stations; that the man running the Central Road just now ought to be the Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor rather than the Third Vice-President of the Central Railroad." Without doubt the charters of corporations guarantee all rights necessary to efficient management, chief of which is the maintenance of discipline. And, in corporations like railroads, whose management affects directly the public convenience and safety, discipline among the employees is of the first importance. Nothing could be more suggestive than the reference which Mr. Powderly made, in a letter of February 10th, to Mr. Lee, of Assembly 246, to the state of affairs on the Reading Railroad just before the great strike on that road: "The men on the Reading Railroad actually controlled the entire management, and had everything their own way. They grew restive, and allowed incendiary councils to prevail. *It was no uncommon thing for them to stop a train on the main track and talk to an up train, in order to settle some little matter.* That sort of thing could not last, and when they finally struck it was at the wrong time for the men, and at just the time to suit the company." The liability of such indifference and recklessness, as that

of which Mr. Powderly here reminds his subordinate, would go far to justify in the public mind the most absolute measures of discipline. Insubordination of this sort would almost inevitably lead to fatal results and become a capital offense.

But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that corporations, like railroads, which are so directly and vitally related to all public interests, can least of all afford to be arbitrary and arrogant in their management. They cannot be managed as private corporations may be, whose success or failure is a matter of less public concern, although the principles of just dealing between employer and employee apply equally to all corporate agencies. The circumstances and conditions which affect their management must be carefully considered and reconsidered from time to time. And one of the circumstances affecting the control of railroads is the highly organized condition of labor on all the great lines. There is scarcely a department of labor on the railroads which has not been classified and organized. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is now an organization of great influence and power extending over the entire country. Add to this the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, the Brotherhood of Railroad Conductors, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and the Switchmen's Mutual Aid Association, — the last four federated in the United Order of Railroad Employees, — and it is seen at a glance how compact a force is the labor employed on railroads. Of course these organizations have the right to exist, and it is folly for any railroad company to ignore their existence, or to make light of their legitimate power. Membership in these organizations will affect the attitude of the men toward their employers. They cannot longer be dealt with simply as individuals. And though the heads of these organizations cannot be acknowledged as having any right of control in the management of the corporation, they can and ought to be recognized in all those relations in which they represent the men in their respective organizations. Indeed, we believe that the honorable recognition of *organized labor* is the first step toward the reconciliation of capital and labor. Wherever this has been done, and to the degree in which it has been done, labor has become the ally rather than the antagonist of capital. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has already become a conservative force in railroad management. Other organizations will follow in this direction as they are recognized, and so gain in moral influence and power. It may be aggravating to deal with a consequential walking-delegate. It is no less aggravating to deal with an imperious agent. The personal equation counts for much, and ought to be carefully attended to; still the principle of the recognition of the rights and obligations of each party must be the final solvent of the problem. Until that is brought about naturally and fully there can be no lasting peace. When it is brought about there will be peace and harmony. The interests of capital and labor will be acknowledged to be the same. In other words,

the question is no longer the simple one of capital and labor, but of organized capital and organized labor. At least this is true in respect to capital in its larger uses, and of labor in its higher grades. And this being the fact, there must be an increasing formality in the relation between the two. Both capitalist and laborer act more and more in a representative capacity. The workman certainly has acquired a new dignity and power through his closer relations to his fellow-workmen, and must be treated accordingly.

The railroad system naturally offers the best field for the carrying on of this new and more formal intercourse between employer and employee. The railroad service requires a high grade of intelligence, it must be comparatively permanent, and it is constantly under the public eye. The public is, in fact, a partner in the railroad business, and the sympathy which it contributes is the final and decisive factor in all disputes — more decisive than money or organization. But we are convinced that there should be no third party, not even the public, to the intercourse between capital and labor. Arbitration seems to be the most available way at present for settling differences, but there ought to be a better way — by conference. Arbitration in the industrial world is better than a strike or a lockout, as it is better for nations than war, but in either case it implies antagonism between parties which cannot be settled by the parties themselves. It is the appeal to the third party, who, in many cases, may have nothing in common with the disputants. We believe that this appeal to the State, through Boards of Arbitration, ought to grow less and less frequent on the part of employer and employee, and we believe that it will, not simply as it is seen that they have common interests and a common end, but more surely when the intercourse between the two is without assumption on the part of the one or the loss of self-respect on the part of the other. And this can come about, we repeat, only by the recognition of labor organizations in their proper functions and within their legitimate sphere. If the employee thinks it worth his time and money to identify himself with a given association or brotherhood, he will never be satisfied to be ignored in that capacity, nor to have those who represent him ignored. The most significant fact in the present condition of labor is organization, just as the present fact of most significance in the Irish question is the sentiment of nationality. And no advances or concessions can succeed in the one case more than in the other which fail to satisfy these conditions.

We have ventured the hope that the duty of the State as an arbitrator may be in time superseded by the more direct intercourse between organized capital and organized labor, between the agents of the stockholders of railroads and others of the more public corporations and the representatives of workingmen's organizations. But, meanwhile, in the midst of the bad feelings which are being engendered, and the bad methods which are being used, the State has a much more serious duty imposed upon it than that of arbitration.

One part of its present duty is to afford such protection to corporations when their business is threatened or violently interrupted that they will not resort to dangerous means of self-protection. The State ought to make the employment of agencies like Pinkerton's detectives entirely unnecessary. Nothing but harm can come from such use of police power by corporations. The State cannot afford to allow such an assumption of its own functions.

Another part of its present duty is to prevent conspiracies against legitimate public business. Such an official suggestion as that of Mr. Powderly to Mr. Lee, under date of August 6th, to the effect that preparations should be made for a strike in 1892, the presidential year, or in 1893, the year of the World's Fair, "so that they will be as one man when these years come," ought to be made an indictable offense. Nothing can be so dangerous to the body politic as the reckless plottings of secret organizations. If labor organizations are to be recognized, as we believe that they ought to be, this element of danger must be eliminated, if not by the good sense of their members, by the resolute purpose of the State.

And still another part of the present duty of the State is the protection of *unorganized* labor. Non-union men have rights which not only corporations, but the State, is bound to respect. And whenever labor organizations make it a condition of return to peaceful work that non-union men shall be discharged or refused employment, these men ought to find that the State is able to guarantee to them that first of all rights — the right to work.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

I.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART II. THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND OF THE CRIMINAL CLASSES.

THE order of the advance of society in the treatment of crime and of the criminal classes is indicated in the topics which follow in alternate numbers of the "Review." See *February number*.

TOPIC 4. THE REFORMATION OF THE CRIMINAL.

"It is of little use to restrain criminals by punishment, unless you reform them by education." Pope Clement XI. (1704).

REFERENCES.

For the discussion of the subject in its *principles* see writers like Montesquieu (*Spirit of the Laws*); Beccaria (*Crimes and Punishments*); Bentham (*Principles of Penal Law. Vol. i. of Works*); Livingston (*Criminal Jurisprudence*); Carpenter (*Our Convicts*).

For the investigation of the subject in its *working details* compare Howard's Report on "The State of the Prisons in England and Wales" (1777), together with his later Reports on the Prisons of the Continent, with Wine's "State of Prisons and of Child Saving Institutions" (1880); and also Second Annual Report of the (U. S.) Commissioner of Labor (1886), Part. II. Historical Notes, and Convict Labor Laws in the United States. See also the Annual Reports of State Institutions of Charities and Correction, the Reports of the National Prison Association of the United States, the Reports of the local associations of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, and the Reports of Associations of Foreign Countries.

NOTE.

We have assumed that no advance in the treatment of crime and of the criminal classes remains to be accomplished, which can be compared with the progress already made through the organization of public justice and the creation of a humane sentiment in the administration of criminal laws. The greatest safeguard of the rights of the criminal as well as of society is a just statute. The laws which define crime and grade punishment, though apparently negative in their action, are the most effective agencies for diminishing crime in a community. Nothing defeats the end of justice so quickly or so surely as unjust, indiscriminate, or even excessive criminal legislation.

The natural outcome of the wiser and more humane criminal legislation of the present century is the science of Penology. This science is being wrought out chiefly by those at work within prison walls, but the careful study of those without into the principles of heredity and social environment is exceedingly helpful. Nothing is more assuring than the harmony which characterizes the meetings of the National Prison Associations and Congresses composed of practical administrators of the laws, judges, wardens, chaplains, and the like, and also of general philanthropists and students of social science.

SUB-TOPICS.

1. *The terms employed to represent the growth of the prison-system: Dungeon, Prison, Penitentiary, Reformatory.*

The *Dungeon*, the inheritance from tyrants, represents the arbitrary, capricious, and cruel use of personal power. It belongs to the age of Feudalism.

The *Prison*, a general term which needs definition, represents in its indefinite use a place of confinement or detention, rather than of punishment. The prison may serve for the detention of persons for other reasons than their crimes, making them the prey of the jailor. It was this feature of the use of English prisons which awakened the attention of Howard and led to his efforts for prison reform.

"The distress of prisoners came more immediately under my notice when I was Sheriff of the County of Bradford; and the circumstance which excited me to activity in their behalf was the seeing some, who by the verdict of juries were declared *not guilty*; some, in whom the grand jury did not find such an appearance of guilt as subjected them to trial; and some whose prosecutors did not appear against them; after having been confined for months, dragged back to jail, and locked up again till they should pay *sundry fees* to the jailor, the clerk of assizes, etc." *Howard's Memoirs* (Baldwin Brown), page 123.

The term *Penitentiary* indicates an entirely disciplinary end, and is

always associated with some well-ordered system of discipline and punishment.

The term *Reformatory* declares the end of prison discipline to be the reformation of the criminal. Originally applied to institutions for reclaiming juvenile offenders, it is now used to designate the work of the higher prisons, as at Elmira, New York, and Concord, Mass.

2. *The experimental stage in prison discipline.*

In England the development of the penitentiary system was long delayed by the system of the transportation of criminals. Various attempts were made to introduce reforms into the convict colonies, but the difficulties were too great to be overcome. It was not till the method of transportation had been practically abandoned that experiments at home were of avail. Of these experiments the Crofton or Irish system was the most successful, and is now the basis of the English system of prison discipline.

In the United States the method of discipline was divided between the Philadelphia or solitary system and the Auburn or silent system. In the latter, which is now almost universally adopted, the work is carried on as associated labor, but in silence.

For successful personal experiments in the management of prisoners, see instances quoted by Miss Carpenter in "Our Convicts," vol. i., chap. 3.

For an abstract of the history of prison discipline in the various countries of the Continent, see *Encyclopædia Britannica*, ninth ed., vol. xix., pp. 757-764. The history of the prison system of Belgium is worthy of special study.

3. *Established principles of prison discipline.*

(1.) The separation of the sexes.

(2.) The classification of criminals, not altogether by age or crime, but by some system of personal merit. See address of Superintendent Tufts, National Prison Congress, 1886.

(3.) Employment. The method still divided between solitary labor, as in Belgium for long periods, and in England for nine months, and associated labor as carried on in the prisons of the United States, with the exception of the State Prison in Philadelphia.

(4.) Mental and moral training aimed at the *will* of the criminal. The per cent. of intelligent criminals is largely increased with the growth of popular education, but the deficiency in moral will power is as marked as at primary stages of prison discipline.

(5.) The principle of the indeterminate sentence. This may take one of two forms. The sentence may be lessened by the systematic effort of the prisoner himself, his time being reduced by his conduct; or the sentence may be at the discretion of the warden, or of some responsible official, the prisoner to be discharged when apparently reformed.

The present English system is a system of remission of time through marks. A sentence of five years allows a possible reduction of one year and twenty-three days; of fourteen years a reduction of three years and one hundred and eighty-one days. Those who are sentenced for life may have their cases brought forward at the end of twenty years and reconsidered on their merits.

The system of remission has been incorporated into the American method of prison discipline, when the principle of the indeterminate sen-

tence at the discretion of the court or the warden does not take its place. Not all prisons are conducted in such way as to make the indeterminate sentence practicable. If the prison life is not a reforming agency the convict is no better prepared for release at the end of ten than of five years.

The advantages of the indeterminate sentence have been enumerated as follows by Superintendent Brockway of the Elmira Reformatory:—

(a) The indeterminate sentence substitutes in the mind of the prisoner the idea of correction for that of punishment.

(b) It contributes to the deterrent principle the idea of certainty as opposed to that of severity.

(c) It centralizes the duty and responsibility of determining the date of the prisoner's release.

(d) It centres upon the warden the cure of the criminal instinct in the prisoner and his restoration to society.

(e) It facilitates the release of the prisoner at the best point of time and under the best circumstances.

(f) It surrounds the strength of legal liability after his release.

Condensed from address of Superintendent Brockway before the National Prison Association, Toronto, 1887.

4. *Unsettled questions affecting prison management.*

1. The method of convict labor. Three methods are in use in the prisons of the United States.

(1.) The lease system, by which the convicts, all or in part, are leased to a contractor at a stipulated sum, the contractor to meet all expenses connected with the management and employment of the prisoner. This system obtains chiefly in the Southern States, where out-of-door work can be carried on, is the most remunerative of all, and is the most detrimental to the prisoner.

(2.) The contract system, by which the contractor engages to employ a certain number of convicts, the State furnishing power and machinery, the work to be carried on within the prison walls. This system is generally employed in the Northern and Western States, but is opposed by many advocates of prison reform, and also by labor organizations, on account of its interference with the labor market. The system is modified by what is known as the piece-price plan, which keeps the work of the convicts under the immediate management of the prison, the contractor simply furnishing the material and receiving back the product at a given price per piece. The reformatory effects of this modified form of the contract system are good, but the modification is no more satisfactory to the labor organizations than the original system.

(3.) The public-account system, by which the State carries on the work of the prison as if it were an industrial concern. This method is satisfactory to all parties in its ideal workings, but is considered by many impracticable through the difficulty of finding wardens who are also good manufacturers.

See Second Annual Report of the (U.S.) Commissioner of Labor, 1886, *Convict Labor*; Report of National Prison Association, 1884; Report of National Prison Association, 1886.

2. The treatment of the habitual or incorrigible criminal.

See address by Professor Simeon Baldwin, American Social Science Association, 1885. Also address of Professor Francis Wayland, National Prison Association, 1886. Continued in remarks at Association, 1887. The Ohio law quoted with modification and approved in address of 1886.

3. The use of the pardoning power. Where should it be lodged and how executed? See Report on this question in Proceedings of National Prison Congress, 1884.

5. *The English and American methods of prison discipline compared.*

The English system is uniform. It allows imprisonment for two years in a local prison, the treatment in the general like that which attends a longer term. When the imprisonment is for a longer term it is termed penal servitude and the prisoner is termed a convict. The sentence for penal servitude consists of three distinct stages.

(1.) A probationary period of nine months of separate confinement and work. The convict has communication only with the prison staff, though he may exercise and attend chapel in the presence of others.

(2.) The period of associated labor, which covers the remainder of the term, subject to the possible remission of time of which notice has been taken.

(3.) The "ticket of leave" period, during which the convict is free under certain conditions which have to do with his after conduct. Any violation of these conditions remands him to prison to serve the balance of his sentence.

The American system varies with the usage of the different States. We give references to the present law in New York, passed in 1889, as embodying the most advanced views in prison discipline:—

Laws of New York, 112th Session, 1889. Chap. 382.

ARTICLE 1. Of the government and maintenance of state prisons, the officers connected therewith, their powers, duties, and compensation.

ARTICLE 2. Of the disposition, discipline, and instruction of prisoners.

Section 74. Whenever any male person over sixteen years of age shall be convicted of a felony which is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, for a term to be fixed within certain limits by the court pronouncing sentence, the court authorized to pronounce judgment upon such offender, instead of pronouncing upon such offender a definite sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for a fixed term, may pronounce an indeterminate sentence in a state prison for a term with minimum and maximum limits only specified, without fixing a definite term of sentence within such limits named in the sentence, but the maximum limit so specified in the sentence shall not exceed the longest period for which such offender might have been sentenced, and the minimum limit in said sentence specified shall not be less than the shortest term for which such offender might have been sentenced. The maximum term specified in such indeterminate sentence shall be limited in the same manner as a definite sentence in compliance with the provisions of section six hundred and ninety-seven of the Penal Code.

Sections 75-83 have to do with the release of prisoners upon parole, and the return of prisoners who violate their parole.

Section 84. It shall be the duty of the agent and warden of each of such prisons, so far as practicable and necessary, to appoint as keepers of such prisons persons qualified to instruct the prisoners in the trades and manufactures prosecuted in such prisons or in other industrial occupations. Instruction shall also be given in the useful branches of an English education to such prisoners as in the judgment of the agent and warden and chaplain may require the same and be benefited thereby. The time devoted to such instruction shall not be less than an average of one hour and a half daily, Sunday excepted, between the hours of six and nine in the evening, in such room or rooms as may be provided for that purpose.

ARTICLE 3. Of the labor of prisoners.

Section 95 provides for the grading of prisoners for work in three classes, corrigibles, those more or less incorrigible, and incorrigibles.

Section 98 fixes the time of daily labor, Sundays and holidays excepted, at eight hours, and declares the object of prison labor to be partly production and profit and partly industrial training and instruction.

Section 102. The system of productive labor in each of said prisons shall be either the public account system, or what is known as the piece-price system, or partly one or partly the other of such systems, as the Superintendent of state prisons shall determine. By the public-account system is meant the system by which the State furnishes machinery and material for the labor of the prisoners and markets the products of such labor thereon. By the piece-price system is meant the system by which the State receives payment for the products of the labor of the prisoners upon materials and machinery furnished by the person making such payment or furnished partly by such person and partly by the State.

Section 108 determines the compensation which the prisoners may receive — not in any case to exceed ten per cent. of the earnings of the prison or reformatory — and regulates the distribution of such surplus among the prisoners.

Section 115, 4. The sum of five hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purchase of materials and machinery for manufacturing purposes in the state prisons of the State, and for all purposes connected with the industries to be carried on therein under the provisions of title two of chapter three of part four of the Revised Statutes as hereby amended.

For explanation of the provisions of the law given above, see article by Prof. C. A. Collin, "Andover Review," November, 1889.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

II.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE official report of the recent International Labor Conference in Berlin,¹ held under the auspices of the German emperor, deserves wide circulation, both as indicating a transfer of governmental interest to social questions and as containing a large body of suggestions for economic legislation upon which the governments of Europe are agreed. Conferences of workmen are common, but a conference of governments, with two exceptions (Switzerland and France) monarchical, to devise legislation in behalf of the laboring class is interesting if not epoch-making. It will certainly give to thought and effort a tendency toward the real problems of our time, that is, how to decentralize the culture and comfort of our marvelous civilization. Nor does it indicate a socialistic tendency, unless one characterizes as socialistic all effort in behalf of the many, that is, democracy. None but a *laissez-faire doctrinaire* can object to suggestions for social legislation that fall far short of the actual legislation of Great Britain and the States of the Union upon these subjects. The delegates of Great Britain and Switzerland would have gone much farther, while others thought these resolutions too stringent; for example, Belgium in regard to child labor, and France in respect to Sunday labor. For the less advanced states of the Continent, therefore, these conclusions will mark their degree of backwardness, and serve as an incentive to social legislation that is certainly conservative enough. The resolutions were separated for voting purposes. Most of them were adopted unanimously,

¹ *Die Protokolle der internationalen Arbeiter-schutz Konferenz.* In Amtlichem Auftrag. Leipzig: Verlag von Dünker und Humblat. 1890.

others by a majority. Of course they are only recommendations and have force only as such. It is not too sanguine to expect them to be embodied in the legislation of all civilized countries within a few years. We regard the suggestions of the final section as particularly important, and likely to be fruitful of great and beneficial results. Modern statistics permit modern legislation to be scientific when in the hands of scholarly, trained statesmen rather than demagogues. Democracy is, however, always in the presence of its deadly foe, — class legislation for the sake of the votes of a class. The translation is as literal as sense will permit: —

I. REGULATION OF LABOR IN MINES.

It is desirable, —

1. (a) That the minimum age for admitting children to underground labor in mines be gradually raised to fourteen years, as experience shall establish the possibility of such a raising of the limit. For the southern countries this minimum age would be twelve years.

(b) That underground labor be forbidden females.

2. That the duration of labor be limited in cases in which mining engineering cannot succeed in obviating all dangers to health arising from the natural or accidental conditions of the industry in certain mines or branches. It is left to each country to bring about the result by laws or decrees or through agreement between the employees and employers, or in any other way that corresponds to the maxims and usages of each nation.

3. (a) That the safety of the laborer and the healthfulness of labor be assured through all means known to science, under the supervision of the state.

(b) That the engineers intrusted with the conduct of the industry be exclusively men of experience and trained technical capacity.

(c) That the relations between the miners and mining engineers be as immediate as possible, to impart confidence and mutual respect.

(d) That there should be a constant extension of institutions which are intended to elevate the lot of the miners, and to attach them to their calling, provident and charitable institutions organized in harmony with the customs of each country, and calculated to insure the miner and his family against the consequences of sickness, accidents, premature disability, old age, and death.

(e) That strikes should be carefully avoided in order to insure an uninterrupted supply of coal. Experience seems to make it certain that the best preventive lies in employers and miners voluntarily undertaking to appeal to arbitration in all cases where their differences cannot be settled by direct agreement.

II. REGULATION OF SUNDAY LABOR.

1. It is desirable with the exceptions and respites necessary in each country, —

(a) That every week one day of rest be assured to persons under legal protection.

(b) That a day of rest be assured to all industrial laborers.

(c) That this day of rest be fixed upon the Sabbath for persons under legal protection.

(d) That this day of rest be fixed upon Sunday for all industrial laborers.

2. Exceptions are allowable, —

(a) In industries which demand an uninterrupted production upon technical grounds, or which provide the public with essential commodities, necessarily manufactured daily.

(b) In industries which, by their very nature, can be followed only in certain seasons, or are dependent upon the irregular activity of elementary natural forces. It is desirable that even in these cases, each workman should have every other Sunday free.

3. To regulate these exceptions from similar standpoints it is desirable that the various countries come to an understanding about them.

III. REGULATION OF CHILD LABOR.

It is desirable, —

1. That children of both sexes who have not yet reached a certain age be excluded from labor in industrial occupations.

2. That the age limit be fixed at twelve years, with the exception of the southern countries where it shall be lowered to ten years.

3. That the age limit be the same for all industries and no discrimination made in this respect.

4. That the children previously satisfy the requirements of the laws in regard to elementary instruction.

5. That children who have not yet finished their fourteenth year be forbidden to work nights and Sundays.

6. That their effective labor should not exceed six hours, broken by a recess of at least half an hour.

7. That these children be excluded from unhealthy or dangerous occupations, or admitted to them only under certain protecting regulations.

IV. REGULATIONS OF THE LABOR OF YOUTHS.

It is desirable, —

1. That youthful laborers of both sexes work neither nights nor Sundays from their fourteenth to their sixteenth year.

2. That their effective work should not exceed ten hours daily, broken by a recess of an hour and a half in all.

3. That exceptions be allowed for particular industries.

4. That limitations be established for occupations that are particularly unhealthy or dangerous.

5. That protection be afforded to young men from their sixteenth to their eighteenth years in regard to, —

(a) Maximum day's work.

(b) Night labor.

(c) Sunday labor.

(d) Employment in particularly unhealthy or dangerous occupations.

V. REGULATION OF THE WORK OF WOMAN.

1. (a) It is desirable that girls and women should not work nights from their sixteenth to their twenty-first year.

(b) That girls and women over twenty-one should not work nights.

2. That their effective labor should not exceed eleven hours daily, broken by recesses of at least one hour and a half.

3. That exceptions should be permitted in certain industries.

4. That there should be limitations in occupations that are particularly unhealthy or dangerous.

5. That mothers should not be permitted to work within four weeks after their confinement.

VI. EXECUTION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE.

1. In case the Powers should approve of the labors of the Conference the following regulations are recommended:—

(a) The execution of the measures adopted in each state shall be superintended by the needful number of peculiarly qualified officers nominated by the government, and independent both of employees and employers.

(b) The yearly reports of these officers, published by the various governments, shall be communicated to the other governments by them.

(c) Each of these states shall from time to time publish statistics covering the questions considered in the Conference as nearly uniform as possible.

(d) The states convened shall exchange these statistics as well as the text of laws or decrees which treat of the questions under consideration.

2. It is desirable that these international conferences be repeated in order to exchange observations covering the execution of these conclusions of this conference, and to inquire whether it is expedient to alter or complete them.

D. Collin Wells.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. *Senses and Intellect.* By JAMES MARK BALDWIN, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Lake Forest University. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1889. Pp. 343.

This is a manual of much excellence, thorough and scientific in matter, and in its earlier portions, though not all the way, in method and presentation as well. The Introduction, in three chapters, deals with the Nature of Psychology, Psychological Method, and the Classification and Division of Psychical Phenomena. Part I., in the two chapters, Consciousness and Attention, canvasses the general characteristics of Mind. Part II., on the Intellect, takes up the remainder of the book. The matter here is treated under two grand topics, The Apperceptive Function and The Rational Function. The former, the Apperceptive, embraces Presentation: two chapters, Sensation and Perception; Representation or Memory: two chapters, Retention and Reproduction, Recognition and Localization; Combination: three chapters, Association, Imagination, Illusions; and Elaboration or Thought: one chapter. To the Rational Function is devoted but a single chapter, the fifteenth and last. On each of these rubrics the author shows a deep mastery of the thought, and presents it in original and lucid speech. Half the work betrays remarkable expository power, but in this there is a falling off in the second half. Mr. Baldwin is acquainted with the best works and latest researches in psychology, English, French, and German, and easily follows Herbart, Wundt, and Lotze through their most intricate analyses. References to the best literature, new and old, are a feature of the work,

and would alone give it high value. Baldwin is no materialist, no associationist, but he gives due recognition to the great writers of those schools, and does not hesitate here and there to follow them. We know of no psychology which so conclusively as this upholds the reality of an immaterial personal agent, while frankly and yet consistently admitting all known facts touching its dependence upon the animal frame. A very strong chapter is the fourth, on Consciousness, where the author points out, quite rightly as we believe, though against McCosh, to whom he is much indebted, and nearly all other psychologists, that consciousness and self-consciousness are not always the same, that, on the contrary, there are cases of consciousness, as in awaking from a swoon or from the influence of nitrous oxide, of which the ego-idea for the time forms no part. The treatment of Apperception, in the same chapter, is striking and truthful. In arguing another point, namely, that there is no such thing as unconscious mental activity, the author seems to be less happy. In chasing Bain, Wundt, Lewes, and the rest through their devious argumentation, he perhaps forgets the force of what is nearer home, the case of sleep, in which he admits (p. 61) that we are ordinarily unconscious. If, then, consciousness is the "necessary condition and abiding characteristic of mind" (p. 58), what and where is our mind when we (?) are in a dreamless sleep? Do we misunderstand the exposition here? It is a terribly difficult and perplexing subject. A few other inconsistencies relate to matters too insignificant for detail. Were we to criticise aught else it would be the general order of topics in the volume. It is the usual one, and perhaps the best. It has often seemed to us, however, that, as feeling is the fundamental element in the psychological life, and as the very first act of knowledge involves rational and discursive processes, a strictly synthetic method would handle Feeling, Reason, and Understanding before Sense-Perception. Sober, patient, clear, and correct is the section on Space, in Chapter VIII., and the same might be said of many another had we time to specify. Old textbooks upon psychology or mental philosophy, so radically has the science advanced of late, are good for nothing. Fortunately we have several new ones that are valuable, a series which began with President Porter's great work, "The Human Intellect," and includes the able treatises of Dewey, Murray, and Bowne. Baldwin's falls worthily into this list. It is less polemic than Bowne's and, on most points, equally clear, — which is saying much, — though nowhere so succinct or so sprightly. While it shirks no difficulty, it is not, like Lotze's "Outlines," merely a book of tough points.

E. Benj. Andrews.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

PERSONAL CREEDS ; or, How to Form a Working-Theory of Life. By NEWMAN SMYTH. Pp. 210. Cloth and paper. Charles Scribner's Sons.

"How, amid the diversities of beliefs and unbeliefs in the world, shall I gain a living, personal creed? How shall I form my working-theory of life?" Is not this anxious question often asked in these times? It is most simply and helpfully answered in these sermons in which Dr. Smyth has undertaken to tell us, not, as too many preachers have done, *what* to believe, but that far more important matter, *how* to believe.

His answer briefly is this: If you would have a creed of your own, —

one to live by and to die by, — you must begin with something, however elemental, which has *reality for you*, and from this simple beginning, where you can say, 'This at least I do believe with all my soul, follow on into the larger truth. "We must always begin with something which we can and do believe with all our minds and hearts, or we shall never come to any high and large faith worthy a man's confessing." "Let a man knock resolutely at any door of moral truth until it be opened to him and he will pass into a whole realm of truths. Through whatever particular gateway or window, or over whatever wall of difficulty a man once gets fairly into the moral world, all things in the moral universe become his." "The first thing that we need to be about, if we really wish to win a creed for ourselves, is to go and hunt through our experience until we come to something, however simple, to which we must and do say: 'I see that to be true; I believe that; I can trust in that.'" "In the initial part of the process it matters not so much what the particular thing is which a man may find to believe; the first essential thing for any man who wishes to live a strong life and to do a man's work in the world is to find something somewhere in his experience of which he can say with all his mind and heart: That I must believe or deny my own soul! Whatever else is shapeless, this is rock beneath my feet!" "And it were better to lay now these foundations, though the workman fails before he dies to build the whole Christian house of faith upon them; it were better to build upon this rock of moral truth, than to put together a whole Christian confession, spacious and pretentious, with nothing but the sands at the foundation of it."

I have quoted freely from the first sermon, on "Moral Beginnings," because it strikes the keynote of the following discourses. The formative principle of them all is this: If you would have a firm grasp of heavenly truths you must get hold of them, to use Dr. Smyth's vigorous expression, by near ends. Just how we may do this is skillfully and vividly indicated in the succeeding discourses. The second sermon shows us how, in accordance with the principle already stated, to get into personal touch with Christ. "The first real thing for us to do if we would gain a personal Christian creed, is to do what Peter and the other disciples did, — go and live awhile with Jesus Christ." This we may do, for example, by the resolute attempt to live with Christ in either his truthfulness, his humility, or his unselfish service. "You may never gain any true understanding of the Son of man, whatever you may think about the Christ, if you are content to seek him as those scribes did who stood around in Jerusalem discussing his miracles, or those people who ran after him from Capernaum to get some loaf or fish from his gift. There are ways in which we surely cannot learn who the Son of man is. But any one of us may know the Christ, even as Peter came to his confession of him, if we will seek, in some real particulars, at least, to live with Christ in his spirit, day in and day out."

The third sermon unfolds more fully the principle that heavenly truths are to be apprehended by their nearer ends. "This is the reasonable way of learning what we can of the doctrines of Christ." It is the vital way of gaining a real theology. And in defending this way the preacher indignantly exposes the folly of teaching that men must believe "the longest and fullest summary of Christian doctrine, with the same definiteness, clearness, and precision of belief," as if "each separate part were necessary to the whole and doubt as to the least portion imperiled everything."

"Men are led to suppose that they must believe a whole table of doctrines, and be as sure, for instance, of some dogma concerning the future life, as they may be sure of the existence of God," — a very palpable hit.

"But evidently the Bible is not a nautical almanac by which on any sea we can make precise calculations of the heavens. Certainly the Bible is not a definition of God, or a complete map of his decrees, or a perfect system of block signals and interlocking switches all along the way of salvation. The Bible is not equally clear, definite, authoritative, concerning all the doctrines." "Certainly, if a man disregards the earthly side of divine truth which he should know, although he would have us subscribe to some theological map of the heavens, of which he may have the agency in the churches, he but deceives himself, and the truth is not in him."

There are a good many sly allusions of this sort scattered through these sermons, but they are made so dexterously that they do not distract attention from the more serious purpose of which they are a little aside.

How to make God a Reality in our lives — a real Presence, — a very different thing from intellectual belief in a First Cause, — is the theme of the fourth sermon. We may know God through the thinking, willing mind, the conscience of man, the love of the human heart, and the Christ in history.

The fifth sermon approaches the doctrine of the atonement by familiar paths of human experience, and will lead those to whom the conventional theories of atonement have little reality into a fresher, more satisfying thought of the divine forgiveness. That our life contains in itself the assurance of its immortality — that "noble, unselfish sacrificial life is its own hope and love its own security" — is the conclusion of the sermon, entitled, "Jesus' Argument for Immortality."

The sermon upon Retribution is a suggestive study for preachers. The future life is spoken of with reserve and reverence; the preacher is not wise above that which is written, and yet he succeeds admirably in making the thought of retribution real, and bringing it home to conscience and life. Would that every one who has a horror of Dr. Smyth's "dangerous speculations" might read this sermon! Its tone and temper may be inferred from one sentence: "I would rather gain for myself, I would rather a thousand times lead some other man into a profound sense and conviction of the worth of a soul, and the tremendous possibilities that lie before it on its endless way, than be able to persuade the whole intellect of Christendom to assent to some word of doctrine or speculation which may seem to me reasonable or Scriptural concerning the world-ages to come. For to succeed in doing the former would be to imitate the Lord Christ in his moral teaching concerning the hereafter."

Little space is left to speak of the last sermon, "Points of Contact between this Life and the Next," which is not least happy in its attempt to lay hold of heavenly truths by their nearer earthly ends. Starting with this life's real worths, we are led into real thoughts of the eternal life; the lines of human relationship lead us to heavenly places. "The points of worth in life are the points of outlook into the heavens. The worths of temporal things belong to the eternal. For heaven surely cannot be poorer than earth. How near and real the heavenly truth seems! how sacred and significant becomes the commonest earthly experience when we discover that the nearest way to the one lies through the other!"

Enough has been said of these notable sermons to indicate their spirit and purpose. Their note is *reality*, and that surely is to say that they are good sermons, for no sermon that lacks reality — and alas! how many do! — is good; and no sermon that has the merit of reality fails of being good; that is, of doing good. Men want, I take it, *real* preaching — sermons that get hold of heavenly truths “by their near ends.” This volume of sermons is bound together by this one purpose: to make divine truth more real to men; and any man who “would honestly like to know what to think and to believe” will find them exceedingly helpful. Are there not many such, who cannot believe everything and yet would gladly believe something? Pastors will find this book very useful to put into the hands of many of their people (it is published in a handy inexpensive paper edition), and some of us, also, may learn from it for ourselves a wholesome lesson in homiletics.

Charles H. Cutler.

BANGOR, ME.

AN AMERICAN COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. Edited by ALVAH HOVEY, D. D., LL. D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. GALATIANS TO COLOSSIANS. The same. THESSALONIANS TO PHILEMON.

These two volumes complete the series of commentaries upon the New Testament, begun by the American Baptist Publication Society fifteen years ago. The society may well congratulate itself upon the completion of what it terms “this memorable work,” and the venerable editor, and all who have labored with him, will receive the thanks of the Christian public for their patient and faithful labors.

It is certainly an encouraging evidence of the growth of Biblical learning in our country that one denomination can find within its ranks such a company of scholarly men as have participated in this work. There may be, also, certain advantages and utilities in a commentary prepared by men of one definite phase of doctrinal belief, and intended mainly for those who are in agreement with them. Yet it must be admitted that the interest of one who is not in this particular fold is somewhat diminished when he is definitely informed that the work is designed for “the members of our [the Baptist] churches and the laborers in our Sunday-schools,” though he, too, is not entirely forgotten, as being among “the students of the Bible in general.” A commentary which is ostensibly of the Baptists and by the Baptists and for the Baptists seems to ignore the fact that “no prophecy of Scripture is of private interpretation.”

There is, however, in this frank statement a kind of sincerity which goes far towards compensating for the narrowness which it implies. The reader knows at once from what point of view the Scripture is approached, and what interpretations of doubtful passages will be defended. With hardly an exception he finds what he expects to find. Probably no other denomination could have summoned seventeen men to such a task who would have differed as slightly as the seventeen who have written this commentary, or would have given so little occasion to the general editor to qualify or correct the views advanced. In these two volumes, covering ten epistles, and written by six authors, the only material points of difference noted relate to the persons addressed in the epistle to the Ephesians (compare Eph. page 9 with Col. page 56), and, perhaps, the

views of the apostle concerning the time of Christ's second coming (compare Phil. page 55 with 1 Thes. pages 16, 26), and the only place where the general editor has felt it necessary to enter his caveat relates to Dr. Dargan's advocacy of the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship (Col. page 15).

We are taught, then, in these volumes, as we had been clearly forewarned we should be taught, not only that there is but one form of baptism (Eph. page 61), that infant baptism is not permitted (Gal. page 50), that there is no historical connection between circumcision and baptism (Col. page 31), and that the congregational order is the only one supported by the New Testament (Eph. page 67, Titus, page 129), but also that these epistles are without error in doctrine or in argument (Gal. pages 44, 45, 46,), and that the New Testament requires us to accept "the entire Pentateuch, in all its essential facts and in all the forms of expression it employs" "as authentic and historic" (1 Tim. page 36); though it is admitted that the Apostle may be mistaken when he affirms that he knows what the future has in store for him, "for in such matters Paul was left to the same means of knowledge as ourselves" (Phil. page 22). The doctrines of original sin (Eph. page 35) and of the perseverance of the saints (Eph. page 38) are confidently defended, and the possibility of repentance after death is dismissed with the phrase which has of late become so familiar that, "save in that passage of doubtful meaning in 1 Peter iii. 19, there is nothing whatever in the New Testament to warrant or even suggest [it]" (Eph. page 64).

Dr. Pidge's protest against the translation, in the Revised Version, of *σπλάγγνα* by "tender mercies" will command the approval of many; but it is surprising that he indorses Trench's distinction between *ἐρωτάω* and *αἰτέω*, which Dr. Ezra Abbot has so completely disproved.

These volumes, like those that have preceded them, are neatly printed on good paper, and the proof-reading is careful and usually accurate. The price of the complete set is sixteen dollars.

William H. Ryder.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By the late REV. WILLIAM HENRY SIMCOX, M. A., Rector of Harlaxton. New York: Thomas Whitaker.

Every reader of this instructive little book must feel deep regret at the untimely death of the author, who did not live to see it through the press. The work was, however, faithfully completed by the author's brother. It consists of an attempt "to indicate, not exhaustively but representatively, the points wherein the language of the New Testament differs from classical and even post-classical usage; to classify such differences according to their origin; and thus to vivify the study of purely verbal grammar, and bring it into connection with wider intellectual interests and sympathies." (Page v.)

The book cannot fail to accomplish this purpose. Not only is it full of information, the fruits of wide and careful reading, but it reveals and must inspire a sincere respect for Biblical Greek. On the fitness of Hellenistic Greek for the uses of Biblical writers, the author says, "If there be any point in which the designs of Providence are obvious to man, it is that this language, with all its characteristics and with all the historical events that gave rise to them, was specially designed as an instrument for making the New Testament known to the world." (Page 18.)

"It is true that the half-Hebraised Greek of the New Testament is neither a very elegant nor a very expressive language; but it is a many-sided language, an eminently translatable language." (Page 20.)

The extent and limit of the influence of the Hebrew upon the language of the New Testament is thus clearly and justly stated: "Biblical Greek, like Biblical and even modern English, has been brought under Hebraising influence through translations of the Old Testament; but as a rule each language has only assimilated as much Hebraism as was in harmony with its own nature; it is only in such writings as the Apocalypse and parts of St. Luke's Gospel, that we get anything more." (Page 85.)

The author's enthusiasm for grammatical studies does not prevent him from seeing the plain limits of grammatical exegesis. In his preface he says, "It will appear that I take a large view of this liberty of the non-grammarians, that I look for little gain to theology, and hardly any to devotion, from the minute verbal study of the language of the New Testament." (Page vi.) This thought is never lost sight of and is frequently repeated, for example: "There is something that the diligent scholar can learn from study of the Gospel in the original; but he must beware of overrating its importance, which is but slight compared with what any diligent reader can learn from study of any decently faithful translation. There are cases, though few, where a passage has its beauty and significance heightened by a shade of language that vanishes in translation." (Page 21.) This may be an over-bold statement, which needs to be somewhat toned down; but all will assent to the same doctrine when thus stated: "Exegesis is a higher thing than grammar. Grammar may be a valuable servant to theology: but the earth is disquieted for a handmaid that is heir to her mistress." (Page 49.)

So far as opinions are expressed concerning the precise meaning of New Testament grammatical forms and idioms, there seems to be little to dissent from. The notes upon the relation of the aorist and the perfect (page 105), upon the use of *ἵνα* (page 176 f.), and of *οὗ* and *μή* (page 181 f.) are especially judicious. On the other hand, the note on *αὐτός* (p. 60 f.) does not seem to be quite as decisive as it might have been. It seems doubtful whether this and the pronouns of the first and second person are always emphatic when expressed, "as subject to a finite verb." (Page 53.) Throughout the book the influence of Aramaic and of colloquial Greek does not seem to be fully recognized.

The book is written in clear and remarkably concise English, though some expressions sound a little queer, at least to an American; as, for example, "We get it [the dative case] used very vaguely, where one can only gloss it 'in relation to.'" (Page 81.) "Whether it be possible or no." (Page 49.) "A mixture of the two got established in Hellenistic usage." (Page 193.)

The editing and proof-reading seem to be carefully done. Only two typographical errors have been noted (pages 66, 139), and these are easily corrected.

William H. Ryder.

THE FOURFOLD GOSPEL. The Four Gospels, consolidated without alteration in a continuous narrative, presenting the Life of Christ in the order of its events. The text, arranged in sections, taken from "The Bible Work," vol. i., N. T. By J. GLENTWORTH BUTLER, D. D. New York and London : Funk & Wagnalls.

This book, as its title-page indicates, consists of a condensed harmony of the four Gospels; the sections are arranged according to the apparent order of events, and, when the records seem parallel, only one report is printed. Dr. Robinson's Harmony is followed, with a few changes, only one of which is of much significance, namely, the combination of John xii. 3-6 with Matt. xxvi. 6-13, which Robinson regards as the reports of two events.

Such an arrangement of the fragmentary records of the life of Jesus tends to give vividness to the evangelical history, and will thus serve a useful purpose, provided it is read with due caution. The usefulness of the book would have been considerably increased if its compiler had suggested, in his preface, that while the general course of our Lord's life is easily traced in the Gospels, the order of particular events and the times and occasions upon which many of his words were uttered are involved in much doubt. A scholar like Dr. Butler may be so familiar with this as to forget that some may use his book with the impression that his words are to be taken without qualification or abatement when he says, in his preface, "The words of the Four inspired Biographers are here woven into a single continuous narrative, giving a complete and connected view of our Lord's life and ministry. With the complete detail of every transaction, parable, and conversation, . . . each event or saying will be more satisfactorily studied and better understood."

William H. Ryder.

LIFE OF HARRIET BEECHER STOWE. Compiled from her Letters and Journals. By her Son, CHARLES EDWARD STOWE. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1889. pp. xii. 530.

Mrs. Stowe's life has been almost as picturesque as her genius, so that her biography turns up as easily under the hand of the biographer as a mellow soil under the plough. The distinctness of local divisions, also, is a great help. Connecticut, Cincinnati, Brunswick, Andover, Florida, rounding off in Connecticut again, give dramatic variety and dramatic unity. And the cloud which has fallen on mental apprehensions while the spirit is ripening underneath is the assurance that the chapters are complete. Yet the filial biographer has doubtless had his weariness and perplexity in choosing among his wealth of material. The latter part of the book gives the impression, interesting as the selections are, that there might be several sets equally so. To us, the letters from John Ruskin give the most piquant accent to the correspondence which fell upon her after the sudden rising of the sun of her genius.

The unreservedness of Mrs. Stowe's individuality shows itself the same in her books and in her life and letters. Instead of crossing her genius, it is an essential part of it. The reason of this is, that it is an unreservedness of humility, faith, and charity. This makes it thoroughly receptive and representative. She has gathered out of New England life, through the alchemy of her sex and her heart and her emancipated apprehensions, that inner sweetness which is more thoroughly characteristic

of it than of most other regions, to judge from all that genius brings out of others. Even being what she was, she could not have done this, had she not been developed out of the inmost stock of New England life and religion. She might have been blighted from her birth under the pharisaic robes of a cold and cultured liberalism, or have been cased in an inhuman rigidity which even she could not have broken through. In either case we should have had an able woman, but there would have been no Harriet Beecher Stowe. And there was granted to her also the whole perfected round of womanly joy and sorrow.

Mr. Lowell, in a letter given here, notes it as remarkable that, while her portrayures of plantation-life must necessarily lack detailed accuracy, "Uncle Tom's Cabin" has been read with enthusiasm by numbers in the South. He rightly gives this as a proof that she has struck through to essential humanity, so that even those who would naturally have been sensitive to faults of local coloring perceive their insignificance here. The book is, indeed, true to the heart of humanity, for it is pervaded by the presence of the Son of man. It is no wonder she was told that it had given back the gospel to the French peasantry. One of the best things for France is, that "Uncle Tom's Cabin" is even yet more constantly read there than any other book from abroad, notwithstanding the utter loss of all the picturesqueness of patois. "The boys means well, but they's powerful car'less. That ar's what troubles me." We remember to have seen this rendered in a French version: "The boys have good intentions, but they are exceedingly negligent. It is that which gives me concern."

As to the question of local coloring, we do not remember, in the few Southern criticisms that have come under our eye, to have seen the defect of this dwelt on. The present writer was brought up during most of his childhood in the border South, and he can detect no false notes. This, however, is not plantation-life. At all events, whatever local coloring may be lacking, there is an immense amount present. Nothing is more characteristic than the sister's description of Mrs. Stowe as visiting a Kentucky place and remaining apparently in an utterly unobservant brown study the whole time, to reproduce afterwards the whole dusky troop, from Black Sam to the little monkey Amanda. It was the same trait that was so often surprising the wives of married students at Andover, who would fancy that she hardly knew of their existence, until some delicate act of remembrance would show that she had discovered their intimate wants.

When two ladies forming such an angle of vision as the queen and Harriet Martineau unite in setting "Dred" above "Uncle Tom," what are we poor sinners to do? Miss Martineau declares the material more rich and substantial. And she is quite right in saying that Mrs. Stowe's main defect is on the artistic side. Undoubtedly in "Uncle Tom's Cabin" the ropes often creak. But we beg still to count among the plebeian multitude who are most deeply moved by that which most deeply moves mankind as a whole. The other books are, comparatively speaking, "of private interpretation," but Christ appeared and spoke immediately in Uncle Tom. And there is no book which shows more convincingly that He is as completely at home in his nineteenth century as in his first.

When the great afflatus had subsided, Mrs. Stowe wisely reverted to her native soil of New England. We do not count "Agnes of Sorrento,"

never having had the nerve to open it. Mr. Lowell, Mr. Ruskin, and others write letters very judiciously praising and criticising "The Minister's Wooing," with its triple advantage of a New England scene, a more digested artistic completeness, and a carefully meditated portraiture of character. Mr. Ruskin not unreasonably objects that the minister is rather too great a simpleton for the best effect, and is as much exasperated that something dreadful does not befall Mrs. Scudder as Queen Victoria, it appears, was that Tom Gordon, in "Dred," is not annihilated. The poor novelist must sometimes feel like Jupiter, when he had to slam down his trap-door upon the crowd of incompatible petitioners. Mr. Lowell gently intimates, apropos of Aaron Burr, that Mrs. Stowe is not peculiarly happy on the velvet floor of the salon. It seems curious that in "Oldtown Folks" she has lapsed on to a distinctly more trivial level in her presentation of Burr than the earlier one. But the later published is perhaps the earlier in fact.

We can hardly help wishing that "Sunny Memories of Other Lands" had been presented to the world in no greater fullness than that in which they are given here. Mrs. Stowe was very human, and it must be owned that she lost her head a little when the whole peerage was at her feet. Thackeray, we remember, confessed that two dukes would do as much for him. Her slighting mention of Highland farms turned into sheepwalks shows that, as was inevitable, there were forms of oppression into which she could not fully enter. Who can into all, especially if friends of illustrious rank and merits have preoccupied our sympathies, and the question has undoubted complications? Mrs. Stowe's perceptions and sympathies were broad and primitive, peculiarly suited to the great cause which she was called to turn from something which it was "bad form" to mention into something whose vibrations could no longer even be muffled out of drawing-rooms. Yet it is hard to say what she might have done in more intricate questions, when we see how delicately subtle, on occasion, can be her analysis of character. And when she analyzes the character, she still leaves us the person, which is more than a good many novelists of high note do. But her kindly enjoyment of the ampler world that opened upon her after a life of struggles is something we cannot quarrel with.

It is interesting to see in this *Life*, how curiously George Eliot seems divided between her pride in Mrs. Stowe as a woman and a genius, and her embarrassment in her presence as a Christian. Mrs. Stowe is nothing if not a Christian, whereat George Eliot seems timidly perplexed. It is a relief to turn to Mrs. Browning.

Whether Mrs. Stowe was wise in allowing the confidences of Lady Byron to transpire through her may be doubted. The virtuous would want to forget, and the world of wickedness would of course be moved to savage vindictiveness that its hero had been brought below the level of effectiveness for evil. And so the biographer appears to think.

Macaulay, towards the end of his life, said that his literary criticisms were something that he was ashamed of. He pronounces "Uncle Tom's Cabin" to be probably the most powerful addition America has made to English literature. But he sees in it only a gloomy, Spagnoletto-like work. He seems wholly insensible to the noble panoramic sweep, to the various and delicate beauties of description, both of nature and humanity, and to the radiance of faith and love glorifying its darkest parts. However, this is simply unappreciative. It was reserved for rulers of

the synagogue among us to denounce as anti-Christian that Christian miracle through which Christ said again: "The Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God." Happily these were only the blasphemies of the minor part.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Moralphilosophie. Eine wissenschaftliche Darlegung der Sittlichen, einschliesslich der rechtlichen Ordnung. Von Victor Cathrein, S. J. Erster Band: Allgemeine Moralphilosophie. Pp. xv, 522. Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau, Zweigniederlassungen in Strassburg, München, und St. Louis, Mo. Mrk. 7.50. — Moral philosophy, according to the author, includes natural law and the philosophy of law. Law centres in justice, the most essential feature of the moral constitution. The fundamental principles of law and morals are the same. In their broad and proper sense ethics and moral philosophy are convertible terms. The proper method is the empirical and speculative combined. General metaphysical principles must be recognized alongside of the facts of experience. Bare data alone are meaningless. The mind must grasp, interpret, and arrange them according to its own nature. Universal history furnishes the most impressive facts for the moral philosopher. All races and conditions of men known to us possess a moral system, — general prescriptions recognized as binding. Among all peoples these precepts are, in general, the same. In a supplement, on the moral views of the chief civilized and barbarous nations of the world (pages 449–521), the author makes clear the force of his position. This is an invaluable feature of the work. The succinct outlines of ancient systems and the rich literature involved, in connection with the fact at present that there is no published work on the general subject, renders this part of the work of special service to the student. Of the old civilizations ten are noticed; of barbarous peoples selections are made from Asia, Africa, Oceanica, North, Central, and South America. What is the significance of such facts of experience and history? The answer furnishes the elementary principles, the elaboration of which constitutes a moral system. These fundamental and universal principles are not innate but arise necessarily, in experience, from the nature of the mind. The chief sources of ethics are three: (a) The natural reason, in experience, furnishes such principles as those of identity — contradiction, cause and effect, etc. (b) History, internal and external, personal and universal, separates the general and permanent from the particular and changeable elements in human nature. (c) Revelation, though not strictly a source of ethics, cannot be overlooked by the Christian philosopher as it strengthens, broadens, and clarifies the results of reason and experience by fixing attention upon the source of all truth. These three sources are one harmonious revelation. "Moral philosophy is the best apology for Theism and consequently for

Christianity." The author's system centres in rational Theism, and maintains that a moral system unsupported by Theism is impossible. This general position is almost diametrically opposed to the current evolutionary ethics which the author has not failed to visit with destructive criticism. It appears that the author has succeeded in fixing solidly his foundations. Certainly he has history as well as the most learned anthropologists on his side, and, what is quite as important in an ethical system, he is able to make clear the nature of moral distinctions and consistently indicate the sanctions of moral prescriptions. Systematically, the work shows eight parts. The object of ethics is moral conduct; but to know conduct we must know men both physically and psychically. Thus the first and second books treat the fundamental principles and suppositions relating to moral goods. The third and fourth books consider moral goods in themselves and discuss the various principles that have been posited for ethics. The true principle is that of the rational nature of man which presents for elaborate study a natural moral law (Book V.) and conscience (Book VI.). The phenomena which accompany or spring out of moral conduct, namely, rewards and punishments, are the subjects of the seventh book, while moral law in general is the subject of the final book. This has a vital relation to the foregoing books, and makes the transition from general ethics to special and applied ethics which is to form the second volume of the work. The book is written with great care, and shows the author's mastery of the entire range of his subject. Among other valuable features of the work is the presentation and criticism of the leading moral systems of ancient and particularly of modern times. This is especially notable with reference to the Kantian, Evolutional, and Positive schools. From an apologetic point of view the work is an elaborate answer to the various systems of moral skepticism. We know of no single work on moral philosophy that is likely to be found more serviceable to the Christian teacher.

Geschichte der Philosophie nach Ideengehalt und Beweisen. Von Prof. Dr. Baumann. Pp. iv, 383. Mrk. 7. — Among contemporary writers on philosophical questions Professor Baumann stands in the first rank, both from his numerous publications and the critical ability by which they are characterized. The present work is a philosophical view of the history of philosophy, bringing the root principles of the various systems into clear view while preserving the continuity of the whole. The systems of Materialism and Identity appear to the author without form and void, and he points out in several places their radical defects. The work falls into two main divisions, first, the history of ancient philosophy with an appendix on the oriental; secondly, the history of modern philosophy, with an abstract of the patristic and scholastic philosophies. The various characteristics of the Greeks are derived from their sociability, the more stern, practical, and spiritual elements coming in upon the conquests of Alexander. This seems to overlook the crabbed superstition that centred in Athens from the earliest times and discharged itself against her most notable philosophers. Greek sociability does not appear to have been of much higher order than that which prevailed in Babylon. It is held that neither Egypt nor Assyria furnish a philosophy in the strict sense of the word. The definition of philosophy by which the author conditions his work is: "dass Philosophie das Wissen ist, welches von den obersten Ursachen und Principien der Dinge gesucht wird, wobei der Begriff des Wissens selbst durch die Merkmale der

Allgemeinheit und Notwendigkeit näher bestimmt wird." This rigid definition, although it allows a contribution from India and China, would if strictly applied exclude many systems that now find a place in the history of philosophy. Applied to the history of philosophy as a unit the definition is exceedingly serviceable in determining the character of the component parts and the extent of our acquisitions in pure philosophy. This is the invaluable service which the work renders. The work as a whole is clear and concise, covering the whole trend of thought to our own day. There are certain features of the work which are specially noticeable for clearness, — such are the representations of Plato, Aquinas, and Leibnitz; the relation of Christianity to the development of modern philosophy and the value of the Germanic spirit in the service of an ideal. Of living philosophers Spencer is the only one noticed. The following restrictions are made upon his system. The derivation of *a priori* ideas through transmission is irrelevant, as there is neither time nor point where *a priori* knowledge can be deduced from experience. His derivation of religion overlooks many considerations. The evolution of the internal from the external is clearly refuted by the history of mankind. He has solved none of the difficulties in the supposed transition from the inorganic to the organic, or from the physiological to the psychological. His "Absolute" is only an expression for the deficiency of our knowledge, something like the Kantian "Ding an sich." Professor Baumann's work is well adapted for general use either as a text-book or an introduction to the study of philosophy.

Die Altchristlichen Bildwerke im Christlichen Museum des Laterans. Untersucht und beschreiben von Johannes Ficker. Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Kaiserlich Deutschen Archeologischen Institutes, mit zwei Tafeln und drei Abbildungen im Texte. Pp. iv, 214. Leipzig: Verlag von E. A. Seemann. — If the work needs any other recommendation than the name of the author it is found in the name of de Rossi, under whose eye and assistance it has been made. It furnishes a most excellent classification and description of the rich contents of the Lateran Museum, which from the time of Benedict XIV. has grown to one of the most valuable archæological collections extant, a collection which neither the student of history nor art can afford to overlook. The work is arranged according to the galleries of the museum and the numbering of the pieces. It thus becomes a complete and indispensable guide to the collection. It is also a comprehensive handbook to the minute study of the subject. The expositions are clear, and the references to literature numerous. It is also a source of light on the beliefs and customs of the early Christians. Much of the Catacomb life lies open before us. Two hundred and fifty-six monuments and eighty-eight frescoes are described. The work is thoroughly furnished with indices, namely, of all subject matter, of inscriptions and monograms, of the places of discovery, and of copies of the originals.

Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens. Ein Lehrbuch der Erkenntnistheorie in Grundzügen von Dr. G. Heymans. Erster Band: Allgemeiner Theil und Theorie des mathematischen Denkens. Pp. viii, 270. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz. Mrk. 6. — The work has a double purpose: first, to the novice it is a text-book to the theory of knowledge; secondly, for the initiated it is a treatise on method. In both of these aims the author is successful. The style is clear and precise beyond ordinary text-books on the subject. The arrangement is

natural and comprehensive, making plain the way to the more difficult questions of logic. The open and time-worn questions are succinctly stated, while the main stress of inquiry centres upon the questions of the relation of psychology to the theory of knowledge. Leading theories are discussed in the course of the systematic treatise, which place the problems firmly in the mind. After an admirable introduction which opens the nature of the theory of knowledge, the work is divided into two parts: first, formal logic which seeks to determine the simple judgments that lie at the foundation of knowledge, and, second, the special part that determines the laws according to which complex judgments arise from the simple. The special part here is concerned with the mathematical sciences. Mill's view of mathematics as an empirical science and of numbers as meaning nothing in themselves is rejected. The discussions as to the nature of mathematical axioms, and of space and time, are clear-cut features of this part of the work. Concerning method, the author seems to adopt the logic of Aristotle in its essential features, supplementing its defective induction with the Kantian Erkenntnistheorie. But this groundwork is given a new exposition. Induction and deduction are two aspects of the one true method. The mind furnishes *a priori* principles to which we may attribute certainty. In building up true knowledge both analysis and synthesis must be in continual use much the same as in chemistry. We regret that our space does not allow a notice of the author's criticisms of the various theories concerning the elements of knowledge and his valuable discussion of the criteria of knowledge.

Immanuel Kant und die Grundlagen der christlichen Religion. Von Lic. Theol. Dr. Wilh. Koppelman. Pp. xii, 113. Gütersloh: Druck u. Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. Mrk. 1.80. — The author stands upon Kantian ground and presents his master's theory of religion in a clear and favorable light. From a comparison of the ethical principles of Kant with those of Christianity we find essential harmony. The categorical imperative is the Golden Rule, the condition of its practice is, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," the ethical dynamic is the Johannine conception of the truth, the highest good is "the kingdom of God," while Pauline rationalism furnishes the background of the ethical and religious doctrines of Kant. From this point are considered Kant's views of faith in God, of sin, of the need of grace, of the revelation of the grace of God in Christ, and of the Christian Church. The conclusion reached is that Kant's semi-hostile relation to the dogmas of Christianity is not a necessary result of the ethical and religious principles of his philosophy. "Considering the relation of Kantian philosophy to Christianity one may assert that there is not only internal harmony, but also that Christian dogmatics, in their last analysis, suppose a theoretical foundation, the principles of which agree with those of Kant." The author has succeeded admirably in relieving many of the obstacles and contradictions which stand in the way of such a conclusion. There is one objection, however, that seems not sufficiently explained. Kant holds that the regeneration of man must proceed from himself and, again, that man is depraved, — radically evil. The logical conclusion would be that regeneration is impossible. But Kant holds the reverse, namely, that a spark of life in man is respect for the moral law, which through education shall dominate the whole life. Here inquiry should have been made into Kant's doctrine of education, which, by maintaining as a cardinal prin-

ciple that "Nature can be trusted to find for herself the best way," gives a second contradiction to his doctrine of human nature and shuts out the prospect of regeneration. It is true that Christianity is the only sufficient answer to Kant's main principles and questions, but it is not clear that Kant would have assented to such an issue. The apparently insuperable difficulty is to reconcile Kant with himself. The treatise is exceedingly well made, and will be found very serviceable in the study of the constructive work of a great thinker.

Glauben oder Wissen? Eine Untersuchung über die menschliche Geistesseinheit auf biologischer Grundlage. Von Prof. Dr. Karl Fischer. Pp. v, 60. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. Mrk. 1.20. — Professor Fischer proceeds from the standpoint that the foundations of all our knowledge, even the most exact, are suppositions which may be accepted or rejected. This is as true in mathematics and natural science as in speculative philosophy. Every science walks by faith, rests upon faith. After the nature of man is determined according to biological principles and made clear by illustration, the author answers two important questions: What is the relation of (1) Science and what of (2) Christianity to these biological principles? The results of this twofold study are summed up in a final chapter. The essay is characterized by clear and sharp exposition, furnishing a great amount of very serviceable material in a very short space.

Wegweiser zur Quellen und Litteraturkunde der Kirchengeschichte. Eine Anleitung zur planmäßigen Auffindung der litterarischen und monumentalen Quellen der Kirchengeschichte und ihrer Bearbeitungen. Von Lic. Dr. Eduard Bratke, Professor der Kirchengesch. an der Universität Breslau. Pp. vi, 282. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. Mrk. 6. — The work is limited to what is regarded as the best literature on the subject in question. The enormous growth of book publishing renders the composition of a thoroughly satisfactory manual of literature in any large department very difficult. This difficulty is augmented when we come to consider the sources of church history. In Germany alone the publications of the year 1888 number 17,000; in the year 1700 they were but 978. In an introductory essay, pages 1–38, the value of a methodical guide-book to the sources and literature of church history is considered, and many features of historical science are suggestively indicated. The main purpose of the work is to fix, critically, certain main lines, and to indicate the literature which bears directly and profitably upon them. This heuristic character of the propædæutic is well sustained both in the expositions and selections of literature. The citations, numbering 1,844, are perhaps too closely confined to Germany. The main section, pages 39–265, is systematic and comprehensive in its treatment of the sources and methodical handling of church history, first in general, then in particular. The closing chapter reviews the remaining literature which illustrates and supplements the general science. The usefulness of such a work, joined with its recent date and its heuristic method, will undoubtedly give the book a favorable reception especially among students of theology and church history.

Die Staatslehre der christlichen Philosophie. Von Julius Costa-Rossetti, S. J. Pp. iii, 91. Fulda: Druck u. Verlag der Fuldaer Actien-Druckerei. Mrk. 1.50. — It is believed that early Christian philosophy furnishes a complete system of civil government, of politics and law. The theory of the state found a prominent place in the ethical and theo-

logical writings of the Scholastics, especially of Aquinas and Suarez. Distinctions, such as between the state as society and as political power, between public and private happiness, between material and spiritual goods, as well as the nature and limits of political power, were drawn with accuracy. The author shows how the Christian theory of the state differs on the one hand from the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, and, on the other, from the celebrated theory of C. L. Haller, who antagonized Rousseau with a purely artificial theory. The Christian philosophy is a mean between these two extremes, holding that rights are not derived from God immediately, but mediately as the author of nature in which rights are immediately founded. The reason gives *a priori* principles and axioms which furnish the foundations of all institutionalism. The study is exceedingly interesting and serviceable, especially as correcting certain crude views of civil society which are sometimes attributed to the Scholastics.

Der Materialismus. Gewürdigt durch Darlegung und Widerlegung. Von G. M. Schuler. Pp. iii, 294. Berlin: Druck u. Verlag der Germania, Actien-Gesellschaft für Verlag u. Druckerei. Mrk. 3.—A popular and very serviceable exposition of the character of materialism. The eighteen chapters of the work treat of as many phases of this enemy of institutions. The work shows wide reading, and, by its references and quotations, is a very good compendium of the literature of opinion on the subject. The positions of materialists are for the most part represented in their own words, while the arguments which are brought against them are drawn from philosophers, statesmen, and ecclesiastics. The author has shown great skill in the arrangement of his material, and brings it to bear upon points in question with much force. The aim taken throughout the work is not merely to combat a doctrine, but to show, in the words of Aquinas, that "the being of God is not an article of faith but a truth of the reason." The literary qualities of the work furnish pleasure with instruction.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

BAD LIEBENSTEIN, GERMANY.

